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 Introduction 
 
1    Everyday rights struggles 
One can say, perhaps with some exaggeration, that the discourse of human rights has become 
pervasive in contemporary politics. As is widely acknowledged, the language of human 
rights, especially after the end of the Cold War, has been the lingua franca of moral and 
political claim-making. The labor movement, civil rights movement, feminist movement and 
LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) movement attest to the efficacy of the 
language of human rights. At the same time, the notion of rights is frequently invoked in 
various contexts and practices ranging from the foreign policy of powerful states to the 
activism of international NGOs, from indigenous movements and even to advertisements.
1
As 
well as the diversity of the contexts in which the notion of a right is invoked, there is also an 
increasing diversity in the objects of rights (what those rights are rights to) such as the right to 
holidays with pay, the right to peace and recently the right to be forgotten.
2
   
This ‘success’ of human rights in the sense of its popularity in public discourse 
(bolstering divergent aims ranging from the political ends of global powers to emancipatory 
aims of social movements to marketing aims of advertisements) is paradoxically accompanied 
by the ‘failure’ of the philosophical analysis of human rights which is characterized by 
persistent disagreements about the moral content and political efficacy of human rights. While 
                                                          
1
 For example in his Nobel Peace Prize Speech in 2009, President Obama emphasized the centrality of human 
rights in US foreign policy stating “Agreements among nations. Strong institutions. Support for human rights. 
Investments in development. All these are vital ingredients in bringing about the evolution that President 
Kennedy spoke about.” Accessed on 30 December 2014 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize. In a totally different area of life, the commercial for Sanex deodorant 
declared our underarm skin has three fundamental rights. The ad is available here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gWw7VCXWHhE&feature=player_embedded (Accessed on 8 January 
2015). 
2
 In its ruling of 13 May 2014 the European Union’s Court of Justice said: “On the ‘right to be forgotten’ : 
Individuals have the right - under certain conditions - to ask search engines to remove links with personal 
information about them. This applies where the information is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant or excessive for 
the purposes of the data processing (paragraph 93 of the ruling). The court found that in this particular case the 
interference with a person’s right to data protection could not be justified merely by the economic interest of the 
search engine. At the same time, the Court explicitly clarified that the right to be forgotten is not absolute but 
will always need to be balanced against other fundamental rights.” European Factsheet on “The Right to be 
Forgotten” ruling (C-131/12). Accessed on 6 January 2015 at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf. For the sake of simplicity, I use the term ‘rights’ to 
mean ‘human rights’ in this introduction. As the dissertation proceeds it will become clearer how the term ‘right’ 
needs to be qualified to count as a human right. The increase in the number of items in the lists of human rights, 
which is sometimes called the inflation of rights, is problematized by philosophers. See for example, James 
Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 92–93, 175. 
different and sometimes divergent notions are proposed as the underlying moral premises of 
the idea of human rights such as universal human interests, dignity, freedom, or basic 
capabilities, there is at the same time persistent skepticism about the philosophical coherence 
and political efficacy of the ‘rights talk’. This skepticism is raised by both supporters and 
opponents of human rights discourse. Supporters are concerned about the inflation and 
consequent debasement of human rights language whereas opponents of rights discourse are 
critical of the whole framework of rights talk because they believe it is individualistic or that 
it reflects and sustains existing forms of dominance.
3
 
One striking feature of this debate about the morality and political efficacy of human 
rights, which initially inspired this dissertation, is the absence from the theoretical discussion 
of human rights of the voices of those who are claiming their rights. When theorists propose 
arguments for and against rights or when they try to envisage a future for rights in 
contemporary theory and politics, they do not usually do it from the viewpoint of those who 
struggle for rights. Where are the humans in all this talk about human rights? Who is the 
subject of human rights? We are familiar with the idea of universal human rights belonging to 
all people but what does it mean for actual people, with flesh and bones, in their everyday 
practices to have those rights? 
An immediate objection to my concern that the voices of those involved in rights 
struggles are absent from philosophical discussions might take the following form. Scholarly 
work in general takes and arguably should take a neutral standpoint which treats social 
phenomena as neutral data for systematic observation and philosophy is not an exception to 
this rule. In addition, political theory is different from real politics: it is concerned with 
abstract moral principles and values, hence with political ideals removed from empirical 
contexts, whereas real politics is about strategic behavior, winning elections, political 
feasibility, etc. Political theory takes and should take a neutral position with respect to real 
politics and instead be concerned with abstract principles that inform the policies. For 
instance, Swift and White argue that not all urgent practical problems are philosophically 
interesting since what is wrong with the most serious problems in the world is often obvious; 
in those cases the values and principles at stake are so stark that there is little normative 
interest for philosophical discussion.
4
 They give the example of sex trafficking; although it is 
a problem of great importance there is not much room for political theory to contribute 
                                                          
3
 I will examine the critique of the whole framework of human rights in chapter 5. 
4
 Adam Swift and Stuart White, “Political Theory, Social Science, and Real Politics,” in Political Theory: 
Methods and Approaches, ed. David Leopold and Marc Stearns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 49–69. 
towards any interesting analysis regarding to sex trafficking. The values at stake are clear and 
it is unlikely that many normative theorists will be found defending the practice. One can, 
along these lines, claim that rights struggles might be urgent and important but that they 
nevertheless are not philosophically interesting, as it is obvious at the level of normative 
principles that all people should enjoy human rights. One may therefore draw the conclusion 
that including the voices of people engaged in rights struggles does not make a difference or 
improvement to theorizing about human rights.  
My response to such objections proceeds along two lines. Firstly, it is not the only 
position in philosophy and even in science that a neutral stance is and should be taken. One 
can deny that such a neutral position can and should be taken with respect to practical issues 
and problems in societies. Secondly, it is not always the case that philosophically interesting 
questions are only those related to the policy implications of abstract political and moral 
theories. Political theories, as Swift and White also acknowledge, can also devote more 
attention to how individuals or groups of individuals react to already existing policies rather 
than to questions of what policies should be pursued by the government. In rights struggles, 
about which I will say more soon, people react to already enacted government policies by 
making a claim that those policies violate their rights. 
Within rights struggles, people claim in their everyday practice that they have such-and-
such rights when they face a serious threat to their exercising those rights. These struggles are 
characterized by outrage raised by some based on the claim that their rights are violated. 
There is conflict and contestation over whether people are justified in claiming that they have 
those rights. In other words, the human in human rights appears on stage when there is a 
struggle over rights. This dissertation is a philosophical engagement with that initial question. 
It is about human rights and the ways in which the idea and language of human rights are used 
in real-life rights struggles. By real-life rights struggles I mean political conflicts and 
contestations during which claims against the political and social order are made in the 
currency of rights; both as a resource for critique (basic rights are violated) and as goals to be 
pursued (everyone should have those basic rights and they should be in place).  
Let me give an initial sense of real-life rights struggles with the some examples of 
conflicts in which claims are made in terms of (human) rights: 
In the late 90s, as part of a larger, nation-wide, privatization project prompted by pressure 
from international financial institutions, the Bolivian government sought private investor 
financing to improve the water supply system infrastructure.
5
 Shortly thereafter, officials in 
the city of Cochabamba in Bolivia sold its municipal water company SEMAPA to the 
transnational consortium Aguas del Tunari, controlled by the U.S. company Bechtel. Bechtel 
increased water rates for SEMAPA customers to $20 USD monthly, a 35 to 50 percent 
increase.
6
 This high rate of increase in water prices combined with a local law extending 
Bechtel’s control of water resources to the city’s southern expansion and surrounding rural 
communities (regions outside SEMAPA jurisdiction) triggered a series of demonstrations and 
protests taking place in the city of Cochabamba between December 1999 and April 2000. A 
diverse group of civilian protestors coordinated their response to these policies in a movement 
that framed water privatization as a violation of basic human rights. The Bolivian government 
responded to the citizen protests by terminating the privatization concession and restoring 
government control over the water supply system in Cochabamba.
7
 While some have decried 
this case as an illustration of the inherent flaws of privatizing water-supply systems, others 
have charged that its failings were in application, not in theory.
8
 The Cochabamba Declaration 
that arose out of the water crisis confirms, however, that some communities consider water to 
be a basic human right, and not purely an economic good.
9
 
The next two examples of rights struggles are from Turkey. The first one is the right to 
housing struggle of a group of residents of Dikmen Valley in Ankara who have been refusing, 
from 2005 to the present day, to leave their dwellings to facilitate the implementation of an 
urban transformation project in the area. They are claiming that ‘people have a right to 
                                                          
5
 Erik B. Bluemel, “The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water,” Ecology Law Quarterly 31 
(2004): 965–966. 
6
 Ship Bright, “Privatization, Globalization and Economic Water Scarcity.” September 21, 2009. Global Fresh 
Water. http://shipbright.wordpress.com/2009/09/21/privatization-globalization-and-economic-water-scarcity 
(Accessed on 8 January 2015).  
7
 See Geraldine Dalton, “Private Sector Finance for Water Sector Infrastructure: What Does Cochabamba Tells 
Us About Using This Instrument?,” School of Orienteal and African Studies (SOAS) Water Issues Study Group, 
Occasional Paper No. 376 (2001). Available at https://www.soas.ac.uk/water/publications/papers/file38380.pdf. 
(Accessed on 8 January 2015). 
8
 See, e.g. Dalton, “Private Sector Finance for Water Sector Infrastructure.” 
9
 See Juan Miguel Picolotti, “The Right to Water in Argentina” (2003), available at 
http://www.righttowater.info/wp-content/uploads/argentina_CS.pdf (visited 8 January 2015). See also 
Cochabamba Declaration, Adopted by the participants in the Conference, “Water, Globalization, Privatization 
and the Search for Alternatives, Cochabamba, Bolivia December 8, 2000. (“Water is a fundamental human right 
and a public trust to be guarded by all levels of government, therefore, it should not be commodified, privatized 
or traded for commercial purposes.”), available at 
http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/imf/bolivia/cochabamba.htm#declaration. (Accessed on 8 January 
2015). Although international human rights law has not yet created legally binding obligations on States to 
recognize a human right to water, it has served to pressure some States into more fully developing a human right 
to water. The water-stressed countries of South Africa, India, and Argentina all provide a right to water, derived 
from constitutions, statutes, judicial interpretations, and, in some instances, international human rights 
instruments. For a comparison of these domestic experiences for the implementation of the right to water, see 
Bluemel, “The Implications of Formulating a Human Right to Water,” 977–985. 
housing’ and that they are and will be fighting for this right. Another example is the resistance 
of a group of workers of TEKEL (the former state-owned enterprise of tobacco and alcoholic 
beverages) against the loss of their pay and social rights due to a change in their contracts of 
employment after the privatization of the TEKEL enterprise. In December 2009, workers of 
the enterprise from 21 cities across Turkey gathered in Ankara, the capital city, occupied one 
of the city’s central squares and lived in makeshift tents for 78 days and campaigned in the 
streets for their rights to a decent job.
10
 
These are just some examples of the many contemporary conflicts in which a rights claim 
is raised. They are instances of heated political situations in which a group of people protests 
against the policies imposed on them, claiming that those policies are unjustified and violating 
their basic rights. They protest by making an explicit or implicit rights claim (right to water, 
right to housing, right to work, etc. either as a supplement to another human right i.e. right to 
life or adequate standard of living, or as a separate human right).  
The participants in what I have called everyday rights struggles—situations of social 
conflict and contestation in which a demand for human rights is made or an outcry is raised 
that the rights of some are violated— face this question of what it means to have such-and-
such rights and the efficacy of rights talk for social change in their day-to-day political 
practice (perhaps implicitly and provisionally). These people take the policies and conditions 
imposed on them by the political authorities to be illegitimate and violating their basic rights 
(to work, to adequate housing, etc.) and they protest against those policies. For the people 
participating in these rights struggles, the question of whether they have those rights is a 
question of lived experience, a question asked in practical contexts or situations. They face 
the question of whether they are justified in claiming those rights in practice. What does it 
mean that a person (or a group of people) is justified in claiming a right? This is the first main 
question of this dissertation.
11
  
However, posing the question what people assume when they claim that they have a right 
in their day-to-day political practice, raises a second question in view of the philosophical 
                                                          
10
 For a more detailed discussion and references of the last two cases of rights-struggles in Turkey, see chapter 1.  
11
 One can argue that there are in fact two questions here: 1) what it means to struggle for rights or claim them in 
practice and 2) when these claims are justified. Are these, perhaps, separate questions? As it will hopefully be 
clearer as I proceed, by seeing the struggles for rights as practices of justification, i.e. asking for justification, 
denying bad justifications, asking to be part of the justification process, etc., I aim to combine the two questions. 
From the perspective of participants in the rights-struggles, the instance of making right-claims and its 
justification are not separate questions, although they can be separated from the perspective of the theorist. I aim 
to perceive these two questions as one (two-tiered) question, first from the perspective of participants in rights-
struggles as to what it means to have, claim or ask for rights and second from the theoretical perspective of 
whether these claims are justified. 
literature on human rights. A standard classification in the human rights literature is to make a 
distinction between the naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights. Adherents of 
the naturalistic conception take the philosophical task to be providing an account of the 
nature, justification and content of human rights as part of the best available moral theory. 
Within the naturalistic approach the question of ‘whether there is a right to X’ is a question to 
be answered in theory by finding the right principles or ‘existence conditions’12 of that right 
and thereby providing a theoretical justification of human rights norms. On the other hand, 
defenders of the political conception claim that this dominant perception of the philosophical 
task as one of providing a justification of human rights norms is irrelevant to, or even distorts, 
international human rights practice. However by the practice of human rights, these theorists 
mostly refer to the place of human rights within international law and doctrine rather than the 
practice of people involved in rights struggles.  
This dissertation is an attempt to explore the possibility of an alternative to these two 
dominant ways of understanding human rights. So, the second main question of this 
dissertation is: can questions about the nature, content and justification of human rights be 
taken in a different philosophical manner than the two dominant positions such that it better 
illuminates real-life struggles? And what difference does it make if we do so? My criterion of 
‘better’ is accounting for the social struggle aspect of human rights, and in order to make the 
struggle aspect more specific I test different conceptions against the aforementioned cases, 
namely the struggles around housing and labor rights. By ‘the social struggle aspect of human 
rights’ I refer to the invocation of the idea of human rights in social struggles as instruments 
or ‘weapons’ used for resisting forms of oppression and/or exploitation. I do not deny that one 
can have a conception of human rights tailored for serving purposes other than accounting for 
the struggle aspect of human rights. One can argue that the naturalistic and political 
conceptions have different purposes such as accounting for the moral essence of human rights 
and the international role of human rights respectively. The claim I will defend in this thesis is 
that if one has as one’s main purpose to account for the social role of human rights and their 
invocation within emancipatory struggles, then political and naturalistic conceptions are not 
well suited to the task. I claim that a democratic account of human rights which grounds 
human rights on the right to justification interpreted as one that entails a right to resistance, 
instead, can account for this social role of human rights.  
                                                          
12
 For a more detailed discussion of ‘existence conditions’ of human rights, see chapter 2. 
2    In defense of a democratic account of human rights 
Before setting out my way of addressing these questions in the present dissertation, let me 
sketch, by way of introduction, two dominant philosophical conceptions of human rights: the 
naturalistic conception and the political conception. These are two broad strategies of 
understanding the role of philosophy with respect to the idea of human rights, that is, to 
provide an account of the nature, content and justification of human rights. According to the 
naturalistic perspective, human rights are perceived as pre-institutional claims that all 
individuals have against all other individuals in virtue of being human. This view emphasizes 
the moral aspect of human rights in the sense that human rights are (a subset of) moral rights 
articulating particularly weighty moral concerns, especially valuable goods or interests that all 
human beings have. Human rights are derived from some basic features and interests of 
human beings which are intrinsically valuable and essential although these essential features 
and interests that ground human rights differ among different naturalistic theories. This way 
of perceiving human rights as ‘rights people have in virtue of being a human’ is a well-
trodden path; the idea of natural rights has a long history and this line of thinking is the 
dominant one in contemporary political philosophy concerned with human rights (taken for 
instance by contemporary political philosophers such as Alan Gewirth, James Griffin and 
John Tasioulas as I show in chapter 2). 
The purportedly alternative political conception of human rights, on the other hand, takes 
the nature of human rights to be claims that individuals have against certain institutional 
structures, in particular, modern states. The political conception stresses the political-legal 
aspect of human rights and it starts from the role human rights play in international doctrine 
and practice. The paradigmatic case of a political conception is John Rawls’s account of 
human rights and most versions of the political view adopt Rawls’s formulation of the main 
role human rights play in international legal and political practice (for instance the accounts of 
human rights provided by Charles Beitz, Joseph Raz and Thomas Pogge which I will discuss 
in chapter 3). Although the emphasis shifts from the ‘essentially human’ to the ‘practice’ in 
the political approach, it is the standards of legitimate sovereignty in the international arena 
and law which is predominantly perceived as the relevant practice. However, the focus on the 
role of human rights as that of setting limits to sovereignty and standards for legitimate 
intervention misses the intranational purpose of human rights, namely their role in setting 
standards of internal political legitimacy. From the perspective of the participants in the rights 
struggles I started with, the primary perspective of human rights is from inside; human rights 
provide reasons for demanding the power to be involved in the arrangement of the social and 
political contexts in which they are embedded. 
In this dissertation, my primary aim is to articulate an alternative theoretical framework 
that expresses what it means when people in rights struggles claim that they have a right to X. 
I propose that instead of asking first ‘what is essentially needed for a humane life?’ or ‘which 
basic features of being human justify a rights claim?’, we take a step back and shift our 
attention to the question what these people in rights struggles do when claiming that they have 
such-and-such rights? I start from the observation that a rights claim is deployed and 
contested in political practice. Then I develop an approach that aims at making sense of that 
practice; what is the meaning of a rights claim? What do people do when claiming that right? 
I call this approach a democratic approach to human rights.
13
 
In my view my starting from the practice is similar to approaches defended by scholars 
like James Tully and Donald Comstock. Similar to their approaches, I also endorse a view, 
which starts from and grants a certain primacy to practice.
14
 One of the characteristics of this 
‘practical’ or ‘critical’ approach as Tully calls it, is that it is “a form of philosophical 
reflection on practices of governance in the present that are experienced as oppressive in some 
way and are called into question by those subject to them.”15 Similarly, Comstock argues that 
critical social research begins with practical problems of everyday existence; life problems of 
definite and particular social agents who may be individuals, groups or classes that are 
oppressed by or alienated from social processes.
16
 In line with what can also be called a 
bottom-up approach I start with the contemporary (political) practice of rights. I start with 
what I call everyday rights struggles—the political contestations, struggles, conflicts and 
consensus over the notion of rights in everyday life. The vulnerable people involved in the 
conflicts mentioned above argue that they have rights in virtue of their humanity and claim 
that the policies that are supposed to be implemented violate those rights. These struggles are 
                                                          
13
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15
 James Tully, “Political Philosophy as a Critical Activity,” Political Theory 30, no. 4 (2002): 534. 
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 Donald E. Comstock, “A Method for Critical Research,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, ed. 
Michael Martin and Lee C. McIntyre (Cambridge, Mass.: MITPress., 1994), 378. 
for me examples of contemporary uses of rights in real-life problems; therefore I start with 
them.  
For the purpose of developing a theoretical framework that is sensitive to the practice of 
rights struggles, I rely on the discourse-theoretic conceptions of human rights and specifically 
the version proposed by Rainer Forst.
17
 Forst puts forward what he calls a ‘constructivist’ 
conception of human rights which is different from naturalistic and political conceptions of 
human rights with respect to the normative grounds and justification of human rights. He 
provides a reflexive argument for the justification of human rights based on what he calls ‘the 
right to justification’. I offer an interpretation of the right to justification as one that entails a 
right to resistance. I do not claim that the right to resistance is the grounding or fundamental 
right. Rather, I offer an interpretation of the right to justification such that within everyday 
rights struggles the right to justification is instantiated as a right to resistance; as a negation of 
bad (or no) justifications given for a policy, law or institution by the groups of people who are 
subjected to them and who claim to be oppressed or unjustly treated by them. Since the right 
to resistance is not the foundational right or the basis from which all other rights derive, I do 
not offer my account as a different ‘conception’ of human rights but as an ‘account’ of the 
discourse-theoretic conception of human rights. More precisely, the democratic account of 
human rights that I develop in this dissertation is a further elaboration of Rainer Forst’s 
account of human rights, whereby I incorporate insights from real-life rights struggles. This 
account of human rights, I will argue, captures the political and social meaning of human 
rights from the perspective of the participants in the rights struggles. The right to justification 
is a right to ‘count’ socially and politically, to be authors as well as subjects of rights; it is a 
right to the power to co-determine the conditions of social and political life. Moreover, this 
interpretation of the right to justification as one that entails a right to resistance gives not only 
a central place to consensus and agreement but also gives room for dissent and conflict in 
thinking about both human rights and democracy. As such, the democratic account could 
avoid at least some of the criticism that strikes discourse-theoretic conceptions (i.e. (rational) 
consensus-centrism) as well as naturalistic and political conceptions. 
My argumentative strategy of comparing the democratic account to the naturalistic, 
political and discourse-theoretic conceptions of human rights does not aim to refute any of 
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them or show that the democratic account is philosophically superior to them. Instead, I aim 
to show where these different approaches draw our attention in their analysis of human rights; 
the naturalistic conception emphasizes morally relevant human features and interests that 
substantiate rights claims whereas the political conception emphasizes the role of human 
rights within international law and practice. Although the discourse-theoretic conception of 
human rights fares better than the naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights on 
some grounds (such as accounting for the internal connection between human rights and 
democracy, perceiving the political dimension of human rights, etc.), it still faces some 
difficulties such as being consensus-centric. The democratic account, as I will argue, can 
answer some of these problems and it provides a perspective that is in tune with that of the 
participants in rights struggles. Therefore, for the purpose of explaining what participants in 
the social struggles do when they claim a right, a democratic account of human rights fares 
better than naturalistic or political conceptions as well as incorporating an element of dissent 
into discourse-theoretic approaches. This is what I will argue in this dissertation. 
3    Outline 
The thesis is organized into six chapters. In chapter 1, I set the stage for a philosophical 
investigation of contemporary human rights practice. I focus on two human rights: the right to 
housing and the right to work. I sketch two instances of contemporary rights struggles for 
these rights in the context of two recent cases from Turkey (struggles of tobacco workers and 
slum residents in Dikmen Valley, Ankara). My primary aim in this chapter is to illustrate 
what I call real-life rights struggles (political conflicts and contestations during which claims 
against the political and social order are made in the currency of rights) rather than giving a 
detailed description and analysis of these cases. In the context of the cases, I make 
preliminary theoretical considerations focusing on three points: the framing of the demands 
by the parties in these conflicts and movements in terms of (human) rights; the justification of 
a right in the political practice; the collective struggle aspect of demands for socio-economic 
rights. 
In chapters 2 and 3, I critically discuss two approaches that are perceived to be dominant 
in the mainstream Anglo-American philosophy of human rights: the naturalistic conception 
and the political conception respectively. I examine the general characteristics and some 
prominent versions of the naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights such as those 
provided by James Griffin, John Tasioulas, Joseph Raz, Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. I 
also examine the implications of each conception’s general perspective on human rights for an 
evaluation of the claims that there is a human right to work and a human right to adequate 
housing. Within the naturalistic approach the question of ‘whether there is a right to X’ is a 
question to be answered in theory by finding the right principles as part of the best available 
moral theory and thereby providing a theoretical justification of human rights norms. Yet 
defenders of the political conception claim that this dominant interpretation of the 
philosophical task as one of providing a justification of human rights norms is irrelevant to, or 
even distorts, contemporary human rights practice. However, by ‘the practice of human 
rights’ these theorists mostly refer to the place of human rights within international law and 
legal doctrine rather than the practice of people involved in rights struggles. 
This dissertation is informed by the goal of opening up a new philosophical perspective 
that gives a moral justification of human rights and that at the same time accounts for the 
social struggle aspect of human rights. For this aim, I propose a modification of the discourse-
theoretic conceptions of human rights. By perceiving human rights and democracy to be 
internally connected, discourse-theoretic accounts perceive human rights to be the outcome of 
political struggle; people are authors as well as subjects of rights. In order to substantiate my 
modification of the discourse-theoretic conception of human rights, I provide in chapter 4 a 
discussion of the basic influences of Jürgen Habermas’s work on human rights including his 
1) rational reconstruction of the system of rights within constitutional democracies, 2) 
analysis of the dual nature of human rights in relation to law and morality. This discussion is 
followed by an examination of two recent discourse-theoretic accounts of human rights 
pursued by Seyla Benhabib and Rainer Forst. 
Chapter 5 steps back from the discussion of specific conceptions of human rights and 
focuses on the skepticism raised against the idea of human rights in general and socio-
economic rights in particular. These objections attack the core assumptions of a theory of 
human rights such as that rights principles are abstract, individualist, ethnocentric, bourgeois. 
Although there is some truth to such objections, I argue that it is a mistake to take a general 
and unequivocally critical position on human rights. Moreover, I claim that a discourse-
theoretic conception of human rights could avoid at least some of the criticism that strikes at 
naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights. 
Although the discourse-theoretic conception of human rights fares better than the 
naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights in terms of accounting for the 
interdependence of human rights and democracy, it still faces some difficulties. One problem 
especially in Habermas’s account of human rights is the absence of a moral justification of 
human rights. In chapter 6, I propose a revised version of a discourse-theoretic conception 
which I call a democratic account that a) accounts for the internal connection between 
democracy and human rights and b) grounds human rights on a particular interpretation of 
Rainer Forst’s basic ‘right to justification’, namely interpreted as a right to resistance. 
Habermas’s discourse principle is mainly a principle of consent; it emphasizes the consent of 
those affected to the norms and actions. Forst’s principle of justification incorporates dissent, 
since the right to justification accords to each moral person a veto right against basic norms, 
arrangements, or structures that cannot be justified reciprocally and generally to him or her. I 
argue that the right to justification, in non-ideal circumstances, entails a right to resistance: a 
right to denounce unjust structures and orders one is subjected to. A conception of human 
rights based on the right to justification understood as entailing a right to resistance gives not 
only to consensus and agreement but also to dissent and conflict a central place in thinking 
about both human rights and democracy.  
In chapter 7, I conclude by bringing the theoretical framework developed in the previous 
chapters to bear on the question of how a rights claim is raised and justified in political 
practice, and I show that the democratic account shifts the aim of philosophy in thinking 
about human rights. The democratic account shows that it is possible to theorize and justify 
human rights without first identifying the specific human features and needs that substantiate 
human rights— as a matter of normative theorizing without making reference to practice. It 
also shows that it is possible to go beyond the political conception’s perception of practice as 
a matter of international relations and law as it directs our attention to the role of human rights 
in determining internal political legitimacy. The theoretical framework developed in this 
dissertation thereby shows that it is possible, in our philosophical thinking, to take a 
perspective that is in tune with the experience of the participants in social struggles for rights 
without losing the moral authority of human rights.               
 
 
 
 
 
 
1   Setting up an Inquiry: Contemporary Rights Struggles  
 
1.1    Introduction  
In this chapter, I will set the stage for a philosophical investigation of contemporary human 
rights practice. I will focus on two human rights: the right to housing and the right to work. 
After giving a brief sketch of contemporary struggles around those rights, with specific 
reference to two cases in Turkey,
18 
I will outline some broad questions which will frame the 
analysis undertaken in this dissertation. My primary aim in this chapter is not to give a 
detailed description and analysis of these cases. Instead, I have the aim of making some 
preliminary theoretical considerations about these cases focusing on three points: the framing 
of the resistance movements as a rights struggle, the justification of a rights claim in political 
practice and the relation between rights struggles and the socio-economic structure. 
Both the right to housing and the right to work are recognized as human rights in some of 
the most important treaties and conventions. ‘Adequate housing’ was recognized as a human 
right in 1948, upon the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 
25.1).
19 
Similarly, Article 23.1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: 
“Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable 
conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.”20 In the human rights discourse 
and literature, these rights are classified under what is called social and economic rights, also 
called ‘second generation rights’, and distinguished from civil and political rights (first 
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 There is also a logistic preference for choosing the cases from Turkey. Because I have Turkish citizenship and 
visit Ankara frequently, I am more familiar with those cases. Therefore I had the chance to observe and 
participate in the struggles. Although this dissertation does not have a central sociological or anthropological 
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(Mahir Mansuroğlu and Candaş Türkyılmaz on 22 July 2012), one resident of the valley who is also seen as the 
leader of the resistance (Tarık Çalışkan on 26 July 2012), one lawyer for the residents (Ender Büyükçulha on 24 
July 2012). In the case of TEKEL workers’ resistance, as the resistance was over when I started my research, I 
relied on secondary resources.  
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 The full article states: Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and 
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
20
Here I use the terms right to work and rights of workers (e.g. trade union rights, labour rights, individual labour 
protections) interchangeably meaning that a right to work means a right to non-coerced work with just working 
conditions such as rights to join and act within trade unions, security protections and limits to working hours.  
generation) and cultural rights (third generation rights). Nowadays, most people and 
philosophers consider socio-economic rights as genuine human rights but there is still 
philosophical controversy about the nature, justification and content of those rights. Some 
people argue that socio-economic rights are not genuine human rights because human rights 
are in essence negative rights.
21
 Others argue that every valid right must be associated with an 
obligation on the part of some identifiable agent, and in the case of economic rights the duty 
bearers are not clearly identified.
22 
Throughout this dissertation, I will explore different 
philosophical approaches to the nature, justification and content of human rights in general 
and socio-economic rights in particular. Let me first give some background information about 
the cases.       
1.2    Two cases of contemporary rights struggles 
1.2.1   Urban redevelopment and the right to housing    
In the 1980s large-scale urban transformation projects were launched in Ankara. ‘The Dikmen 
Valley Housing and Environmental Development Project’ was one of the pioneer 
interventions of this type situated in Dikmen Valley aiming at redeveloping an unauthorized 
housing area. Dikmen Valley is one of the riverbeds in Ankara and covers 290 hectares. As 
part of this project, the people residing in the squatter (gecekondu
23 
in Turkish) neighborhood 
have been asked to leave their houses as the transformation project required demolishing the 
buildings in the area. These are mostly people who had migrated to Ankara in the 1970s from 
various parts of Turkey and they constructed the slums in the 1980s. They have been told that 
they will be given houses from the new buildings constructed. Declaring that the conditions 
offered in order to afford another house are unacceptable and that the residents of squatter 
houses who have already accepted the conditions did not get adequate housing, 600 
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 The slum houses are called gecekondu in Turkish which means ‘built overnight’ referring to the fact that they 
are built without official permission and in a short time by the resident’s own means. People who came to the big 
cities in internal migrations in the 1970s provided the labor supply required and because there were not many 
social housing opportunities they built their own slum/squatter houses. The state provided ownership rights to 
some of these residents over time. In this dissertation I will use the term ‘squatter house’ to refer to gecekondu 
and the term ‘slum’ to refer to the neighborhood comprised of many gecekondu. 
households started to resist the demolition in 2006 (there were about 2,400 households at the 
beginning of the project).
24
 They desribe their struggle in these words:  
We are people of Dikmen Valley. You should know us well by now. We are poor, we are 
workers. We are working and earning our life by our labour. Most men among us work as 
waiters, construction workers, janitors...Most women among us work as cleaning workers in 
their or other people’s houses, they are houseworkers...our children, our youth...We don’t 
want to have a villa or palace. What we want is just a house to live in and to live a humane 
life. For this we struggled for six years with our honour, we claimed our houses, our district, 
our city. . . . We realized that the state which has forgotten us in our poor district and did not 
provide water, electricity, public transportation, playgrounds, sport fields, health care and 
schooling services, eventually remembered us. But, we witnessed that the state provided 
cruelty and demolition to us, to its citizens. Because, these lands on which we built our 
houses and raised our children and lived with our honour are now wanted to be given as a 
present to capital under the name of “urban transformation plan”. In order to build and sell 
luxurious houses in which a handful of wealthy people live, in order to fill the pockets and 
safes of some people, our squatter houses (gecekondu) need to be demolished. . . . We don’t 
want much, we just want that our right to housing is recognized and that our right to a house 
in order to have a human life is respected.
25
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 Although the urban transformation project including the Dikmen Valley region started much earlier in the 
1990s due to the proximity of the region to the city center, it was accelerated after the local elections in 2004 and 
the City Council Meeting dated 17 February 2006 where ‘Dikmen Valley 3th, 4th and 5th Stage Urban 
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projects in Dikmen Valley (Decision no: 2010/667, date 13.07.2010). Consequently, in July 2011, a new 
ministry; ‘The Ministry of Environment and Urbanization’ with the Decree No. 644 is established. Perhaps 
considering the persistent resistance from residents against the earlier project, this time a negotiation and debate 
process with the residents is initiated. However, this did not last long (see footnote 27 for more detail). The most 
recent piece of important information about the current situation of the Dikmen Valley region is that on 
13.11.2014, the Municipality of Ankara announced in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey No. 29174 
(the national and only official journal of the country that publishes the new legislation and other official 
announcements) that nine parcels of immovable property (which refers to the region within 4
th
 and 5
th
 stage 
urban transformation project in Dikmen Valley) will be sold through a closed auction. The auction took place on 
27.11.2014 accompanied by the protests of the Dikmen Valley residents and because no decision could be 
reached at the first auction it was postponed to 11.12.2014. The sale could not be finalized in the second auction 
as well (only two firms participated in the auction and neither of them could make an offer to buy all nine parcels 
together as the municipality demanded). The auction was postponed again.  
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 The online news and petition (dated November 14, 2011) signed by the organizations and people who declare 
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to English is done by me. The text is available at http://www.sendika.org/yazi.php?yazi_no=40911 (Accessed on 
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Since 2006, the residents of Dikmen Valley have continued an organized struggle which they 
call ‘a housing rights struggle’.26 They have established an office of housing rights in the 
neighborhood. They have developed a collaboration with the chambers of architecture and 
urban planning and another bureau of housing rights in another district of Ankara. They 
formed an urban transformation and Right to Housing work-group in 2006. The work-group 
organized one Right to Housing Forum in 2009 and participated in the organization of one 
People’s Rights Forum in 2011 in Ankara with the participation of environmental engineers, 
urban planners, architects, the representatives of Dikmen valley neighborhood as well as some 
other people opposing urban transformation projects in one other district in Ankara (Mamak) 
and 8 districts in Istanbul. After the first forum, they formed an office (literal translation is 
‘assembly for the right to housing’) which is the center of the resistance against the 
demolition as well as a forum for having meetings to discuss the problems of the inhabitants 
of the neighborhood or to have cultural activities. Since the beginning of the conflict, there 
have been several occasions on which police officers came to the district to start demolishing 
the squatter houses. They had grim fights with the police officers and many law-suits have 
been opened by the residents of the district; both individual cases (personal action) as well as 
collective cases (public action) are still ongoing.
27
 The central demand in their struggle, as is 
stated in the call for petition, is that they want their right to housing to be recognized and that 
their right to a house in order to live a human life is respected.
28
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 The phrase barınma hakkı (in Turkish) can be translated as ‘the right to housing’ or alternatively as ‘the right 
to shelter’, I prefer to use the term ‘right to housing’ in order to refer to the main demand of this movement, but 
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 Due to their long-lasting resistance to the demolition of their houses, in 2011 a dialog and negotiation process 
between the residents of the valley and the municipal authorities has been initiated. The residents met the mayor 
of Ankara (İ.Melih Gökçek) and municipality bureaucrats on 6 January 2012. The representatives of the 
residents demand that the instalments to buy from the newly built houses are adjusted to the socio-economic 
conditions of the residents and the process of debate and discussion of the policies with the residents is 
continued. However, the major declines these demands and suggestions. In addition, when a woman was 
explaining that she cannot meet the payment conditions demanded by the authorities because her husband is 
unemployed and she cannot work because her newborn kid is sick, the mayor replied, in a scornful manner, 
suggesting that the husband can sell lemons. As the tension in the meeting invoked by this comment increased, 
the mayor left the meeting. After this incident, the debate and discussion process among the residents and 
municipal authorities stopped and the demolition attempts accelerated (three demolition attempts took place in 
January 2012). By the time I completed this thesis (End of January 2015), some residents of slum houses are still 
resisting the demolition although their number decreased due to increased pressure from the authorities. In 
response to the most recent change in policy of the municipality to sell the parcels which include the houses of 
those residents, they have protested that the auction is illegitimate. In addition, the Union of Chambers of 
Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) which opened a law-suit for the termination of the urban 
transformation project declared that they will open a lawsuit demanding the cancellation of the opening of the 
parcels that include the residential areas on sale at auction. The resistance is ongoing and it is uncertain how it 
will culminate in the near future. However, what is certain is that the resistance having gone on for more than 
seven years now has turned to a symbol of ‘the right to housing struggles’ in Turkey. 
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 See footnote 20 above for the reference. 
Is the struggle of the people of Dikmen Valley unique? In some senses it is unique and in 
other senses it is not. With respect to the peculiar process of urbanization, its legal structure 
and the relation between the state, local authorities and the private sector concerning urban 
transformation projects in Turkey, the resistance of Dikmen Valley residents has its 
idiosyncrasies. On the other hand, in the sense that the residents of Dikmen Valley are evicted 
from the places they live, it is not unique as in many countries of the world, many people face 
the threat of being evicted from the places they live due to various reasons such as urban 
transformation projects, construction of dams, roads, hydroelectric power stations, etc. As is 
documented in the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) Report 
(2011), evictions and housing rights violations have increased globally.
29
 What is especially 
important about the case of Dikmen Valley resistance for the purposes of this dissertation is 
that it is explicitly organized around the claim and slogan of ‘people have the right to 
housing’, and they pursue what they call a rights struggle against neoliberal policies of urban 
planning. 
The expansion of neoliberal forms of planning has fueled a discussion around the notion 
of ‘the right to the city’ in human geography and urban sociology, especially in critical urban 
theory.
30
 Critical urban theorists stress that political and economic restructuring in cities is 
negatively affecting the enfranchisement of urban residents. The idea of the right to the city 
has been explored and popularized as a response to this perceived disenfranchisement in cities 
and as a way to empower urban dwellers.
31
 In this approach the right to adequate housing is 
seen as one of the central rights among a group of rights associated with urban life such as the 
right to education, the right to health care and the right to transportation. 
David Harvey, one of the prominent thinkers of the right to the city, states that the right to 
the city is one of the most important human rights. Yet in practice the right to the city seems a 
far cry from reality; as we suspect, it seems a far cry from the universality of the UN 
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Declaration of Human Rights. The endless accumulation of capital and the conception of 
rights embedded in it, Harvey argues, produce inequality and injustice. In the era of global 
capitalism the inalienable rights of private property and profit rule. However, Harvey argues 
that at the face of “force deciding between equal rights” we cannot cynically dismiss utopian 
thinking and ideals of justice.
32
 Instead, we should contextualize them; we should fight for the 
turning upside down of rights, to make the now derivative rights more fundamental. “The 
inalienable right to the city”, as a more inclusive city with a public sphere of active 
democratic participation, Harvey says, “is worth fighting for.”33  
Like Harvey, Peter Marcuse also argues that there is a conflict in rights. He formulates 
the right to the city as “an exigent demand by those deprived of basic material and existing 
legal rights”, a demand raised by those who are deprived and alienated.34 He also argues “that 
there is a conflict among rights that needs to be faced and resolved rather than wished 
away.”35 As I will argue, the critical approach to human rights perceives a dialectical 
relationship between rights and the subject of rights in the sense that rights are a matter of 
political struggle and contestation among various agents. Therefore, even if one argues that as 
a moral idea a universal human right belongs to all human beings ideally, in concrete 
situations it is not practiced and exercised by all equally; there are ongoing contestations and 
struggles over rights. It can also be the case that both sides of a debate make an appeal to 
rights, but to different rights. For instance the defenders of abortion (identified as pro-choice) 
argue that women have the right to decide about matters concerning their bodies including 
reproduction, whereas opponents of abortion (identified as pro-life) argue that the fetus has a 
right to life. Or it can be the case that different groups of people have a conflict of interests 
over the exercise of the self-same right, for instance how the resources of a nation will be 
used collectively (etc. land rights, housing rights, rights over natural resources like rivers, 
forests, etc.) can be seen as a conflict over the distribution of resources within society as well 
as a conflict over property rights of different individuals. In this sense, the right to the housing 
claims of the urban poor can be seen as a demand for their property rights in conflict with the 
property rights of the construction companies.  
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The right to the city literature in critical urban theory demonstrates how the strategy of 
contextualizing universal human rights language can mobilize urban politics. I think this 
literature can be informative for moral and political philosophy in its depiction of how the 
claim of the right to the city, “a moral claim, founded on fundamental principles of justice, of 
ethics, of morality, of virtue, of the good”, is contextualized in practice and is expressed in 
terms of a struggle for rights.
36
 
1.2.2   The right to work       
Now I want to shift to another struggle, again in the city of Ankara. In 2008, TEKEL (a 
former state-owned enterprise of tobacco and alcoholic beverages) was sold to British-
American Tobacco (BAT).
37
 It was part of a series of privatization projects, steps of which 
have already been taken by previous governments. In 9 December 1999, a letter of intent was 
made conditional by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that involved directives to 
dismantle the public support and subsidization schemes for the agricultural economy in 
general, and privatization of the tobacco, spirits, animal husbandry and sugar plants, in 
particular.
38
 
The new owners sacked more than eight thousand workers and in December 2009 they 
announced that they were going to close down twelve factories and twelve thousand workers 
would be displaced. The government proposed a new contract for workers which is known by 
its identifying code: the 4-C. According to the Privatization Law of Public Enterprises, 
employees of a privatized public enterprise have a right to be employed with the same 
personal benefits (in other words, keeping their acquired labor rights) in other public 
enterprises. However, the AKP government added a temporary clause to this law in 2004. The 
proposed 4-C contract relied on this added clause and it was formulated by the government as 
an interim solution for displaced workers. The contract involved re-defining the job status of 
the workers as temporary (up to ten months), with no guarantee of renewal. For the TEKEL 
workers this shift in their job status would have meant that their average monthly wage would 
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decrease from TL1,200 (approx. $800) to TL800 (approx. $550).
39
 In addition, “the new 
‘jobs’ would not necessarily be related to the displaced workers’ ability or expertise, and in 
practice they have taken various forms of simple public services such as gardening public 
parks, etc.”40 The workers were given one month’s time to decide if they would accept the 4-
C contract.  
Declaring that these conditions are unacceptable, on December 15, 2009 an estimated 
twelve thousands workers from factories across the country marched to Ankara and set up a 
camp of resistance in one of the central squares in the city center. They have, taking turns, 
stayed in their makeshift tents for 78 days despite freezing cold, police forces’ heavy-handed 
action and government opposition. The TEKEL workers’ resistance received massive support 
from citizens all over Turkey, university students, workers from other unions and from 
national and international bodies including the European Parliament and the International 
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC). It is recognized as one of the most powerful workers’ 
struggle of recent years in Turkey and Europe. On 4 February 2010 tens of thousands of 
Turkish workers took part in a one day general strike organized by Türk-İş union in support of 
the protest.
41
 TEKEL workers also opened a lawsuit against the government’s imposition of 
one month’s time to shift to 4-C status. On March 1, 2010 the Court of State Council 
(Danıştay) decided in favor of the workers that the execution of the decision that changes the 
TEKEL workers’ contract to 4-C status is suspended. After this decision the workers removed 
their tents and their struggle entered into another phase.  
As the scholar Metin Ozuğurlu argues; “the leitmotiv of the fight between the TEKEL 
resisters and the government was directly constituted by the concept of rights.”42 The workers 
put their demands into the framework of a rights’ struggle. They did not make their gained 
labor rights a matter of negotiation and accept the precarious employment conditions (without 
job security and with cuts in wages and social benefits). Therefore, for the workers, their 
rights are their conditions within the struggle. They stated that they could sit at the negotiating 
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table for instance for negotiating over wage levels only after their rights and conditions are 
accepted.
43 
 
Without doubt, the concept of a human right is a powerful concept and most social 
movements appealed to it for public agitation or to gain public support for their causes. 
Indeed, Prime Minister Erdoğan tried to downplay the power of the rights’ talk during the 
initial stages of the resistance. Erdoğan himself said: “this [TEKEL worker’s resistance] is no 
longer a struggle to achieve rights” and posited himself as the defender of “orphan’s rights 
against the TEKEL resisters.”44  
The notions of rights and human rights have been employed to a large extent in labor 
movements historically and recently the human rights terminology of the right to a decent job 
in order to have a decent and dignified human life have been frequently used in the struggle 
for labor’s rights.45 While labor rights movements and human rights movements have both 
long used rights principles and language to advocate their goals, they also had different 
trajectories. As Virginia Leary observes in an influential essay published in 1996:  
Worker’s rights are human rights, yet the international human rights movement devotes little 
attention to the rights of workers. At the same time, trade unions and labor leaders rarely 
enlist the support of human rights groups for defense of worker’s rights. A regrettable 
paradox: the human rights movement and the labor movement run on tracks that are 
sometimes parallel and rarely meet.
46 
Leary argues that although the catalogue of international human rights includes numerous 
rights relating to work and despite the fact that there has been a correlation between the status 
of worker’s rights and the status of human rights in general in a country, non-governmental 
human rights organizations generally choose to concentrate on political and civil rights issues 
(such as torture, imprisonment of political prisoners, or free speech issues) and they neglect 
economic, social and cultural rights (such as the right to housing, the right to food and 
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worker’s rights).47 Labor advocates and labor unions, on their part, relied on their own 
organizations for promoting and advocating worker’s rights, and they were oblivious to the 
international human rights movement thereby reducing the chances of cooperation with 
human rights organizations.  
This trend of failing to address worker’s rights as human rights is perceived to be 
changing in the late 1990s. Some creative partnerships have evolved between labor unions 
and key human rights organizations. Labor scholars and labor movements, particularly in the 
United States, have developed a keen interest in human rights discourse and using 
international legal instruments for advocating worker’s rights. These scholars and activists 
have argued that “worker’s rights are fundamental human rights and ought to be 
constitutionalized or statutorily recognized as such.”48 Recently, there has been a call to bring 
labor rights into the mainstream discussion and practice of human rights which is considered 
to be an urgent task given the current context of the global economic recession and the 
increasing unemployment and poverty rates worldwide.
49
 Some defenders of labor’s rights, on 
the other hand, warned about putting too much emphasis on human rights arguing that there 
are risks that a rights-based approach fosters individualism instead of collective worker power 
and that it subverts the very idea of union solidarity.
50
 Therefore, a debate about the role and 
effectiveness of human rights activism and human rights arguments in support of workers’ 
rights has been fueled mainly among labor historians and international lawyers. It is worth 
exploring what political philosophy can contribute to that debate. An analysis of the notion of 
labor rights as human rights; the extent to which labor rights are human rights and the extent 
to which they diverge from basic human rights such that they require separate analysis and 
application can be a good starting point.  
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1.3   Preliminary theoretical considerations about the cases 
The residents of Dikmen Valley claimed their right to housing and TEKEL workers claimed 
their right to work and corresponding labor rights. The historical background and underlying 
causes of these problems and events are, without doubt, deeper than what is briefly stated 
above. However, I do not aim to give a systematic analysis of these movements and conflicts 
here; my primary aim is rather to reflect on some theoretical considerations and implications 
derived from those cases which will direct, as this dissertation proceeds, my inquiry about the 
philosophical thinking on human rights.  
  The first consideration is that the parties to these conflicts and movements framed their 
demands in terms of ‘rights’. The first question is to what extent the rights claims of 
participants in these struggles can be considered as genuine human rights. As I mentioned 
before, the rights associated with these struggles, the right to housing and the right to work, 
are included in important human rights documents, especially among the catalogue of socio-
economic rights. However, there are at least two features of rights demands in these cases that 
make them different from the discussion of socio-economic rights within the mainstream 
human rights literature. Firstly, the mainstream human rights literature focuses on socio-
economic rights understood mainly as part of the right to an adequate standard of living (i.e., 
on measuring the right to an adequate standard of living and analyzing the nature of related 
legal and social welfare guarantees) and the analysis of the right to work and related labor 
rights are comparatively little studied in the economic rights literature (with the exception of 
child labor, which has received considerable attention).
51
 Secondly, the mainstream human 
rights literature defines human rights as rights all human individuals have in virtue of being a 
human. However, in the cases I mentioned, there is a collective struggle aspect with respect to 
those rights.
52
 This is clearer with respect to labor rights including the rights of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining. There is also, perhaps less obviously, a collective 
struggle aspect to the right to the city and housing as it is the poor and marginalized segments 
of an urban population that raise these rights claims. In fact, the slogan of Dikmen Valley 
residents is: people have a right to housing. And, in the second case the people are having a 
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collective struggle as workers.
53
 In short, it needs to be explored to what extent the rights 
claims raised in these cases are genuine human rights claims and how the mainstream 
literature on socio-economic human rights needs to be interpreted and modified in order to 
analyze the collective aspect of those rights-struggles.  
The second consideration is about the justification of human rights within the practice of 
the struggle for rights. In both cases there is an inclination to relate the demands for rights 
with a conception of humane life and human dignity. For instance, as I quoted at the 
beginning of section 1.2.1, the residents of Dikmen Valley state their demands as: “What we 
want is just a house to live in and to live a humane life.”54 Similarly, with respect to the 
worker’s movement, Özuğurlu mentions that, in field studies, they have begun to hear a 
pretext for being organized in trade unions which is: “in order to be seen as a human being”; 
“in order to protect my dignity.”55 The second set of research questions following from these 
cases for a philosophical inquiry is: How can these rights claims within these cases be 
justified? What are the reasons of the participants in these struggles to claim those rights they 
are demanding? How can the underlying referent (of human dignity) be reconstructed in a 
way that is faithful to the practice of struggles for rights?  
The third consideration is that participants in both struggles perceive their struggle for 
specific rights to be connected with larger socio-economic structures. For instance, Tarık 
Çalışkan, a leading figure of the Dikmen Valley resistance, states that their struggle is both a 
struggle for rights and a class struggle. He argues that there is a systemic problem and the 
threat they are facing cannot be perceived independently of widespread neoliberal policies 
which apply the market-driven, profit-making mentality to the use of urban spaces and the 
housing problem.
56
 In fact, the non-governmental organization People’s Houses (Halkevleri) 
which has been one of the most active participants in the resistance movements against urban 
transformation projects in various cities acts as an umbrella organization covering various 
rights struggles including struggles for the right for free education, the right for free medical 
treatment, the right to water resources (against the hydroelectric plant projects) and the right 
to free public transport. In their analysis, these different struggles are connected and result 
from problems caused by a general scheme of socio-economic structure. Rights struggles, 
                                                          
53
 Without doubt it is possible to combine the idea of collective and group rights with ontological individualism. 
For instance, it possible to imagine a conception of human rights according to which it is only individuals who 
possess human rights but at the same time there exists structures produced by the interaction of those individuals 
which made some individuals vulnerable and oppressed. They can demand rights especially because of their 
disadvantaged position in those structures.  
54
 For reference, see footnote 25 above. 
55
 Özuğurlu, “The TEKEL Resistance Movement,” 184. 
56
 Personal communication on 26.07.2012. 
according to this perception, are part and parcel of a general struggle for social change. The 
relationship between rights struggles and the socio-economic structures (or in the terminology 
of class analysis with the class struggle) is the third theoretical consideration derived from the 
cases examined.  
1.4   Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have given two examples of rights struggles from the recent history of 
Turkey. The cases are meant to be illustrative (rather than exhaustive) of the use of the idea of 
(human) rights in situations of political conflicts and contestations. The next step is to explore 
whether the rights claims that arise in these conflicts are genuine human rights claims and if 
they are, then how they are justified in practice. In order to do that, we first need an overview 
of the philosophical thinking about the nature, content and justification of human rights. The 
next two chapters start to make such an overview by examining two dominant views about the 
philosophical thinking on human rights: the naturalistic conception and the political 
conception. In chapters 2 and 3, I will examine the general characteristics and some 
prominent versions of the naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights respectively. I 
will also examine the implications of each conception’s general perspective on human rights 
for an evaluation of the claims that there is a human right to work and a human right to 
adequate housing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2    The Naturalistic Conception of Human Rights 
 
2.1   Introduction: different conceptions of human rights 
In the previous chapter, I have described some rights struggles in the context of the right to 
housing and the right to work. One of the main questions of my inquiry is whether those 
rights people in these struggles claim are genuine human rights claims. I have mentioned that 
these rights are listed as human rights in the main human rights documents. However, in the 
light of the disputes and philosophical inquiries about what human rights are taken to be and 
philosophical objections that some items on those lists are not genuine human rights, 
references to the international treaties and lists of human rights would not settle the matter 
about the ‘existence conditions’ of those rights.57  
The usual state of the art in philosophical discussions about human rights is to develop 
various conceptions of human rights each of which offer answers to a set of philosophical 
questions about the nature, content and justification of human rights. The next step is to 
assess whether the items in the main human rights documents register as human rights on this 
particular conception of human rights. Therefore, asking the apparently straightforward 
question with respect to those rights struggles whether the right to work and the right to 
housing should be considered as human rights takes us to the core of these conceptual 
questions about human rights. It requires some patience to review the different conceptions of 
human rights in the philosophical literature, the disagreements between which are complex.  
What are the main features of a conception of human rights? Thomas Pogge points out 
that a conception of human rights has two main components: 
− the concept of a human right used by this conception, or what one might also call its 
understanding of human rights, and 
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− the substance or content of the conception, that is, the objects or goods it singles out for 
protection by a set of human rights.
58
  
In the light of this, we can say that a conception of human rights is concerned with two main 
questions related to these parts: What are human rights? And which rights are human rights?  
In a similar vein, Matthias Risse makes a distinction between the concept and various 
conceptions of human rights.
59
 According to Risse’s distinction a concept of human rights is 
the idea of human rights which, following Joshua Cohen, has three features: they are 
universal in the sense that they are owed by every political society and owed to all 
individuals, they are requirements of political morality whose force does not depend on their 
being expressed in enforceable law; they are especially urgent requirements of political 
morality. Moreover, an account of human rights has to meet two methodological assumptions. 
First, if there are human rights they must meet the condition of the fidelity assumption: a 
substantial range of human rights should be identified by the main human rights documents. 
Second, any proposed list of human rights should be open-ended: we can, through normative 
reasoning, argue in support of human rights that have not previously been enumerated as 
human rights and interpret rights defined in abstract terms for application.
60
 Echoing Rawls’s 
distinction
61
 between a conception and various conceptions of justice, Risse argues that there 
can be various conceptions of human rights that have the same concept of human rights; they 
may have those features and meet the conditions specified by Cohen. Yet, they can still have 
different particular understandings of human rights. One particular way of understanding 
human rights would be as protections of essential features of personhood.
62
 A different way of 
understanding human rights is that human rights are rights individuals have as members of the 
global and political order.
63
 After making this distinction between the concept and 
conceptions of human rights, Risse lists four conditions for a conception of human rights.
64
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 Risse claims that any full-fledged conception of human rights would offer answers to all these questions: “Is 
there 
Apart from the issues of the concept and content of human rights, one aspect of human 
rights which is especially important for philosophical discussions is the question of how 
human rights may be philosophically justified. Justification in its relation to moral philosophy 
means providing reasons for the validity of moral principles and concepts such as rights, 
duties, etc. The disputes about the philosophical justification of human rights are centered on 
two questions: do human rights require philosophical justification? If they do, what kind of 
justification? The discussion about justification of human rights is also closely related to the 
discussion on the philosophical foundations of human rights. Philosophers have tried to justify 
human rights by appealing to various ideals such as universal human interests, agency, human 
dignity as the grounds or foundations of human rights. 
Several philosophical conceptions of human rights are advanced with each giving specific 
answers to these questions about the nature, content and justification of human rights as well 
as each combining moral, political and legal aspects of human rights in a particular way (or 
giving priority to one or more of these aspects). Hence given the diversity of aspects of and 
questions about human rights, there is no straightforward way to classify philosophical views 
of human rights. Nevertheless, two approaches are often perceived to be dominant in the 
philosophical literature on human rights; the ‘traditional’, ‘naturalistic’, ‘natural law 
conception’ and the ‘practical’, ‘political’, ‘positive law’ conception of human rights, 
especially within the Anglo-American mainstream philosophy of human rights.
65
 
Although rarely found in their ideal typical forms, these two approaches (I will hereafter 
call them the naturalistic conception and the political conception for short) are dominant and 
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perceived to be alternative philosophical approaches to human rights 
66
 The goal of opening 
up a new perspective informs this dissertation. For this reason, I start by characterizing these 
dominant positions: the naturalistic conception in this chapter and the political conception in 
the next chapter. As I cannot offer an examination of all prima facie plausible conceptions 
that can be classified under these views, I will first make a general characterization of each 
conception and then examine some prominent versions offered in the literature. In a next step, 
I will examine the implications of each conception’s general perspective on human rights for 
an evaluation of the claims that there is a human right to work and a human right to adequate 
housing. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, I will briefly track the origins in the doctrine 
of natural law and natural rights. Then, I will formulate conditions which make a rights theory 
a natural rights theory, and in turn, make a human rights theory a naturalistic theory of human 
rights (sections 2.2 and 2.3.). I will critically examine three recent versions of the naturalistic 
conception of human rights, namely the accounts developed by Alan Gewirth, James Griffin 
and John Tasioulas (sections 2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 respectively). In section 2.4, I will examine 
the implications of the naturalistic conception for the claims that there are human rights to 
work and housing. In section 2.5, I will outline the general difficulties and objections raised 
against the naturalistic conception of human rights. In section 2.6, I examine the question of 
whether human rights require justification. The final section summarizes my conclusions. 
2.2   The nature of natural rights  
Although the use of the term ‘human rights’ began at the end of the eighteenth century (for 
instance the term ‘les droits de l’homme’ in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
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of the Citizen (1789)), it gained wide currency in the middle of the twentieth century 
especially after the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).
67
 While the appearance of 
the term ‘human rights’ on the historical stage is relatively recent, its precursor term ‘natural 
right’ (ius naturale) has been on stage since the late Middle Ages.68 The idea of a natural right 
has been closely related to the idea of ‘natural law’ and natural rights were generally believed 
to be derived from natural laws. 
The belief in the existence of a natural moral code based upon the identification of certain 
fundamental and objectively verifiable human goods formed the basis of the natural law 
doctrine. Natural Moral Law states that there is a natural order to our world (determined by a 
supernatural power in the theological view) that should be followed. Although the doctrine of 
natural law originated in the philosophy of Greek and Roman antiquity, St. Thomas Aquinas 
gave it its most influential statement in the 13th century.
69 
According to the classical-
theological canon of natural law developed by Aquinas, there are natural dispositions in 
human beings to reason which serves as the rule and measure of human actions:  
The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s mind so as to 
be known by him naturally. Summa Theologica, Question 90, Article 4.
70
 
[I]t is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from 
its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and 
ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most 
excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for 
itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural 
inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational 
creature is called the natural law. Summa Theologica, Question 91, Article 2.
71
 
The transformation of theological-classical natural law into modern natural rights theory 
(which is also called the secularization of the doctrine of natural rights into human rights) 
went through the Protestant Reformation and the Age of Enlightenment and can be traced 
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back to the writings of Enlightenment thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and 
Immanuel Kant among others.
72
 
What is to count as a natural rights theory? In order to give a systematic exploration of a 
natural right and its existence conditions, one can start from the concept of a right. The 
beginning of wisdom in the analysis of the concept of a right resides in the famous 
classification of “fundamental legal conceptions” given by Wesley Hohfeld.73 By virtue of 
abundant illustrations from juridical arguments, Hohfeld shows that we use the term ‘right’ to 
cover four different forms of entitlements which he calls rights, privileges, powers and 
immunities. Hohfeld maps the logical relations among these fundamental conceptions 
organizing them into two tables of opposites (contradictories) and correlatives (equivalents): 
 
Table 1: Hohfeldian scheme of jural opposites and correlatives.
74
 
Hohfeld claims that we use the term ‘right’ to mean these four forms of legal relationships 
and that this state of affairs results in confusion. He proposes that usage of the term should be 
limited to the first category in the table, namely to what is called a ‘claim’ or ‘claim-right’ in 
the literature (or what Hohfeld himself calls “a right in the strictest sense”).75 Hohfeld’s 
distinctions were developed in the analysis of legal rights, but they have applicability to the 
moral sphere. For instance Hohfeld’s claim-right is generally regarded as coming closest to 
the concept of individual rights used in political morality.
76  
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 For instance in his project of developing an account and justification of human rights, Alan Gewirth, Human 
Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), confines himself 
to what Hohfeld called ‘claims’ or ‘claim-rights’.  
To say that A has a claim right to X usually means that people have a duty not to interfere 
with A’s having or doing X. This duty can range from a negative duty of non-interference, to 
the positive duty of securing A’s access to X. Although Hohfeld’s categorization helps to 
clarify different forms of entitlement denoted by the term right, it would be mistaken to 
suppose that every right that is asserted must belong to one and only one of Hohfeld’s four 
categories. Instead a single assertion of a right usually means a cluster of different Hohfeldian 
elements. For instance if I say I have a property right in a house, this would typically imply 
my claim-right that others should refrain from damaging my house or entering it without my 
permission, my privilege as an owner to the personal use of the house, my power to sell the 
house or rent it, and my immunity from other’s disposal of the house without my consent. 
Therefore rights usually consist of a complicated cluster of Hohfeldian elements.
77  
If we use the term ‘right’ to refer to these four different forms of entitlement, what makes 
them all rights? In other words, what is their common feature that makes them “all species of 
a single genus”? 78 Two rival accounts which attempt to capture the essential defining feature 
of rights and the relation between duties and rights have been proposed; on the one hand there 
is the ‘choice’ or ‘will’ theory of rights and on the other hand, there is the ‘benefit’ or 
‘interest’ theory of rights.79 According to the choice theory having a right is essentially a 
matter of having a choice; it gives the right-holder control over another’s duty. The best 
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known contemporary proponent of a choice or will theory of rights is Herbert Hart.
80
 If an 
individual A has a duty to do something and if another individual B to whom the duty is owed 
is in a position to control the performance of the duty, this degree of control makes B a right-
bearer on Hart’s account. For example, if A makes a promise to B, A has the duty to keep the 
promise, but it is a duty from which B can waive or release A, hence B has the corresponding 
right. By the same token, a creditor can be said to have a right correlative of the duty of her 
debtor because the debtor’s duty to repay is subject to the discretion of the creditor.81 Hence, 
according to a choice-theory of rights those duties over which an individual can exercise 
control can entail correlative rights. In Hohfeldian terms, choice theorists assert that every 
right includes a Hohfeldian power over a claim; A has a duty and B has Hohfeldian power in 
relation to that duty.  
Although Hart’s choice theory is applicable fundamentally for an analysis of ordinary 
legal rights and given the fact that, in his later writings, he has forsaken the choice theory 
regarding moral rights, we can still talk of a model of moral rights as ‘protected choices’.82 
The model of rights as protected choices takes the values of autonomy and self-determination 
as central and says that to regard people as having certain moral rights is to regard them as 
autonomous beings within the domains specified by the content of the rights. In this sense 
choice theory captures an essential link between rights and an individual’s autonomy, “a link 
which indicates the distinctive normative function performed by the concept of rights in our 
moral language.”83 
However, the conception of rights as protected choices is counterintuitive with respect to 
paradigmatic human rights. For example, if we think of the fundamental human rights such as 
the right to life, freedom from torture, the right to a fair and public trial, few of us believe that 
we have these rights because we can waive the corresponding duty-bearers from their duties 
not to kill, not to torture, etc. Moreover, according to choice theory, rights cannot be ascribed 
to beings incapable of choice such as infants, animals, mentally disabled and comatose adults, 
as well as past and future generations. The alternative ‘interest’ or ‘benefit’ theory which is 
based on Jeremy Bentham’s analysis of legal rights will be of more help in understanding 
those rights. 
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According to Bentham rights are essentially ‘benefits’ and whoever benefits from a duty 
possesses a right.
84
 In Bentham’s thinking, an individual A can be said to have a right if 
another individual B has a duty to perform (or refrain from) an act which is in A’s interest. 
Originally associated with Bentham’s analysis, interest or benefit theory has been defended in 
various forms by modern writers such as David Lyons, Joseph Raz and Neil MacCormick.
85
 
Interest theory is comprehensive in the sense that it counts unwaivable rights and the rights of 
incompetents as rights the possession of which is in the interest of rights-holders. As such, 
interest theory also taps into the plausible relation between holding rights and well-being. But 
interest theory also faces some problems such as that there can be third-party beneficiaries 
who benefit from some duties’ being met without being right-holders. For instance, if I 
perform my duty to return 100 € I borrowed from you, there can be other beneficiaries than 
you, such as your family, a person you owed money, etc. Neither Bentham nor other modern 
defenders claim that all these beneficiaries can claim rights. For instance, in his qualified 
version of Bentham’s theory, Lyons holds that one has a right in respect of another’s duty or 
obligation only if one is “the direct, intended beneficiary of that duty or obligation.”86 Raz 
takes this analysis one step further and holds that an individual X has a right “if and only if X 
can have rights, and other things being equal, an aspect of X’s well-being is a sufficient 
reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.”87 According to Raz’s view rights 
are understood as grounds of duties; X can be said to have a right (whether in moral theory or 
legal system) whenever the protection or advancement of some interest of hers is recognized 
(by the theory or the system) as a reason for imposing duties or obligations on others. Hence, 
the second model of rights as ‘protected interests’ takes the value of welfare as central and 
says that to regard people as having certain moral rights is to regard the welfare of the 
individual as important such that it requires protection.  
As is clear from the usage of the concept, rights admit of different varieties—legal, 
customary, moral, etc. Among the several varieties of rights, a distinction between 
conventional and moral rights is especially important for the purpose of understanding natural 
rights. Conventional rights are the products of a conventional rule system (e.g. a legal right is 
a product of a legal rule system). Moral rights can be understood by comparing them to 
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conventional rights and extrapolating the existence conditions of conventional rights to those 
of moral rights. Extrapolation the existence conditions of conventional rights to moral rights 
leads to the supposition that moral rights are the products of non-conventional rule systems, 
thus to the supposition that moral rights are natural rights.
88
 The natural rights tradition seeks 
to explain the moral force of rights by embedding them in a system of rules which, by virtue 
of being natural rather than conventional, has moral force. 
What makes a right a natural right? There is not a unique answer to this question in the 
natural rights tradition. Neither the classical nor the modern period in the tradition yields a 
unanimously endorsed account of the nature of natural rights. As is occasionally pointed out 
by critics and also acknowledged by defenders, the idea of natural rights is ambiguous and 
abstract. The gist of the idea of a natural right is that it is a non-conventional right; it is a right 
that exists independently of the laws, governments and conventions of any existing society. 
But, what are the existence conditions of natural right(s)? We can reconstruct what is widely 
accepted in the natural rights tradition. Sumner provides such a reconstruction. He suggests 
four conditions which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient to count as a natural 
rights theory: “As a rough initial approximation we may say that a moral theory is a natural 
rights theory just in case (1) it contains some moral rights, which (2) it ties to the possession 
of some natural property, and which it treats as both (3) basic and (4) objective.”89 Let us 
explicate each of these four conditions. 
The first condition is conceptual: “a natural rights theory must affirm the existence of 
some moral rights and thus must employ some conception of a right.”90 Hence, the first 
condition entails that a natural rights theory is a rights theory as it contains some moral rights 
but it does not explain what it means for those rights to be natural. The second condition takes 
us one step further towards such an explanation. It suggests that the criterion for a natural 
right must itself be a natural property. In Sumner’s words:  
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A natural rights theory therefore must assign (at least some of) its rights to a class of 
subjects determined by their common and exclusive possession of this natural property. . . . 
[W]hat, in this context, makes a property a natural property? Two requirements are obvious. 
First, the property must be empirical and thus whether or not an individual possesses it must 
be ascertainable by ordinary empirical means. . . . Secondly, the property must not logically 
require the existence of any particular institution or social practice. Thus conventional 
properties such as citizenship, social status, and wealth are excluded.
91
 
The requirement that the criterion for a natural right must itself be a natural property can be 
found in the modern natural rights theories of McDonald and Brown.
92
 McDonald argues that 
people continue to suppose that they have ‘natural’ rights, or rights as human beings, 
independently of the laws and governments of any existing society. If, for instance, the laws 
of every existing society condemn a human being to be a slave, he, or another human being on 
his behalf, may hold that he has a right to be free. But since, ex hypothesi, this right is denied 
by every existing law and authority, it must be a right possessed independently of them and it 
must be derived from another source. The slave has a right to be free in virtue of his status of 
being a man like any other man. This, however, is a natural status as opposed to one 
determined by social convention. “Every man is human ‘by nature’ and no human being is ‘by 
nature’ a slave of another human being.”93 Similarly, Brown states; “[i]t has been widely 
supposed that all men have inalienable rights by reason of certain properties common to all 
men and nothing else. On this supposition, the term “natural” is used in reference to the set of 
unspecified defining properties.”94 So far, these two conditions imply that a natural rights 
theory is any moral theory which contains rights and the criterion of those rights are natural 
properties. 
The third condition is structural and it is related to the place of rights in a moral theory. 
According to this condition, a natural rights theory treats rights (and only rights) as morally 
basic.
95
 Rights principles and only rights principles are located at the most basic level in the 
structure of a natural rights theory. Therefore, in Sumner’s formulation “a theory is a natural 
rights theory only if rights are the moral category fundamental to the theory, thus only if the 
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theory’s base consists exclusively of rights principles.”96 A theory will fail this condition if; i) 
it has no assignable base (it has no basic principles at all), or ii) it is duty-based or goal-based, 
iii) or it is a mixed theory (its base consists of principles drawn from different moral 
categories of rights, duties or goals). 
The fourth condition is related to what we may call the ontological status of basic rights 
in a moral theory. The basic moral rights can be claimed to be subjective (if their existence is 
dependent on some subjective state or activity—whether actual or hypothetical—of some 
subjects) or objective (their existence is independent of all subjective states and activities). 
Sumner argues that there are two methods of grounding rights depending on whether they are 
claimed to be subjective or objective; the constructive model (e.g. contractarian theories) and 
the realist model respectively. If rights are subjective then their existence is a matter of 
creation or invention and if they are objective their existence is ultimately a matter of 
discovery of principles which accurately represent moral facts. Natural rights theories, 
according to the formulation of the fourth condition, are committed to the realist model and to 
the accompanying claim of the objectivity of rights. 
If we recapitulate the explication of the four conditions, a natural rights theory is any 
moral theory which 1) employs a model of rights, 2) assigns some set of rights to some set of 
individuals on the basis of some natural criterion, 3) treats these rights (only rights) as morally 
basic and 4) claims that they are objective.
97
 If we confront these conditions with the rights 
theories available in the literature, it is unlikely that we will find a single theory that meets all 
four conditions. For instance, the self-proclaimed natural rights theory of Finnis fails the third 
condition because its basic principles postulate not rights but goods.
98 
Some other theories fail 
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the fourth condition because they use a constructivist methodology.
99 
However the first two 
conditions are widely satisfied by available natural rights theories. Hence, we can say that the 
natural rights theories have two basic characteristics: 1) they contain some rights (no matter 
how these rights are conceptualized as protected interests, protected choices, or a combination 
of the two) and 2) the criterion of possessing those rights is itself a natural property. 
2.3   Natural rights and human rights 
If we now turn back to the understanding of human rights, in the last century the language of 
natural rights was largely replaced by the language of human rights. According to Finnis, 
‘human rights’ is a contemporary idiom for ‘natural rights’ and he uses the terms 
synonymously. It is a widely accepted view that the two sorts of rights are closely related.
100  
The long-standing understanding of “human rights as natural rights” embraces the most 
common and well-known definition which conceives human rights as moral rights possessed 
by all human beings (at all times and in all places), simply in virtue of being human.
101
 As 
Jean Cohen nicely summarizes:  
The traditional approach frames human rights as moral rights that all individuals have by 
virtue of being human. Accordingly, human rights are universal and have unrestricted 
validity, binding all individuals and societies whatever their religion, tradition, or culture. 
Human rights are deemed to be the most important among moral rights—articulating 
especially valuable goods or interests, particularly weighty moral concerns that all human 
beings have. They are ascribed to all individuals equally.
102 
In his The Idea of Human Rights, Charles Beitz provides a similar characterization of what he 
calls the naturalistic view of human rights:  
This idea [naturalistic view] is open to several interpretations. These have at least two 
elements in common. First, human rights are distinct from positive rights—that is, rights 
actually recognized in a society, or anyway enacted in law. . . . The notion of a right existing 
in a state of nature is one way of conceiving of such a right, although it is not the only way. 
Second, human rights belong to human beings “as such” or “simply in virtue of their 
humanity.” This means, at a minimum, that all human beings are entitled to claim human 
rights. It may also mean that the grounds on which a particular human right may be claimed 
are available to everybody because they inhere somehow in each person’s nature or status as 
a human being. Putting these two points together, naturalistic conceptions regard human 
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rights as having a character and basis that can be fully comprehended without reference to 
their embodiment and role in any public doctrine or practice.
103
 
Hence, two elements form the core of the naturalistic view. First, human rights are not 
contingent on existing laws and social practices. Take, for instance, the natural right to 
freedom mentioned above. Every person is human ‘by nature’, and no human being is ‘by 
nature’ a slave of another human being. If, for example, the laws of every existing society 
condemn a human being to be a slave, s/he or somebody else on her behalf, may yet hold the 
idea that s/he has a “right” to be free. “Man was born free,” said Rousseau, “and everywhere 
he is in chains.”104 So, it might be the case that all men are not free in reality but they ought to 
be (ideally), independent of the laws of all particular societies. So, the idea of natural rights 
transcends the particular historical and political contexts. The second element that forms the 
core of the naturalistic view of human rights is the idea that the ground (s) (or the justificatory 
basis) for making a right-claim inhere(s) somehow in each person’s nature or status as a 
human being. 
These two core elements are obliquely related to and to a large extent overlap with the 
first two conditions that a moral rights theory needs to meet in order to be a natural rights 
theory which I have reconstructed in the previous section (2.2). With respect to human rights, 
the second condition which states that the criterion of a natural right needs to be natural 
property usually turns to be membership to the species. Hence to repeat Sumner’s words: “in 
the natural rights tradition moral rights have standardly been assumed to be human rights, and 
thus membership in our species has been the most popular criterion for being a right-
holder.”105 As I will discuss, different theories propose different qualities as being grounds of 
human rights. 
In this chapter, when I use the term ‘the naturalistic conception of human rights’, I am 
predominantly referring to contemporary philosophical accounts of human rights that propose 
some (not mutually exclusive) conceptions of humanity and fundamental goods as ground(s) 
of human rights such as the agency conception of humanity, the conception of basic interests, 
or the idea of human dignity and freedom.
106
 In the remainder of this section, I will closely 
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examine three recent versions of the naturalistic conception of human rights proposed by Alan 
Gewirth, James Griffin and John Tasioulas.  
I have chosen to focus on Griffin’s account because it is considered to be “the most 
comprehensive recent effort to generate a theory of human rights from naturalistic 
foundations.”107 In particular, the adherents of the political conception of human rights such 
as Beitz and Raz, labelled the conceptions of human rights they are criticizing as naturalistic 
or orthodox conceptions and they perceived Griffin’s theory of human rights as an example of 
the naturalistic approach.
108
 There is not much discussion about Gewirth’s account of human 
rights in the recent philosophical literature of human rights and it is less uncontroversial if his 
account can be called naturalistic. I nevertheless briefly discuss Gewirth’s account in this 
chapter as it will be helpful in illustrating the differences between what I shall call different 
‘modes of justification’ of human rights (see section 2.6).109 Griffin provides an ethical 
justification of human rights in the sense that the right principle is derived from a substantive 
notion of the good whereas Gewirth provides a moral justification of human rights which 
gives moral reasons and is neutral on the question of the good life. The issue of the mode of 
justification (especially whether it is moral or ethical) will be pertinent to an account’s 
vulnerability to the ethnocentrism charge – the charge that it is biased towards one tradition 
(i.e. Western) or a comprehensive conception of the good. After examining Griffin’s theory, I 
briefly examine the account of Tasioulas as another example of the naturalistic view because 
he takes up Griffin’s approach and modifies it towards a pluralistic grounding of human 
rights. He also positions himself against the political approaches as he defends the need to 
provide a moral grounding of human rights.
110
 
 It is worth mentioning here that there is no very clear understanding of what counts as a 
natural conception of human rights within the literature on political conceptions of human 
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rights. Beitz acknowledges this point by saying that there is not an unambiguous target of 
naturalistic conception because i) the idea of natural rights has a long history and has changed 
over time, and ii) there are different interpretations of in what sense natural rights may be said 
to be ‘natural’.111 Notwithstanding this ambiguity over what counts as a naturalistic human 
right theory, Griffin’s personhood or agency theory of human rights is generally considered to 
be a lucid account of the naturalistic conception of human rights in the literature.
112
 Moreover, 
as I will discuss below, Griffin himself claims that his approach is naturalistic (in an 
expansive sense of ‘naturalism’ in his view). Although there are other accounts which can be 
considered as naturalistic, for the time being what is important for my analysis is the 
exemplification of an understanding of the nature of human rights conceived independently of 
the embodiment of human rights in international practice which is the main problem with 
naturalistic accounts according to defenders of the political conception.
113
  
2.3.1   Alan Gewirth: Human action as the basis of human rights 
In Reason and Morality and in a series of articles, Gewirth has presented a theory of the basis 
and content of human rights through a moral justification.
114
 He begins with a depiction of the 
concept of right proposing that the full structure of Hohfeld’s claim-right is given by the 
following formula: 
                 A has a right to X against B by virtue of Y.   
There are five main components here:  
I. The Subject (A) of the right, the person who has it, 
II. The Nature of the right, what being a right consists in,  
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III. The Object (X) of the right, what a right is a right to, 
IV. The Respondent (B) of the right, the person or persons who have the correlative 
duty, 
V. The Justifying Basis or Ground (Y) of the right.115 
When rights in question are human rights, Gewirth argues, both the subjects and respondents 
(elements I and IV) comprise all human beings equally; the objects (element III) are certain 
essential interests of human beings as prospective purposive agents; the nature of a right 
(element II) is an individual’s interest that ought to be respected and protected; and the 
justifying basis (element IV) is a stringently rational supreme principle of morality.
116
  
It is crucial to elucidate Gewirth’s moral justification of human rights here as it will be 
illustrative of the taxonomy I give between different modes of justification in section 2.6. 
Gewirth starts by postulating that human rights are derived in essence from humanity’s moral 
nature and that “agency or action is the common subject of all morality and practice.”117 He 
proposes a formulation about the nature of human rights such that rights are “personally 
oriented normatively necessary moral requirements” and he goes on to provide moral reasons 
to justify or ground moral requirements that constitute the nature of human rights.
 118
 He argues 
that the justification of our claims to basic rights is grounded in what he believes the 
distinguishing characteristic of human beings: the capacity for rational purposive agency. 
Freedom and well-being, the argument goes, are the necessary conditions for rationally 
purposive action. As they are prerequisites for purposive action, each individual is entitled to 
have access to freedom and well-being. Gewirth then moves from the idea that freedom and 
well-being are necessary conditions of her action to the requirement that she ought to recognize 
that other people also have rights to freedom and well-being. This requirement to recognize 
others as right bearers is due to what Gewirth calls the principle of generic consistency (PGC) 
expressed as: “[a]pply to your recipient the same generic features of action that you apply to 
yourself.”119  
Gewirth argues that an agent has to accept that other people as being prospective purposive 
agents also have rights. Otherwise, the agent will logically contradict herself and be irrational. 
An agent cannot logically will his/her own claims to basic rights without simultaneously 
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accepting the equal claims of rationally purposive agents to the same basic rights. “The 
argument for the PGC has”, Gewirth claims, “dialectically established that the human rights 
have as their objects the necessary conditions of action and successful action in general and that 
all humans equally have rights.”120 In Gewirth’s justification of human rights the justifying 
basis or ground of human rights is a normative moral principle that serves to prove or establish 
that every human morally ought, as a matter of normative necessity, to have the necessary 
goods as things to which he is personally entitled, “which he can claim from others as his 
due.”121  
Without being able to do justice to the rich account of human rights that Gewirth 
provides, I will briefly discuss in what sense Gewirth’s account can be considered as 
naturalistic. Gewirth, himself claims that his argument for human rights is not 
straightforwardly naturalistic in the sense that it does not proceed assertorically but rather 
dialectically. According to Gewirth, an assertoric argument for human rights is in the form, 
“someone is human or has some humanly related property, such as rationality or capacity for 
agency or various needs, therefore he or she has rights.”122 He rather provides what he calls a 
dialectically necessary argument. What he means is that “the argument has established not 
that persons have rights tout court but rather that all agents logically must claim or at least 
accept that they have certain rights.”123 In other words, it is possible and indeed logically 
necessary to infer rights claims to objects which are the proximate necessary conditions of 
human agency or ‘human action’ as Gewirth prefers to name it.124  
Gewirth criticizes (Aristotelian) naturalistic foundations and offers an alternative moral 
theory which, he claims, may be construed as a theory of natural law with certain 
qualifications.
125
 Gewirth’s moral theory is not ontologically grounded in the nature of the 
human—on what human beings essentially are—but rather on human action:  
Now while human action is indeed a pervasive feature of the general human condition, 
human action reflects not human nature per se but rather a certain development of it, since it 
consists in man’s purposive or intentional control of his natural tendencies. Thus human 
nature is the necessary condition of human action, but not its sufficient condition. At the 
same time the concept of human action is morally neutral and hence not question-begging in 
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the present context, because a concern with how persons are to act is common to all 
moralities, regardless of their highly divergent contents.
126
  
 
Therefore, Gewirth acknowledges that his moral principle of generic consistency (PGC) 
shares with natural law theories the characteristics of what he calls ontological groundedness 
(being based on essential features of the nature of the human) but only in the modified form 
since the generic features of action do not derive from man’s nature per se but from a certain 
purposive development of it.
127
 According to Gewirth “[t]he metaphysical level is provided by 
the concept of the human action as the ontological and justificatory context of the principle of 
human rights.”128 Hence, unlike Griffin whose justification I will discuss in the next section, 
Gewirth does not provide an ethical justification dependent on a particular notion of the good. 
Nevertheless he does not aim to offer a post-metaphysical justification, nor does he deny the 
need for a justification of human rights.
129
 Moreover, for Gewirth human rights are moral 
rights and the content of human rights is derived from the application of PGC to different 
contexts and problems. He provides a justification of human rights by simply arguing that 
they are prerequisites of the purposive agency of individuals and without reference to their 
embodiment or role in any public doctrine or practice. Hence to the extent that he perceives 
human rights to be primarily moral rights without referring to their legal character and 
embodiment in international law, Gewirth’s account resembles the naturalistic conception of 
human rights. 
130
 I will now move to the examination of the theory of human rights proposed 
by Griffin, which is often considered to be one of the most canonical contemporary examples 
of a naturalistic conception of human rights.  
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2.3.2   James Griffin: Normative agency as the ground of human rights 
James Griffin’s account of human rights has been considered one of the most prominent 
contemporary versions of the naturalistic conception of human rights.
131 
In his most recent 
book On Human Rights, he suggests that “human rights can be seen as protections of our 
human standing, or personhood.” 132 
Griffin starts with complaining about a state of “indeterminateness of sense” about the 
term ‘human rights’. He argues that when the theological content of the term was abandoned 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, the term was left with very few criteria for 
determining the correct and incorrect use of the term. As a result of this indeterminateness of 
sense, Griffin believes, the language of human rights has become “debased.”133 This is 
because in our time there is a proliferation of rights or in Griffin’s words “a growth of the 
extension of the term.”134 The idea of human rights plays an increasingly central role in 
contemporary moral and political life. This growth of the extension of the term makes the 
understanding of its intension more important whereas it remains especially thin. 
In order to remedy this indeterminateness of sense, Griffin aims to “add to the evaluative 
content of the term.”135 According to Griffin, there has not been much theoretical 
development of the idea of human rights since its emergence by the end of the Enlightenment. 
Without doubt, there have been some sort of (institutional) developments such as the 
development of the League of Nations, treaties and basic mechanisms for the international 
protection of human rights but “none has been added to the idea itself. The idea is still that of 
a right we have simply in virtue of being human, with no further explanation of what ‘human’ 
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means here.”136 He argues that there is a common agreement that human rights are derived 
from ‘human standing’ or ‘human nature’, but virtually no agreement about the relevant sense 
of these two supposedly criteria-providing terms.
137
 He aims to provide an account of human 
rights which has some criteria to tell us whether any such proposed right really is one and 
which, as such, makes a (philosophical) contribution towards the completion of the 
incomplete idea of human rights.
138
 
Before developing his own account, Griffin makes two classifications of different 
approaches to explaining rights: 1) a distinction between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ 
accounts and 2) a distinction between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ accounts.139 Structural 
accounts characterize rights largely by their formal features. Joel Feinberg’s account of rights, 
which says that a right is a claim with two features, is a highly structural one. The first feature 
is that a right is a claim against specifiable individuals and second, it is a claim to their actions 
or omissions on one’s behalf.140 Dworkin’s view that ‘rights are trumps’ is another highly 
structural account.
141
 But according to Griffin, an account of human rights must have more 
substantive evaluative elements than those supplied by any of the predominantly structural 
accounts we now have.
142
 For instance, we need to know how to attach moral weight to both 
rights and to different levels of the general good as well as a sketch of the highly vague term 
‘human dignity’, especially in its role as a ground for human rights.143 
According to Griffin there are generally two ways for philosophy to supply a more 
substantive account of human rights. This brings us to Griffin’s second distinction between 
top-down and bottom-up approaches. In his words:  
There is a top-down approach: one starts with an overarching principle, or principles, or an 
authoritative decision procedure—say, the principle of utility or the Categorical Imperative 
or the model of parties to a contract reaching agreement—from which human rights can then 
be derived. Most accounts of rights in philosophy these days are top-down. Then there is a 
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bottom-up approach: one starts with human rights as used in our actual social life by 
politicians, lawyers, social campaigners, as well as theorists of various sorts, and then sees 
what higher principles one must resort to in order to explain their moral weight, when one 
thinks they have it, and to resolve conflicts between them.
144
 
After indicating that both approaches should be welcomed and that they can be compatible, 
Griffin states that he has adopted the bottom-up approach. Starting not from an a priori 
commitment to an off-the-shelf general moral theory but from the history of the idea of a right 
in the human rights tradition that originates in the late medieval period, Griffin proposes a 
substantive account in the spirit of that tradition. The basic theme running through this 
tradition and about which Griffin thinks there is no harm in continuing to speak is our sense 
of “a distinctively ‘human’ existence.”145 Here Griffin makes the assertion that we value our 
status as human beings highly and that human rights can be seen as protections of our human 
standing. For him, our distinctively human existence centers on our being agents or as he calls 
it, ‘our personhood’. Griffin identifies personhood with “normative agency” which he 
describes as having three parts:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
[O]ne can break down the notion of personhood into clearer components by breaking down 
the notion of agency. To be an agent, in the fullest sense of which we are capable, one must 
(first) choose one’s own path through life—that is, not be dominated or controlled by 
someone or something else (call it ‘autonomy’). And (second) one’s choice must be real; 
one must have at least a certain minimum education and information. And having chosen, 
one must then be able to act; that is, one must have at least the minimum provision of 
resources and capabilities that it takes (call all of this ‘minimum provision’). And none of 
this is any good if someone then blocks one; so (third) others must also not forcibly stop one 
from pursuing what one sees as a worthwhile life (call this ‘liberty’). Because we attach 
such high value to our individual personhood, we see its domain of exercise as privileged 
and protected.
146
 
As is clear from the last sentence in the above paragraph, Griffin’s  intuitive idea is that 
because we regard the exercise of our personhood as having especially high value, we see its 
domain as privileged and in need of protection. And, the substance and content of human 
rights are to be grasped in terms of their strategic role in protecting our personhood or our 
normative agency which is a precondition for “deliberating, assessing, choosing and acting to 
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make what we see as a good life for ourselves.”147 The gist of Griffin’s argument is that we 
should primarily ground human rights in personhood. And we can generate most of the 
conventional list of human rights from this ground. However, Griffin argues that personhood 
cannot be the only ground needed for human rights, because it leaves many human rights too 
indeterminate. We also need to take into account practical considerations, what Griffin calls 
‘practicalities’ to make the content of the right determinate enough. Griffin uses the term 
‘practicalities’ to refer to “features of human nature and of the nature of human societies.”148 
Hence, Griffin states:  
I propose, therefore, only two grounds for human rights: personhood and practicalities. The 
existence conditions for a human right would, then, be these. One establishes the existence 
of such a right by showing, first, that it protects an essential feature of human standing and, 
second, that its determinate content results from the sorts of practical considerations.
149
 
 
In what sense is Griffin’s account naturalistic? Here, Griffin explains that his account is not 
based on a conception of human nature if one upholds a narrow conception of nature which 
excludes value. Griffin does not make a species argument which claims that having the factual 
properties of homo sapiens is constitutive of having a distinct human existence. Rights are not 
derived from something objective and factual about human beings. Hence, Griffin claims his 
account is not naturalistic in this sense of the term ‘natural’. Neither does he claim that rights 
are derived from value judgments which are a matter of taste. He claims that the right position 
is a kind of naturalism, but an expansive (not a reductive) one.  
    In the usual kind of reductive naturalism the boundaries of the ‘factual’ and ‘natural’ 
are kept relatively tight. Such forms of naturalism are influenced by David Hume’s view that 
values cannot be derived from facts. Griffin mentions that Hume’s dichotomy of fact and 
value depends upon his narrow conception of fact. Griffin, subsequently, claims that the most 
plausible interpretation of ‘nature’ is an expansive one rather than the narrow interpretation of 
Hume. In an expansive naturalism, the boundaries of ‘natural’ or ‘factual’ are pushed outward 
so that they now encompass human interests and also events such as these interests being met 
or unmet. Griffin singles out values of personhood via notions of autonomy and liberty as 
being especially important ‘human interests’. And rights are derived from these interests: they 
are interests, hence they are especially important and therefore need protection. Griffin 
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claims, in this sense, that he draws the notions of human nature and human agency inside the 
normative circle. This is not in line with a narrow understanding of ‘nature’ (the kind of 
reductive naturalism), but is in line with an “expansive naturalism.”150 
Hence, in Griffin’s account the criterion for assigning rights to some group of people is 
their having normative agency.
151 
The underlying model of rights in this account resembles 
more the choice model than interest model of rights, as the normative anchor is set on the 
notions of personhood and agency rather than the interests of the human individual.
152
 So, if 
we reconstruct the conditions developed in the earlier section, in Griffin’s account: 1) a model 
of rights as protected choices (as the protection of individual autonomy) is employed, 2) it 
assigns some set of rights to some set of individuals on the basis of their having normative 
agency, and (2.a) treats normative agency as natural in the sense of an expansive naturalism. 
What about the justification of those rights in Griffin’s account? How are the rights 
derived and what is their place in moral theory? The steps in Griffin’s justification can be 
briefly summarized as such:      
i) The human rights tradition including the linguistic community of “philosophers, 
political theorists, international lawyers, jurisprudents, civil servants, politicians, and 
human rights activists” furnishes us with the idea that human rights are grounded in 
our status as human beings.
153
 
ii) Human dignity is identified as the valuable status protected by human rights. 
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iii) At the core of human dignity is our normative agency—“our capacity to reflect on, to 
choose and to pursue what we ourselves decide is a good life.”154  
iv) Normative agents have values of personhood (autonomy, liberty, minimum provision). 
v) Since human rights protect our status as normative agents, they protect these values of 
personhood. 
vi) Human rights norms arise from this importance attached to values of personhood and 
the requirements of practicality. 
Griffin’s justification of human rights is not ‘foundationalist’ in a highly ambitious sense. 
Ambitiously foundationalist views have the ambition of showing that a schedule of human 
rights can be derived from a conception of human nature that is both historically invariant and 
contains no evaluative content.
155
 Rather than being foundationalist in this sense of grounding 
ethical thinking on objective facts about human nature, Griffin’s ethical justification derives 
human rights norms from the double criteria of values of personhood and requirements of 
practicality. The values of personhood underlying the human rights norms are “interests that 
are central to normally functioning human agency”; hence the notion of ‘human’ invoked by 
Griffin’s theory is a “normatively loaded one.”156 
Although not foundationalist in the strict sense, Griffin’s theory is a substantive theory of 
human rights. In contrast to those views which claim that there is no need for justification of 
human rights (see section 2.6), Griffin is concerned to set the conditions that need to be met 
for a norm to be a human right. His account is substantive in a further way that he grounds 
human rights in human goods, particularly the goods of personhood. As such, Griffin’s 
justification is one of ethical justification in which a substantive notion of the good grounds 
human rights. Deontological justifications on the other hand, justify human rights without 
making reference to a substantive notion of good but rather to a moral principle or rule.
157
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Analysing Griffin’s view, Rainer Forst provides a criticism of the ethical justifications of 
human rights. Using a distinction between morality and ethics as developed by Habermas and 
Dworkin, Forst argues that “a conception of human rights needs to have independent and 
sufficient moral substance and justification, though not one of an ethical kind that relies on a 
conception of the good. In the context at hand, an ethical justification rests on a notion of the 
good life, even if it is a very general one, while a moral justification is supposed to be neutral 
as to the question of the good or worthwhile life.”158 
Griffin derives human rights from a basic interest in pursuing the good. Certain subjective 
interests are considered to be fundamental for normative agency and they are turned into 
intersubjectively justifiable claims for rights. Normative agency understood as our capacity to 
“choose and to pursue our conceptions of a worthwhile life” stands at the center of Griffin’s 
view.
159
 So even though Griffin does not attach human rights to any particular notion of the 
good, the autonomy or the capacity of choosing what we see as a good life for ourselves, or 
being “self-deciders” about our good life is the core of our human status. On this view, the 
good life can only be called as such, if it is autonomously chosen and pursued. This is a 
reasonable belief, Forst says, but it is a belief “which might also be doubted by someone who 
believes the good to consist in following a higher calling or in one’s duties as a member of a 
particular community in a traditional sense.”160 Hence, Griffin has a partial, non-
universalizable conception of the good and such a conception cannot ground universal human 
rights. 
Moreover, even if we grant the claim that autonomy is an essential condition of the 
pursuit of the good, the moral weight of a general duty to respect others as autonomous agents 
does not follow without an additional moral consideration. Forst argues that to shift from a 
personal prudence perspective to general morality, “a procedure of intersubjective 
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justification seems to be necessary as the main generator of normativity.”161 Griffin does not 
give such an intersubjective justification; the explication of the translation of the first-person 
subjective interests (of a prudential ethical value for me) to general moral rights (to a moral 
reason for all) is missing in his account. 
Griffin’s account of human rights is occasionally cited as a contemporary version of the 
naturalistic conception of human rights and it is criticized for reasons which I have briefly 
discussed. Another kind of objection to the personhood account of Griffin is provided by John 
Tasioulas. He criticizes Griffin’s account not because it is naturalistic or it has an ethical 
justification, but because it grounds human rights only in personhood. I will explicate this line 
of criticism in the next section.
162
 
2.3.3   John Tasioulas: Pluralistic grounding of human rights 
John Tasioulas recommends the adoption of a systematic approach to human rights.
163
 In 
Griffin’s formulation a systematic approach starts by developing a theory of values, then a 
theory of ethics in general, then a theory of rights in general, followed by theories of legal 
rights and moral rights, and finally a theory of human rights, either moral or legal.
164
 
Tasioulas adopts a less ambitious version of the systematic approach which Griffin calls a 
“semi systematic approach.”165  
Instead of starting from a theory of value in general, Tasioulas starts from a theory of 
moral obligation within which moral rights and human rights are situated. He states that he 
does not have an ambitious aim of giving a definition of a moral right. Neither does he insist 
that one should take sides in the long-standing controversy between the proponents of 
‘interest’ and ‘will’ theories of rights. Instead he elaborates on three important features of 
moral rights relevant for a conception of human rights. These features are: 1) moral rights are 
sources of moral duties or obligations. Moral duties are categorical (i.e. apply to an agent 
regardless of the agent’s motivation) and exclusionary (i.e. they exclude some of the 
competing reasons from bearing on what the duty-bearer should do) in their normative force, 
2) individual moral rights are grounded in some normatively salient feature of the individual 
right holder (e.g. in the interests or normative status of the right holder) and 3) moral rights 
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have a directed character in the sense that they are held by identifiable individuals.
166
 This 
threefold characterization of moral rights, Tasioulas argues, begins to explain why human 
rights properly qualify as individual moral rights, as opposed to interests, values, claims, 
goals or moral considerations of some other kind.
167
 
 Taking Griffin’s account as his focus, Tasioulas argues that personhood values alone are 
inadequate for grounding human rights. Instead, Tasioulas proposes a pluralist account of 
human rights such that prudential values other than values of personhood can give rise to 
rights all individuals have in virtue of being a human being. He suggests that it is not 
implausible to think that other values such as the value of accomplishments, the basic interest 
of avoiding pain and the value of understanding may contribute to the justification of the 
human rights to work, not to be tortured and to education respectively. Tasioulas argues that 
Griffin’s personhood account provides an implausibly indirect justification of the 
paradigmatic human rights. For instance, Griffin provides an indirect justification of one 
paradigmatic human right, the right not to be tortured, by its adverse impact on our 
personhood by “render[ing] us unable to decide for ourselves or to stick to our decision.”168 
On the other hand, a pluralist account might make a more intuitively plausible justification of 
the right not be tortured by resting it directly in the victim’s interest in avoiding severe pain 
and suffering. 
In addition to “a more natural and secure style of justification for paradigmatic human 
rights”, Tasioulas suggests two further advantages of the pluralistic grounding of human 
rights.
169
 First, for the reason that a pluralist account expands the range of interests that 
ground human rights it augments more effectively the idea that human rights are moral norms 
of substantial normative force. Second, “a pluralistic grounding of human rights enhances the 
prospects of justifying the applicability of human rights to cultures which do not place such a 
high value on autonomy and liberty as Western cultures.”170 By not grounding human rights 
exclusively on personhood values, pluralist accounts are better equipped to respond to the 
recurrent objection of “parochialism” or “ethnocentrism.”171 In short, starting from a criticism 
of Griffin’s grounding of human rights exclusively on personhood values; Tasioulas defends 
an account of human rights as a subset of moral rights although “rudimentary and 
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incomplete.”172 As grounding human rights in a plurality of substantive goods, Tasioulas’ 
pluralist account is subject to some of the general criticism directed to the naturalistic 
conception in general which I will examine in section 2.5.  
2.4   Are there a human right to work and a human right to housing? 
In this section, I will examine the implications of the naturalistic conception’s general 
perspective on human rights for an evaluation of the claims that there is a human right to work 
and a human right to adequate housing. Before starting, it is important to emphasize that the 
right to work (it is also called the right to employment) is not the only norm in the area of 
work; there are other related rights and goals such as the right to free choice of employment, 
the right to unemployment benefits during unemployment, an entitlement to decent working 
conditions and to fair remuneration, etc.
173
  
The naturalistic conception of human rights starts from a ground (or multiple grounds) in 
order to develop a conception of human rights. First, a basis or ground which delineates the 
important features of human beings is identified. This basis subsequently leads to a list of 
human rights.
174
 For instance, Gewirth devotes the last two chapters of Reason and Morality 
to what he calls ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ applications of his moral principle of generic 
consistency (PGC). Direct applications concern interpersonal actions of particular individuals 
such as the resolution of ethical dilemmas in which individuals’ rights to freedom and well-
being clash in some way with another person’s well-being. Indirect application of the PGC 
concerns social rules and institutions. Here Gewirth discusses the kinds of social rules that 
should shape voluntary associations among people, government, civil liberties and society’s 
effort to meet social and welfare needs of its members. Gewirth’s 1996 book Community of 
Rights, is a sequel to Reason and Morality, especially with regard to the indirect applications 
of the PGC. In this book, he expands on the indirect applications to social and economic 
rights as he states that this book can be regarded as “an attempt to give a philosophical 
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elucidation and specification of some of the main economic and social rights set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of human rights by showing how they can be derived, by various 
modes of argument from a single rationally justified moral principle that serves to ground 
their more specific contents.”175   
The right to employment is one of the cornerstones of Gewirth’s community of rights 
which he derives from the principle of generic consistency. Gewirth offers an elaborate set of 
arguments concerning the right to employment, the state’s obligation to provide employment 
opportunities, and the state’s obligation to minimize opportunities for employers to exploit 
workers for personal profit.
176
 Without being able to go into the details of Gewirth’s 
arguments, what is important for me is that he argues in favor of a moral right to employment 
because of its crucial impact on well-being and freedom. 
In a similar manner, after developing his personhood account of human rights, Griffin 
describes the three highest-level rights: to autonomy, liberty and minimum provision.
177 
In a 
next stage, he reflects on the discrepancies between the lower-level human rights that emerge 
from his philosophical account and the lists derived from the most authoritative declarations 
in international law. Griffin checks the items in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) and the International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural 
Rights (1966) to identify the acceptable, unacceptable and debatable items in these 
documents seen through the lens of his personhood account.  
Here, I will briefly examine the implications of Griffin’s account for the specific rights 
claims I have focused on in the previous chapter: the right to work and the right to housing. 
With respect to the former, Griffin explicitly states that on his account, there is not a human 
right to work.
178
 He argues that there is certainly a human right to the minimum resources 
needed to live as a normative agent, but those resources do not need to come from work. 
Since work is one of the most effective means to have access to these material resources, it is 
plausible to think that we have a right to work. But according to Griffin, the right to work 
enlisted in the human rights documents is the application of an abstract universal right to 
adequate material provision required for agency and “to options to live in productive, 
interesting and enjoyable way” in a particular time and place.179 This universal form of 
abstract right applied to current societies is formulated as a right to work; we value work in 
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our societies as it is the most effective means to having adequate material provision and it 
enhances one’s feeling of self-worth as being productive and contributing to society. Yet, 
Griffin argues, if in an advanced technological society there would not be enough work for 
everyone, and those without work are equally provided with resources needed to live as an 
agent, we cannot say that the human rights of the unemployed are violated. For this reason, 
Griffin classifies the right to work as an unacceptable item in the human rights documents. 
For Griffin, there is a human right to the minimum resources to live as an agent, which 
would typically, but not necessarily, be secured through work. However, as Tasioulas argues 
this seems too quick and problematic on two counts. First, the fact that we can conceive of a 
society in which work is not the necessary means to securing the minimum resources needed 
for agency does not mean that it cannot be a human right. We can similarly envisage a world 
order in which the national borders and state sovereignty are abolished but this does not 
diminish the case that there is a right to nationality now—which is recognized as a human 
right in Griffin’s account.180 Second, Tasioulas argues that there can be grounds other than 
personhood such as self-respect and personal accomplishments that justify a right to work. A 
non-personhood value such as the universal interest in accomplishment can be invoked to 
justify a human right to work, in the following way:  
(1) [T]here is a universal interest in accomplishment and one particularly central way in 
which it can be satisfied is through engaging in productive and remunerative activity, (2) 
this interest is closely related to the sense of our dignity as adult human beings; in particular, 
to our capacity for full, rather than second-class, status in our communities, and (3) that 
interest (together with any other relevant interests realized through productive employment, 
such as enjoyment, autonomy and so on) is sufficiently important to justify the existence of 
a right to work possessed by all humans, one that imposes duties on others (primarily on 
state institutions, perhaps) to create decent work opportunities, and (4) the existence of such 
a right is not vitiated by considerations of practical feasibility.
181 
Therefore, one can argue that there is a moral meaning of work that is independent of its value 
as a means of securing an adequate level of material provision. From this moral meaning one 
can justify the existence of a right to work which gives room to arguments about how the 
correlative duties are assigned. For instance it can be objected that a human right is violated if 
a state prohibits some group of people from holding jobs (i.e. women, religious minorities 
etc.) even though they are granted minimum material provision. There can be correlative 
duties of this right in the sense such that states make sure that people are not systematically 
excluded from employment, or in the stronger sense that the government can become the 
employer of last resort. These are further considerations about the duties associated with the 
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right to work if there is such a right and how this right is given institutional expression (e.g. 
implementing mechanisms for compensating those deprived of work or for apportioning 
available work among people who wish to work, etc.) —to which I will turn to in the next 
chapter. At this point, it is sufficient to say that the route the naturalistic conception takes is 
first delineating the ground (or grounds) of human rights and then from this ground 
developing the list of human rights.  
The implications of the naturalistic conception with respect to the right to housing is less 
direct than the case of the right to work because there is not much explicit discussion about 
the right to housing in the literature. If we conceive the right to adequate housing as part of 
the minimum provision necessary to support life as a normative agent, we can say that 
Griffin’s personhood account generates a positive right to housing. As Griffin states, what is 
needed to function as a normative agent will be “air, food, water, shelter, rest, health, 
companionship, education and so on.”182 It is now common to acknowledge that welfare 
rights and liberty rights are indivisible in the sense that one needs to be alive and have 
supporting goods in order to be free and autonomous agents. Even the most parsimonious 
accounts of human rights recognize welfare rights as being basic rights for securing basic 
needs. Nevertheless, there can be different arguments for a human right to welfare such as 
welfare for effective citizenship in a modern liberal democracy
183
 or Griffin’s argument that 
there is a human right to welfare as necessary conditions of normative agency. 
However, recall that the people in the struggles claim a right to housing and the broader 
‘right to the city’ as a response to their being forced to leave their neighborhoods due to the 
implementation of urban transformation projects. If this claim is associated with freedom of 
residence (Article 13.1 of Universal Declaration), the implications for Griffin’s account are 
less trivial than the conception of the right to housing within welfare rights. This is because, 
according to Griffin, there is not a human right to residence as soon as the basic amenities (a 
decent education system, adequate material provision, so on) are provided. “One’s 
personhood would not be threatened if one were required to live in a particular place, so long 
as the basic amenities are provided.”184 According to Griffin’s understanding the people in 
squatter houses may have a preference for living in the city center and the places in which 
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they are already settled, but it is not the case that the policy relocating these people violates a 
human right as long as the basic amenities in the designated living spaces are provided.  
This brief reflection on the application of the naturalistic conception to the specific rights 
to housing and work does not aim to give a definite answer to the question: Are there human 
rights to housing and work according to the naturalistic conception? This reflection rather 
exposes that the route taken by the naturalistic conception is to first develop a philosophical 
account of human rights with ground, justification and content of human rights and then 
compare it with the main human rights documents. Different versions of the naturalistic 
conception can arrive at different lists of human rights and as we have seen with respect to the 
right to work, the same right can be denied as a human right by one account (i.e. Griffin’s 
personhood account) whereas it is accepted as a human right by another version of the 
naturalistic conception (i.e. Gewirth’s agency account or Tasioulas’s pluralist account). From 
a very similar basis such as human agency, Gewirth and Griffin derive very divergent sets of 
rights and with a different mode of justification. I will examine these different modes of 
justification in section 2.6 but before that I would like to review some of the most common 
objections to the naturalistic conception of human rights.  
2.5   Objections to the naturalistic conception of human rights 
One can find the objections raised against the idea of natural rights from the very beginning of 
the discussion of natural rights of the human individual in the moral and political philosophies 
of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Thomas Paine. The first critics of the idea of inalienable 
natural rights were Edmund Burke and Jeremy Bentham. They claimed that rights arise out of 
laws, from the actions of government or evolve from tradition. Bentham famously dismissed 
the idea of natural rights as “nonsense upon stilts” as he states: “right with me is the child of 
law… a natural right is a son that never had a father.”185 It is possible to divide the reasons of 
Bentham’s opposition to natural rights into two broad categories: the conceptual and the 
substantive. The assertion of such rights, he claims, is absurd in logic and pernicious in 
morals.
186
 The conceptual criticism is that the idea of natural rights is a logical absurdity, a 
contradiction in terms. His argument, as Sumner reconstructs it, is as follows: “(1) there can 
be no rights without rules (laws); (2) there can be no natural moral rules (laws); (3) there can 
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be no natural rights.”187 Leaving the details of the argument aside, Bentham’s skeptical 
argument casts doubt on the possibility of providing existence conditions for natural rights by 
comparing them to conventional rights. The substantive criticism is that, according to 
Bentham, not rights but utility should serve as the basic standard of moral assessment. For 
Bentham, the language of natural rights is “from the beginning to the end so much flat 
assertion.”188  
Hannah Arendt was one of the prominent thinkers of the twentieth century who also 
criticized the idea of natural rights. Although she is more well-known for her work on the 
subjects of politics, authority and totalitarianism, her notion of “the right to have rights” 
which she first articulated in The Origins of Totalitarianism has also been very influential. 
She has been considered as one of the early thinkers to make a systematic criticism of natural 
rights from a political perspective. Echoing Edmund Burke’s critique of the French 
Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man that human rights were an “abstraction”, 
Arendt claimed that the conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a 
human being as such, broke down at the very moment when we are confronted with people 
who have lost all their qualities (e.g. their citizenship, social status) and specific relationships 
except their humanity. “The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being 
human.”189 Abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was the greatest danger for the 
victims of extermination and concentration camps, for the stateless people and refugees. The 
human being who had lost her right to have rights, her place in a political community, her 
political status in the struggle of her time, and her legal personality is left with those qualities 
which can become articulated only in the sphere of private life and reduced to “mere 
existence” in all matters of public concern.190 
Recently criticism of the naturalistic conception of human rights is articulated from the 
viewpoint of the defenders of the purportedly alternative political conception that has become 
popular after the publication of John Rawls’s Law of Peoples in 1999. One can divide the 
concerns about the naturalistic conceptions of human rights into two categories: (a) concerns 
about the naturalistic conception as such and (b) concerns about specific versions of the 
naturalistic conception (e.g., Griffin’s agency account).191 In section 2.3.2 above, I have 
briefly discussed Forst’s objection to Griffin’s ethical justification of human rights. Below, I 
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will discuss objections to the naturalistic conception in general under two headings of; i) 
concerns about “ordinary moral reasoning”, and ii) concerns about an ahistorical notion of 
universality. 
As I discussed before, it is not very clear for the defenders of the political conception 
what counts as a natural conception. Notwithstanding the differences between particular 
versions, when defenders of the political conception refer to a very wide range of human 
rights theories as naturalistic, they most of the time refer to the views that offer an 
understanding of the nature of human rights conceived independently of institutional 
structures and the embodiment of human rights in international practice.
192
 
2.5.1   The concern about ordinary moral reasoning 
The first concern stems from Rawls’s objection to grounding human rights (as part of his Law 
of Peoples) on “any particular comprehensive religious doctrine or philosophical doctrine of 
human nature.”193 Liao and Etinson call this concern “the concern about Ordinary Moral 
Reasoning.”194 They argue that according to Rawls, one should not use ordinary moral 
reasoning to ground human rights. In other words, one should not use “a theological, 
philosophical or moral conception of the nature of the human person” to ground human 
rights.
195
 
The reconstruction of Rawls’s argument against ordinary moral reasoning is as follows: 
Rawls aims to develop a ‘Law of Peoples’, a set of principles and norms (including human 
rights) of international law and practice, that ‘well-ordered people’ can freely agree as a basis 
to govern their mutual relationships and thereby establish a mutually respectful peace.
196
 By 
well-ordered people he means liberal peoples and decent peoples together.
197
 Rawls argues 
that grounding human rights on any particular comprehensive or religious doctrine of human 
nature would involve religious or philosophical doctrines that can be objectionable from the 
perspective of decent hierarchical peoples as being distinctive of Western political tradition 
and prejudicial to other cultures.
198
 To avoid being ethnocentric in this sense, Rawls suggests 
that liberal and decent peoples agree not on the grounds but on the role of human rights in the 
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Law of Peoples. According to Rawls, this role of human rights in the Law of Peoples is to 
restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct and to specify limits to a regime’s 
internal autonomy.
199
   
According to Rawls, if the law of peoples were justified by ordinary forms of moral 
reasoning, whether religious, philosophical, or moral, this may render the law of peoples 
unacceptable from the point of view of some well-ordered peoples who hold incompatible 
religious, philosophical, and moral views. Rawls’s alternative proposal is that liberal and 
decent peoples should appeal to what he calls public reason. Public reason, Rawls explains, is 
the reason of free and equal peoples, and its principles are not derived from any particular 
moral, religious, or philosophical view; instead they are grounded in values and ideas that can 
be shared by both liberal and decent peoples. By grounding moral norms in prudential values, 
the naturalist tradition goes against the strategy advocated by Rawls, “who presents them as 
part of a distinctively political conception of justice, one that stands free of any 
comprehensive moral, religious or metaphysical doctrine.”200  
2.5.2   The concern about timelessness and irrelevance to the practice 
Apart from the ordinary moral reasoning concern, another concern raised by proponents of the 
political conception to naturalistic accounts is that they are invariant across time and space 
and that they are irrelevant to the international practice of human rights. 
Beitz and Raz argue that the idea of the naturalist tradition that all human beings at all 
times and places have human rights seems to be timeless. If we look at some of the human 
rights currently recognized by international practice such as “the right to education” or “the 
right to social security”, they presuppose certain social structures and practices hence it does 
not make much sense to say all human beings at all times and places have them. As Raz 
argues it does not make much sense that the right to education and the distinctions between 
elementary, technical and higher education as is stated in the Article 26 (1) of the Universal 
Declaration applies to cave dwellers in the Stone Age.
201 
Similarly, Beitz says that: 
The third feature of natural rights is that their requirements are invariant across time and 
space. The natural rights of the tradition were supposed to be timeless in this way, but as I 
observed earlier (§ 5), it is hard to see how some of the rights of the declaration could 
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qualify: consider, for example, the rights to social security or, again, to free elementary 
education (arts. 22, 26). It is reasonably clear from examples like these that its framers could 
not have intended the doctrine of human rights to apply, for example, to the ancient Greeks 
or to China in the Ch’in dynasty or to European societies in the Middle Ages. International 
human rights, to judge by the contents of the doctrine, are suited to play a role in a certain 
range of societies.
202
 
In short, proponents of the political conception argue that human rights make sense only if 
one considers the historical contexts and social practices they are embedded in or they refer 
to. Considering human rights to be timeless, naturalistic conceptions fail to illuminate or may 
even distort the ‘nature’ of human rights as we find them in international political practice. 
The answer of Liao and Etinson to this timelessness critique is that we can plausibly 
explain the existences of some contemporary human rights such as the right to education 
without abandoning the claim that human rights are timeless by making a distinction between 
basic rights and derived rights or between the aim and the object of a right.
203 
The idea is that 
some basic rights or the aim (goal or end) of a right can be thought to be timeless if we 
consider them as protections of some fundamental underlying values or goals which bear 
normative force. In Griffin’s case those are the values we attach to agency/personhood which 
he lists as autonomy, minimum provision and liberty. Human rights are grounded in these 
three values of personhood.
204 And, we also have ‘practicalities’ as a second ground.205 Griffin 
acknowledges that there are some human rights which do not apply to all societies. He gives 
the freedom of the press as an example. However, he suggests that we should think of human 
rights as having different levels of abstraction. There are some basic rights at the higher levels 
of abstraction which are universal and in this sense timeless. We also have lower-level human 
rights derived from this basic right in certain historical and social contexts. Freedom of the 
press, for that matter, is derived from freedom of expression and “freedom of expression is 
derived from, as a necessary condition of, autonomy and liberty.”206 
However, responding to the timelessness critique by distinguishing between basic and 
derived rights has two drawbacks. First, if there are some higher-level rights which are basic 
and some lower-level rights which are derived from them, one should give some criteria 
according to which these rights are differentiated. Griffin takes the values of personhood as 
central for grounding human rights and derives the content of human rights from these values. 
But as Tasioulas claims, Griffin does not supply “an account of the general nature of moral 
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rights that explain why human rights properly qualify as individual moral rights, as opposed 
to interest, values, claims, goals or moral considerations of some other kind.”207 Griffin’s 
second ground of practicalities will not yield this distinction either. This is because 
practicalities represent a constraint that bears not only on (human) rights, but also on most 
parts of the moral domain such as justice, a good life. Hence, as I discussed in section 2.3.3, 
Griffin does not provide, a “natural and secure style of justification” of even the paradigmatic 
cases of human rights from these values of personhood.
208  
The second drawback is that, as long as human rights are not only political/legal rights 
but also moral rights the idea that there are some basic human rights and also derivations of 
them which are also human rights mean that (derived) moral rights are established by 
reference to other (basic) moral rights. If all human rights are (a subset of) moral rights then 
one needs to develop the criteria for distinguishing between basic moral rights and derived 
moral rights.
209
 One strategy can be to propose that there are some basic values (which either 
bear high-level deontic implications or not) that have specific normative importance and 
derive a principle of right from the importance attached to these values. This is Griffin’s 
strategy. After all, he anchors the normative force of human rights on the “high value” we 
attach to our personhood.
210
 But such a strategy has the drawbacks of i) giving a 
theological/ethical justification of human rights which I discussed above and ii) not being 
equipped enough to respond to recurrent objections of ‘parochialism’ or ‘ethnocentrism’ as it 
diminishes the applicability of human rights to communities and groups which do not place 
such a high value on autonomy and liberty. 
Therefore, the naturalistic conception as such and the particular version provided by 
Griffin are not properly equipped to accommodate the ordinary moral reasoning and 
timelessness criticisms simultaneously. Any attempt to amend the naturalistic conception to 
incorporate the timelessness criticism by distinguishing between basic and derived rights 
cannot get around the ethnocentrism charge.
211
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Another concern about the naturalistic conception of human rights is that it does not 
incorporate or make use of considerations about the political character or discursive functions 
of human rights within the existing practice. This is a potential problem for the naturalistic 
theories. Human rights are not ordinary moral norms applying mainly to interpersonal 
conduct but they are also political norms dealing mainly with how people should be treated 
by their governments and institutions. Naturalistic theories conceive human rights as moral 
rights that all people have. The problem is not that there are no such universal moral rights 
and duties, but that we are not referring to them when we speak of human rights in the modern 
context. To see this, Pogge suggests we consider an ordinary assault in a pub, perhaps after 
some drinking and argument. Though the victim may be badly hurt, we would not call the 
assault a human rights violation. However, a police beating of a suspect in jail does seem to 
qualify as a human rights violation.
212
 Whereas the moral right of freedom from assault is 
violated in both cases, only the second case seems to qualify as a human rights violation. This 
suggests that, “to engage in human rights, conduct must be in some sense official.”213 This 
ignorance of the political aspect of human rights by naturalistic theories is problematic 
according to Beitz as well. In his words:  
International human rights are primarily claims on institutions and other social agents—
one’s own government, in the first instance, and other states and international actors, when 
one’s own government defaults. International human rights are potential triggers of 
transnational protective and remedial action and should be suitable to function as 
justifications of it. This is part of the nature of human rights as they operate in global 
political discourse, and it seems almost certain to influence one’s views about the basis and 
contents of international doctrine.
214  
Hence, both Pogge and Beitz criticize naturalistic views starting from common sense or a 
practical view of the role human rights play in global political discourse. I will say more about 
the alternative proposal of a practical or political conception of human rights in the next 
chapter. Before that, I will discuss the questions about the justification of human rights.  
2.6    Justification of human rights and different modes of justification 
At the beginning of this chapter, I noted that the philosophical questions about human rights 
are focused on the questions about the nature, content and justification of human rights. So 
far, I have discussed how the naturalistic accounts of human rights conceptualized the nature 
and content of human rights. I have argued that naturalistic accounts conceptualize human 
rights as depending on what they perceive essential to human standing (such as normative 
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agency, freedom, basic interests, etc.) and they delineate the content of human rights 
depending on what this essential aspect of human nature or standing entails, in other words, 
which objects or goods are required to guarantee that specifically human status. The questions 
of justification are obviously related to these questions about the nature and content of human 
rights. For the sake of clarity, nevertheless, I discuss the questions of justification separately.  
The disputes about the philosophical justification of human rights are centered on two 
questions: 
i) Do human rights require philosophical justification? In other words, do we need to 
justify the idea of human rights by delineating the reasons or grounds depending on which 
they are claimed or supported? 
ii) If they do, what kind of justification? If one’s reply to the first question is positive, then 
the question is prompted as to what kind of justification one offers as there are different ways 
of justifying human rights depending on the type of reasons given in support of human rights 
and the methodology used in the justification. 
I have already started discussing the second question and mentioned different modes of 
justification of human rights when I discussed the ethical justification of Griffin. However, 
one can possibly ask the question as to why we need to justify human rights in the first place 
before asking what kind of justification one is aiming for.  
Philosophers like Griffin who offered justifications of human rights started from a 
presumption that such an effort will have some contribution to human rights practice. Griffin 
aims to provide a contribution in the field of ethics by offering a ground on which human 
rights depend and thereby bring some determinateness to the concept of human rights. This is 
his way of finding a solution to the phenomenon of human rights inflation which he finds 
problematic. However, some people question the value and significance of such a contribution 
to the practice of human rights.  
One prominent position with respect to this question of what philosophy can contribute to 
human rights practice is the anti-foundationalist position of Richard Rorty.
215
 Following the 
Argentinian jurist and philosopher Eduardo Rabossi, Rorty claims that “human rights 
foundationalism is outmoded and irrelevant.”216 He argues that the idea of a rationalist 
foundation of human rights does not make sense anymore especially from a pragmatist 
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perspective.
217
 According to Rorty, if one has a pragmatic perspective which is concerned 
with the question of casual efficacy and the efficient ways of how to achieve “the utopia 
sketched by the Enlightenment”, then the meta-ethical question of acquiring moral knowledge 
is irrelevant.
218
 Rorty claims that the most efficient way of promoting human rights is 
manipulating feelings and progressing what he calls “sentimental education” rather than 
increasing moral knowledge.
219
 
One can understand Rorty’s anti-foundationalist position with respect to the justification 
of human rights in two senses. The first one can be called ‘anti-foundationalism in a weak 
sense’ that denies the necessity and possibility of founding human rights on metaphysical 
grounds such as God’s will, natural law, religious worldviews or an objective notion of the 
good. When Rorty attacks attempts to found human rights culture on transcultural and 
“transcendental status of the common moral consciousness”, he seems to be attacking 
attempts to justify human rights on metaphysical grounds.
220
 He argues that we should stop 
searching for universal human nature or morally relevant transcultural facts as foundations of 
human rights. However, there can be a second position with respect to the justification of 
human rights which can be called ‘anti-foundationalism in a strong sense’ that denies the 
necessity and possibility of founding human rights on any grounds either metaphysical or 
non-metaphysical.  
Anti-foundationalism in a weak sense does not imply anti-foundationalism in a strong 
sense. In other words, objecting to transcendental or metaphysical justifications does not deny 
the possibility of providing non-transcendental justifications of human rights.
221
 One can 
object to founding human rights on metaphysical grounds but still think that it is possible to 
justify human rights based on other grounds. Rainer Forst’s justification of human rights is an 
example of such a non-transcendental justification; it is agnostic towards the question of what 
counts as an ethically worthwhile or good life.
222
 In other words, negating transcendental and 
metaphysical justifications does not necessarily imply a negation of all justifications. 
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Therefore, it is not clear why we have to choose between a metaphysical or transcendental 
justification of human rights and a pragmatist anti-foundational position in the strong sense of 
not providing any justification at all. Instead, one can choose the middle ground of founding 
human rights on non-metaphysical grounds which are neutral between different 
comprehensive worldviews.  
Moreover, it is implied in Rorty’s claim that he has a commitment to the aim of bringing 
about the Enlightenment project. His claim is that reasoning about what is the right thing to 
do is not the most efficient way for achieving this aim. If one shares Rorty’s view that what 
matters is to change human behavior so as to have a higher degree of respect for human 
rights, then he may be right that appealing to sentiments and the cultivation of sympathy 
might be more effective in that respect. However, one can still wonder why it is desirable, in 
the first place, to bring about and spread the Enlightenment project to other communities and 
groups that do not endorse it, if it does not have a value and universal validity. If we do not 
know why (and for which reasons) we are aiming at the realization of human rights, how can 
we know for sure that we are justified in trying to change a particular situation, and how can 
we appeal to the sentiments of the people to achieve those aims? In other words sentiments 
can have a role in realizing a higher degree of respect for human rights but this does not mean 
that they can (exclusively) ground human rights.  
Similarly, Joseph Raz, one of the adherents of the political conception whose account I 
will examine in the next chapter, also argues for “human rights without foundations.”223 Rorty 
points to sentiments whereas Raz argues that we need to look at the role human rights play in 
international relations. However, even if in that case the question of justification will be posed 
anew; this time the existing or desired system of international human rights will require 
justification.
224
 If the existing systems of human rights are taken for granted without 
justification, human rights will lose their critical bite. Moreover, the claim that there is 
agreement in practice about human rights is an empirical claim which is subject to serious 
doubts. 
Therefore the skepticism about the need for a justification of human rights can come from 
different standpoints such as Rorty’s pragmatist position or Raz’s political approach. I will 
say more about these positions when I examine the political conception of human rights in the 
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next chapter and skepticism about the idea of human rights in general in chapter 5. For the 
time being, I hope to have shown that Rorty’s antifoundationalist argument presupposes a 
stringent conception of a foundation as an objective and metaphysical source substantiating 
human rights. It does not necessarily apply to all kinds of justification.  
One important difference among different conceptions of human rights is their 
justificatory methods and procedures. I call this aspect the mode of justification. With respect 
to human rights there are two broad modes of justification: ethical and moral justifications. 
Moral justifications are in turn divided into monological and intersubjective modes of moral 
justification.  
An ethical justification derives the notion of right from the notion of good. Griffin 
provides such a justification. He derives human rights from a basic interest in pursuing the 
good. Certain subjective interests are considered to be fundamental for normative agency and 
they are turned into intersubjectively justifiable claims for rights. Normative agency 
understood as our capacity to “choose and to pursue our conceptions of a worthwhile life” 
stands at the center of Griffin’s view.225 So even though Griffin does not attach human rights 
to any particular notion of the good, it is still the case that the autonomy or the capacity of 
choosing what we see as a good life for ourselves, or being “self-deciders” about our good life 
is the core of our human status in his view. On this view, the good life can only be called as 
such, if it is autonomously chosen and pursued. This notion of autonomy can be reasonable 
and common. However, when Griffin argues that people value autonomy because it is 
necessary to pursue the life they deem good, he smuggles a particular ideal of a good life into 
his notion of being a person to the fullest degree.
226
 Griffin argues that “personhood is the 
capacity to choose one’s own path through life—that is, not be dominated or controlled by 
someone.”227 However imagine someone who believes the good life consists in following a 
higher calling or in one’s duties as a member of a particular community in a traditional sense. 
Such persons’ perceptions of what constitutes the good life contradict Griffin’s notion of 
agency being a self-chooser. Hence, Griffin’s account is not neutral with respect to a 
particular notion of the good life. These types of justification of human rights are subject to 
the ethnocentrism charge as they diminish the applicability of human rights to communities 
and groups which do not place such a high value on autonomy and liberty.
228
 
Moral justifications on the other hand, justify human rights without making reference to a 
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substantive notion of the good but rather to a moral principle or rule. Gewirth’s justification 
of human rights is a moral justification. By grounding human rights in a moral principle (the 
principle of generic consistency), Gewirth provides a moral justification of human rights. 
Moreover, his moral justification is monological; all legitimate rights claims can simply be 
derived from the perspective of a single agent. 
Finally, a discourse-theoretic justification (i.e. Rainer Forst’s justification of human 
rights, see section 4.4) is an intersubjective moral justification. In Forst’s account, human 
rights are seen as the result of intersubjective, discursive construction of rights claims that 
cannot be reciprocally and generally denied between persons who respect one another’s right 
to justification. 
These different modes of justification of human rights make the different conceptions of 
human rights vulnerable to different objections. As mentioned before, Griffin’s ethical 
justification is open to the ethnocentrism charge whereas a monological moral justification 
can make a human rights theory vulnerable to the individualism objection. Gewirth’s theory 
of human rights can be considered to be individualist in two respects. First, it is individualist 
in the sense that he argues for particular generic rights on the basis of characteristics of human 
individuals as such, i.e. human action. Second, his justification is monological: the generic 
rights are based on requirements of action of individual actors per se. The agent must 
recognize the rights of others as a matter of rationally consistent behavior, not for instance out 
of a moral duty towards others or a principle of reciprocity.
229
 For the aim of understanding 
how human rights claims are justified within real-life struggles, I will argue that an 
intersubjective moral justification fares better than ethical and monological moral 
justifications because such a justification is not susceptible to the ethnocentrism and 
individualism objections. I will examine different objections to the idea of human rights in 
general in chapter 5. Before that, however, I will continue with explicating different 
conceptions of human rights in the next two chapters; namely the political and discourse-
theoretic conceptions in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
2.7    Conclusion    
Asking the apparently straightforward question with respect to the rights struggles with which 
I began this dissertation—whether the right to work and the right to housing should be 
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considered as being human rights—takes us to the core of the conceptual questions about 
human rights. In this chapter I started to examine the first of two stylized philosophical views 
on human rights, namely the naturalistic conception of human rights. By examining the 
literature and the idea of human rights derived from the tradition of natural rights and natural 
law, I have reconstructed the conditions for a rights theory to be a natural rights theory. A 
rights theory can be considered a natural rights theory if it 1) employs a model of rights, 2) 
assigns some set of rights to some set of individuals on the basis of some natural criterion, 3) 
treats these rights (only rights) as morally basic and 4) claims that they are objective. 
Confronting this logical reconstruction of the conditions for a rights theory to be a natural 
rights theory with theories provided in the literature results in a reformulation of the 
conditions. Natural rights theories have two basic characteristics: first, they contain some 
rights (no matter whether these rights are conceptualized as protected interests, protected 
choices, or a combination of the two) and, second, the criterion of possessing those rights is a 
natural property. The implication of this reconstruction of the conditions for the idea of 
human rights is twofold. We can say two elements form the core of the naturalistic view of 
human rights. First, human rights are not contingent on existing laws and social practices. The 
second element that forms the core of the naturalistic view of human rights is the idea that the 
ground (s) (or the justificatory basis) for making a rights claim inhere somehow in each 
person’s nature or status as a human being. 
After this exercise of giving some conceptual clarification and providing a reconstruction 
of the conditions which make a right theory a natural rights theory and a conception of human 
rights a naturalistic conception of human rights, I have examined three important 
contemporary versions of the naturalistic conceptions of human rights provided by Alan 
Gewirth, James Griffin and John Tasioulas. Gewirth argues that it is possible, indeed 
necessary to accept that there are human rights to generic goods of action. Griffin 
conceptualizes human rights as protections of our human standing as normative agents and he 
delineates values of personhood as being the relevant values for our normative agency that 
confer rights. Tasioulas criticizes Griffin’s grounding human rights solely on personhood and 
offers a pluralist account of human rights.  
In this chapter, I have also reflected on the implications of the naturalistic conception of 
human rights for the claims that there is a human right to work and a human right to housing. 
The route taken by the naturalistic theories is to specify the especially important human 
interests or values that confer rights (that give reasons or grounds for rights claims) and they 
derive the list of rights from these designated grounds. In section 2.5, I have briefly 
mentioned some objections to the naturalistic conception of human rights from which the 
second stylized view on human rights, the political conception, has been initiated. In the last 
section, I have reflected on the question whether human rights require justification and I have 
argued that an antifoundationalist position which criticizes metaphysical and transcendental 
justifications of human rights does not imply that human rights do not need justification at all. 
I have also differentiated between different modes of justifications, moral and ethical 
justification, and monological moral justification and intersubjective moral justification of 
human rights. This differentiation is relevant for investigating the vulnerability of different 
conceptions to some of the most influential objections to the idea of human rights, such as the 
ethnocentrism objection and the individualism objection.  
In the next chapter, I will examine the political conception of human rights following a 
track similar to the one in this chapter. I will begin by examining the Rawlsian origins, and 
some contemporary versions of the political conception of human rights. Then, I will reflect 
on what makes a political conception of human rights political. I will subsequently explore 
the implications of the political conception for the two cases and examine the objections to the 
political conception.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
3     The Political Conception of Human Rights 
 
3.1    Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I stated that there are two stylized views about the philosophical 
understanding of human rights: the naturalistic conception and the political conception. I 
examined the naturalistic conception and some specific versions of this conception. I also 
examined some implications of the naturalistic conception with respect to the cases I focused 
on. In this chapter, I will continue by examining the second view, the political conception, and 
discuss its implications for the specific rights to work and housing. 
As analyzed in the previous chapter, the influence of the tradition of natural rights 
thinking on the contemporary idea of human rights has been multifaceted and complex, and 
there are various positions within the naturalistic conception with different philosophical 
commitments. Yet, we can still take it that the naturalistic conception is one of the two 
dominant views within the Anglo-American philosophical understanding of human rights. 
Instead of tracing the origins of the objections to the naturalistic conception back to the first 
objections to the idea of natural rights (e.g. positive law understanding of human rights by, for 
instance, Bentham), I will start with a turning point—a political turn— in the contemporary 
philosophy of human rights after the publication of John Rawls’s Law of Peoples in 1999. It is 
frequently perceived that Rawls was the first to put forth the political conception of human 
rights.
230
 Without doubt, one can argue that the idea of a political conception of human rights 
had preceded Rawls, but when I say ‘Rawlsian origins’ I am referring to the Ralwsian revival 
in Anglophone thought on rights which already started with his epoch-making A Theory of 
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The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, John Rawls, “The Law of Peoples,” in On Human Rights, ed. Stephen Shute and 
Susan L. Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993), 41–82. 
Justice (1971) and was followed by his challenge to the orthodoxy in moral thinking on 
human rights in The Law of Peoples.
231
 
As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, Rawls criticizes grounding the idea of 
human rights on a theological, philosophical or moral conception of the nature of the human 
person. Instead, he argues, one should start from the role human rights play in the Law of 
Peoples—a set of principles and norms (including human rights) of international law and 
practice that well-ordered people (both liberal as well as nonliberal but decent societies) can 
accept as the standard for regulating their behavior toward one another. In recent debates 
alternatives to the naturalistic view of human rights which adopt Rawls’s political stance have 
been developed. This alternative which is called the political/institutional
232
 approach or 
practical approach
233
 starts from a functional account of the discursive practices of 
international human rights and it stresses the political-legal aspect of human rights.  
 In this chapter, I will examine the political conception of human rights. I will start by 
tracing the Rawlsian origins of the idea of a political conception of human rights (section 3.2). 
Then I will briefly examine some recent theoretical positions of the political conception of 
human rights (section 3.3). In section 3.4, I will try to elucidate what is political about the 
political conception. In section 3.5, I will examine the implications of the political conception 
for the claims that there are human rights to work and housing. Finally, I will discuss some 
objections to the political conception of human rights (section 3.6).   
3.2    Rawlsian origins  
Rawls’s remarks on human rights and their political importance are scattered throughout his 
work.
234
 Nevertheless, the essentials of Rawls’s view of human rights can be summarized in 
the following points:
235
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 In Theory of Justice, Rawls had not used the expression of human rights and his reclaiming of individual 
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235
 One can say that Rawls’s account of human rights is laid out in its entirety in The Law of Peoples. Rawls does 
not mention the notion of human rights at all in his A Theory of Justice and he only mentions it in passing in 
Political Liberalism. In his A Theory of Justice Rawls discusses rights and duties incurred by a notion of justice 
that applies to liberal democracies whereas the notion of human rights as part of international law binding on all 
peoples are the subject of The Law of Peoples. However, the justificatory strategy, namely the argument from the 
i) A special class of urgent rights. Human rights in the Law of Peoples express a special 
class of urgent rights—violation of which is condemned by both reasonable liberal peoples 
and decent hierarchical peoples.
236
  
ii) The role of human rights in the Law of Peoples. Human Rights play a special role as 
part of a reasonable Law of Peoples: they “provide a suitable definition of, and limits on, a 
government’s internal sovereignty” and “they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its 
conduct.”237 For Rawls, the role of human rights is that their violation brings sovereignty’s 
legitimacy into question and justifies an intervention.  
iii)   The universality of human rights. The political (moral) force of human rights, 
honored by both liberal and decent hierarchical regimes, “extends to all societies, and they are 
binding on all peoples and societies, including outlaw states.”238 Human rights are ‘universal’ 
in this sense that they apply to all contemporary societies. 
iv) Human rights are not peculiarly liberal. Rawls restricts human rights to a list of a 
few fundamental rights: to a proper subset of the rights possessed by citizens in a liberal 
constitutional democratic regime, or of the rights of the members of a decent hierarchical 
society. The list includes: “the right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to 
liberty (to freedom from slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure 
of liberty of conscience to ensure freedom of religion and thought); to property (personal 
property); and to formal equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that 
similar cases be treated similarly).”239 This list does not include all the rights that have been 
stated as human rights in various international declarations. For example the rights to freedom 
of expression (Article 19 in the UDHR) and freedom of association (Article 20 in the UDHR) 
or the right of democratic political participation (Article 21 in the UDHR) are not included. 
v) The idea of public reason. Human rights are elements of the public reason of the 
Society of Peoples.
240
 Contrary to the naturalistic theories there is no appeal to any 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Original Position, is similar for the justification of human rights in The Law of Peoples and the justification of 
the principles of justice in A Theory of Justice. The contracting parties are individuals in A Theory of Justice and 
peoples in Law of Peoples. 
236
 Ibid., 79. 
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 Ibid., 81. Outlaw states are certain regimes which “refuse to comply with a reasonable Law of Peoples” Ibid., 
5.  
239
 Ibid., 65. 
240
 As mentioned before (see 2.5.1), the idea of public reason is the reason of free and equal peoples in deciding 
about public matters. The idea is present in the works of Kant and Rousseau as well as in Rawls and Habermas. 
Despite the differences among their views, the basic idea is that some moral or political rules (human rights in 
this context) can rightly be imposed on persons (or on peoples in the law of peoples) when the rules can be 
justified by appeal to ideas or arguments that those persons (peoples in Rawls’ law of peoples), at some level of 
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independent philosophical conception of a human right in Rawls’s account of the content or 
authority of the doctrine of human rights.
241
 Human rights are values about which liberal and 
decent societies are supposed to agree, each for their own reasons. In other words, Rawls 
suggests that there is not a single normative ground for a conception of human rights, but 
there are liberal grounds for liberal conceptions of human rights and others grounds for other 
conceptions.
242
   
Despite the fact that Rawls’s restriction of the function and content of human rights is 
criticized (I will discuss this criticism in section 3.6), the basic insight implicit in Rawls’s 
thought has been appreciated and utilized in recent developments of the political conception 
of human rights. This insight is that we might frame our understanding of the nature and 
content of the idea of human rights by identifying the role this idea plays in the public reason 
of international society.
243
  
3.3    Recent versions of the political conception  
After this brief summary of the Rawlsian origins of the political conception, in this section, I 
will briefly consider in turn five political conceptions provided by Joseph Raz, Charles Beitz, 
Thomas Pogge, Joshua Cohen and Mathias Risse. Raz and Beitz are self-proclaimed 
adherents of the political conception. Therefore, I believe that examining their accounts is 
instructive for grasping an idea of human rights different than the naturalist conception. 
According to widespread interpretations in the literature, Pogge and Cohen are also 
considered to be developing a political conception.
244
 I will also examine a recent account of 
human rights provided by Risse. It is less straightforward to classify Risse’s account of 
human rights as a political conception, because it is different than other scholars mentioned; 
he does not use the Rawlsian framework.
245
 Nevertheless, I believe examining his account 
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 In fact, according to Risse himself, his membership account is a basis-driven conception of human rights. In 
this sense, it is closer to orthodox accounts which are basis-driven according to Risse. He makes a distinction 
between basis-driven, principle-driven and list-driven conceptions of human rights. Basis-driven accounts begin 
with the specification of the basis on which human rights are held, which leads to a principle, which in turn leads 
under a political conception is fruitful as he claims to develop a contingent account of human 
rights. Moreover, Risse considers the right to work as a human right from the perspective of 
his account which is peculiarly instructive for my research as the right to work is one of the 
cases on which I focus. For this reason, Risse’s argument is good to illustrate how a 
contingent account of human rights justifies a human right to work.  
Below, I have grouped these accounts in two groups. Raz, Beitz and Pogge, 
notwithstanding the differences among them, have incorporated and extended the Rawlsian 
insight that human rights are standards of legitimacy. For Cohen and Risse, the main 
emphasis has been on the role of human rights for membership to the global political 
community. However, this grouping has been made for the sake of exposition and it is not 
claimed to be mutually exclusive or exhaustive.  
3.3.1   Human rights and standards of legitimacy: Joseph Raz, Charles Beitz and 
Thomas Pogge 
A well-known proponent of the political conception of human rights is Joseph Raz. In the 
article “Human Rights without Foundations”, Raz argues that the view which he calls “the 
traditional view” has an understanding of the nature of human rights which is so remote from 
the practice that it is irrelevant to it. These views take human rights to be those important 
rights that are grounded in our humanity. However, Raz argues that it is not clear why human 
rights are important rights if they are understood along the lines of the naturalistic conception. 
“Neither being universal, that is rights that everyone has, nor being grounded in our humanity, 
guarantees that they are important.”246 Instead, he argues, if one looks at the practice of 
human rights, one realizes that a significant threshold of importance of a human right is that 
its violation justifies limiting state sovereignty. In his words: “observation of human rights 
practice shows that they are taken to be rights which, whatever else they are, set limits to the 
sovereignty of states, and therefore arguments which determine what they are, are ones which, 
among other things, establish such limits.”247 
    Raz argues that the rejection of the universality of human rights as understood by the 
naturalistic conception does not imply moral relativism. A political conception, he argues, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to the list of human rights. Practical accounts, on the other hand are list or principle-driven according to Risse. 
They may start with a list of human rights within international law or a principle about the function human rights 
play in international relations, Risse, “Common Ownership of the Earth as a Non-Parochial Standpoint,” 17. 
Perhaps, Risse’s conception should not be classified as a political conception at all. Still I examine it in this 
chapter because it offers a contingent (not naturalistic) account of human rights which entails a human right to 
work. 
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recognizes the universality of morality. Human rights are moral rights held by individuals. 
But not all moral rights are human rights. Individuals have them when the conditions are 
appropriate for governments to have the duties to protect the interests which the rights protect. 
And, the rights that are given institutional recognition are regarded as human rights by the 
political conception. This is why, for instance, the right that people who made promises to us 
shall keep them is not a human right whereas the right to education is a human right.  
    Raz argues that there are three layers of argument for a rational justification of human 
rights. First, some individual interest, in combination with how social conditions require its 
satisfaction in certain ways, establishes an individual moral right. It is also possible to think 
that some rights are rock-bottom in the sense that they are not derived from any individual 
interest. Second, under some conditions states are to be held under the duty to respect or 
promote the interest (or the rights) of individuals identified in the first part of the argument.
248
 
The third layer shows that states do not enjoy immunity from external interference regarding 
their success or failure to respect the right in question. If all three layers of the argument 
succeed, then we have established that a human right exists. For instance, at the first layer we 
can argue that there is an interest of the individual to be equipped with whatever knowledge 
and skills are required for her to be able to have a rewarding life in the conditions in which 
she is likely to find herself. The way in which social conditions require the satisfaction of the 
interest (for instance via formal instruction) is a contingent matter. At the second layer, it is 
argued that under some conditions the state should be the guarantor that education is 
provided, and when this is the case, people have a right to education. And, when there are 
more or less the same conditions throughout the world, the question of the last layer arises: 
should states enjoy immunity from external interference depending on their success or failure 
to respect the right to education of people within their territory? If the conditions of the 
international community are such that they should not enjoy such immunity then the right to 
education is a human right. Raz states that to derive the conclusion at each layer depends on 
the considerations specific to the layer. In this sense human rights have a rational justification 
but “they lack a foundation in not being grounded in a fundamental moral concern but 
depending on the contingencies of the current system of international relations.”249 
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Another prominent proponent of the political conception of human rights is Charles Beitz. 
In his The Idea of Human Rights (2009), after critically examining two theoretical positions 
(naturalistic and agreement views) about the nature of human rights, Beitz argues that these 
views distort rather than illuminate human rights practice.
250
 Following Rawls, he suggests 
that we do better to approach human rights practically, not as the application of an 
independent philosophical idea to the international realm, but rather as a political doctrine 
which has a certain role in global politics.
251
 According to Beitz, “the human rights 
enterprise” is a discursive and political practice that exists within a global discursive political 
community. The members of this practice, including governments of states, inter- and supra-
national organizations, NGOs, use the practice’s norms for giving reasons in deliberation and 
arguments about how to act. The norms of practice are expressed in the main international 
human rights documents although these formulations are subject to reformulation and revision 
in practice.
252
 A practical conception, in Beitz’s view, takes this doctrine and practice of 
human rights as we find them in international political life as the source materials for the 
construction of a conception of human rights.
253
  
Beitz proposes a two-level model that describes in general terms the roles played by 
human rights in the public normative discourse of global politics. In this model, human rights 
are protections of urgent individual interests against standard threats. At the first level, the 
political institutions of states (including their constitutions, laws, and public policies) are 
bearers of primary responsibilities to respect and protect human rights. A government’s 
failure to carry out its first level responsibilities may be a reason for second level agents 
outside the state such as other states and non-state agents, the international community and its 
agents to take action.
254
 In this sense, there is a division of labor between states as the bearers 
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of primary responsibilities to respect and protect human rights and the international 
community and its agents as the guarantors of these responsibilities.
255
  
The following three aspects of the practical conception impose conditions on determining 
whether a right is a genuine human right or not; i) human rights are urgent individual interests 
that are a matter of ii) national responsibility (“in the absence of protection, there is a 
significant probability that domestic-level institutions will behave, by omission or 
commission, in ways that endanger this interest”), and iii) international responsibility (“there 
are permissible means of international action, aid, and assistance such that, if they were 
effectively carried out, the interest would be less likely to be endangered and that these means 
would not be unreasonably burdensome for those who have reason to use them”).256 However, 
conditioning the authenticity of a human right upon the availability of effective and 
reasonable international means of guaranteeing it, serves to constrain the list of bona fide 
human rights.
257
 For example, as Beitz argues it is unlikely that there is a genuine human right 
to democracy in his account. This is because there may be non-democratic regimes that can 
nevertheless meet the urgent social and economic needs of its citizens and the international 
means of guaranteeing the right to democracy might be non-effective as is historically proven 
to be the case.
258
 
Another political conception of human rights which considers the role of human rights in 
setting standards of legitimacy is the institutional understanding of human rights proposed by 
Thomas Pogge.
259
 Pogge starts by delineating six features any plausible understanding of 
human rights must incorporate. First, human rights express ultimate moral concerns: people 
have a moral duty to respect human rights. Second, human rights express weighty moral 
concerns, which normally override other normative considerations. Third, these moral 
concerns are focused on human beings, all human beings and only human beings have human 
rights and the special moral status associated with them. Fourth, with respect to these moral 
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(Cambridge: Polity, 2002). 
concerns, all human beings have equal status: they have exactly the same human rights. Fifth, 
human rights express moral concerns that are unrestricted, i.e., they ought to be respected by 
all human agents regardless of their particular epoch, culture, religion, moral tradition or 
philosophy. Sixth, these moral concerns are broadly sharable, i.e., capable of being 
understood and appreciated by persons from different epochs and cultures, and by adherents 
of a variety of different religions, moral traditions and philosophies.
260
 After mentioning that 
various understandings of human rights are consistent with these six points, and critically 
examining three such understandings of human rights, Pogge suggests an understanding of 
human rights that he endorses. Human rights, on Pogges’s account, are to be understood as 
claims against the institutional order of any comprehensive social system: “postulating a 
human right to X is then tantamount to declaring that every society and comparable social 
system ought to be so organized that, as far as possible, all its members enjoy secure access to 
X.”261 
In support of his institutional account, Pogge offers an interpretation of article 28 of the 
UDHR which states: “everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”262 Pogge argues that 
this article has a particular status in the sense that it does not add a further right to the list of 
human rights; rather it puts a background condition for all human rights postulated in the 
other articles of the declaration as its reference to “the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration” suggests. Pogge endorses a weak interpretation of this condition according to 
which all human beings have a claim that any institutional order imposed on them be one in 
which their postulated rights and freedoms can be fully realized.
263
 Pogge’s argument is that 
there exists a global institutional order and global basic structure that makes everyone who 
collaborates with it responsible for securing human rights.  
Pogge’s argument that human rights (he focuses in particular on the right to be free from 
poverty) are claims on the global institutional order is appealing and has some strengths. 
Firstly, it provides, at least in principle, a more plausible assignment of responsibilities in 
regard to the underfulfillment of human rights: government leaders and other officials have 
primary responsibility for securing rights of their citizens but the governments and citizens of 
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the wealthy countries also have responsibility for securing rights of distant others as they 
maintain the global unjust institutional order. Moreover, though I will not pursue the topic 
here, Pogge claims that his institutional understanding of human rights has two additional 
advantages of sidestepping the long-standing debate between positive and negative rights and 
duties, and rendering human rights more broadly shareable. Although these advantages make 
Pogge’s account attractive, it is not clear how the duty not to participate in unjust social 
institutions provides the best basis for understanding the rights individuals are entitled to 
claim. Many rights in the UDHR such as rights to legal standing, participation and association 
can be seen as conditions for membership in a society and not primarily as remedies for the 
consequences of unjustly imposed institutions.
264
 I now turn to two accounts which conceive 
human rights as conditions of membership. 
3.3.2   Human rights and membership: Joshua Cohen and Mathias Risse 
I would like to consider two additional political conceptions of human rights suggested by 
Joshua Cohen and Mathias Risse. On Cohen’s view human rights norms are best understood 
not as norms of proper conduct of a good or righteous life but rather as norms founded on an 
idea of membership or inclusion in an organized political society.
265
 Hence, like Pogge, 
Cohen has an associational account of human rights: rights and corresponding duties are 
created by the special relationships people have with others, rather than as claims individuals 
have simply in virtue of being human. Again like Pogge, Cohen delineates three features of 
human rights and makes two methodological assumptions. He argues that human rights are 
universal in being owed by every political society to all individuals, they are requirements of 
political morality which need not be expressed in law to have normative force and they are 
urgent requirements of political morality. Moreover, an account of human rights must meet a 
condition of fidelity: if there are human rights, then at least some substantial range of rights 
identified by the principal human rights documents like the UNDR might be among those 
rights. Finally, Cohen assumes a condition of open-endedness: we can, through normative 
reasoning, argue in support of additional rights.  
After delineating the features and assumptions every conception of human rights needs to 
meet, Cohen proposes his membership account according to which human rights are 
international norms that specify the basic conditions for membership or inclusion in a political 
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society.
266
 The membership account of Cohen can be read in two ways. On the first reading, 
the norms appear to specify conditions of membership any political society must satisfy to be 
recognized as a member of the international community. This reading is close to Rawls’s 
position that treats human rights as minimal conditions for a society that makes a plausible 
claim to political self-determination. Again like Rawls’s account, the set of rights derived 
from Cohen’s membership account is less demanding than the full-set of rights required for a 
liberal-democratic society. For instance, there is not a human right to democracy according to 
Cohen’s conception. On the second reading, human rights are norms of membership owed by 
political societies to individual members of those societies. However, this notion of 
membership is a normative one—distinct, for example, from living in a territory. One central 
feature of the normative notion of membership is that a person’s interests are taken into 
account by the political society’s basic institutions: to be treated as a member means that 
one’s interests are given due consideration.267 On this second reading, the idea is that, beyond 
the traditional nation-state, transnational institutions have created associative relations with 
others that in turn give rise to normative obligations that are more demanding than basic 
humanitarian concerns.
268
 Although these two readings are not necessarily incompatible, there 
might be some tension between them. For instance, the preferred set of rights is related to 
which function of human rights is preferred. If, as the first reading suggests, Cohen endorses 
the view that human rights provide a set of limits on internal sovereignty, then this view 
favors a restrictive list such as Rawls’s. On the other hand, in line with the global scope of the 
second reading, Cohen also speaks of human rights as part of the content of an ideal global 
public reason. Such conceived human rights have a broader role than that of determining 
standards of legitimate intervention. Hence, Cohen is ambiguous about which is the proper 
function of human rights in his account but this does not deny the possibility that these two 
functions can work in tandem.  
Another conception I want to consider here is Mathias Risse’s conception of human rights 
as membership rights in the global order.
269
 After making a distinction between basis-driven, 
list-driven and principle-driven conceptions of human rights, Risse sketches a basis-driven 
conception, the basis being “membership in the global and economic order.”270 He argues that 
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the membership in the global order is the basis on which individuals hold human rights and 
the set of rights people hold in virtue of being such members is partially generated from the 
standpoint of the collective ownership of the earth.
271
 According to Risse’s egalitarian 
interpretation of common ownership of the earth (details of which I omit here) human beings, 
no matter when and where they were born, have a moral status of being co-owners of the 
resources of the earth. The co-ownership rights are pre-institutional natural rights, but the 
erection of political and economic structures on the commonly owned space requires 
membership rights (associative rights) to guarantee individuals’ ownership rights. The set of 
human rights is the set of rights we can derive from the demand that the erected political and 
economic structure does not render individuals incapable of meeting their basic needs, and 
they thereby preserve their co-ownership status.
272
 
 The defining features of human rights, on this view, are that they are important moral 
demands against authority which are at the same time also matters of urgent global concern. 
Risse states:   
To argue that X is a human right, what is required in a first, preliminary step is that X be 
shown to be a matter of urgency in the affected agents’ immediate environment, and then, 
second, that a genuinely global concern be established. (It is hard to imagine that anything 
could be of global concern for which one could not take that first step, but what is 
constitutive of X’s being a human right on this view is the second.) 273 
Risse also underlines that his conception which perceives human rights as membership rights 
in the global order must be distinguished from Cohen’s conception of human rights as 
membership rights of persons in their respective political society to ensure inclusion. I will 
not pursue the distinction between the two conceptions, as my main concern is the 
implications of these conceptions for specific rights claims such as the right to work and the 
right to housing—a matter to which I will turn in section 3.5. 
Without claiming fidelity to the details of different versions, we might say that the main 
achievement of the political conception is its demonstration that an adequate conception of 
human rights cannot be derived solely from the moral importance attached to one’s humanity 
without reference to the doctrine and practice of international human rights. The defenders of 
the political approach do not deny that there are universal moral rights and duties, but they 
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emphasize that we are not referring to them when we speak of human rights in the modern 
context. Although it offers an interesting basis for defining rights as human rights, the 
political conception too faces certain difficulties to which I will turn in section 3.6. Before 
that, I will examine in what sense this conception of human rights is political and how it 
differs from the naturalistic conception. 
3.4    Human rights: political not metaphysical, moral or philosophical 
As with the naturalistic conception, there are different versions of the political conception of 
human rights. In this section I would like to reflect on what makes them all political 
conceptions, in other words distil their common features.  
Firstly, the political conception does not start from a philosophical or moral conception of 
the human person to understand what human rights mean. Rather it starts from practice, from 
a human rights phenomenon, and engages in the philosophical interpretation of that practice. 
The phrase ‘human rights phenomenon’ is used to denote the contemporary situation in which 
the discourse of human rights gained prominence in political discourse and has become the 
lingua franca of the international community.
274
 There is a shared conviction among the 
adherents of the political conception that a proper way of understanding human rights is to 
conceive them as elements of international practice rather than as natural rights. Secondly, 
human rights are political in the sense that the type of justification given for them is 
determined by their political role and function in international political practice although there 
are differences among individual theorists’ understanding of what this role or function 
consists in. There is another sense of human rights being political, which is that they are 
claims against mainly (though not exclusively) political institutions and their officials. 
Finally, human rights are understood as connected to the conditions of membership in a 
political society rather than rights individuals possess simply in virtue of their humanity. 
There are also some discussions about how the features of universality, content and 
justification of human rights are understood within the political conception. There are 
differences between different versions of the political conception with respect to these issues 
some of which I have examined in the previous section. Here, I will briefly discuss the 
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general viewpoint of the political conception with respect to the issues of universality, content 
and justification of human rights. 
Both a naturalistic and a political conception of human rights may conceive human rights 
to be universal but their way of interpreting the criteria of universality differs. For the 
naturalistic conception there are some universal human interests that are essentially human 
(e.g. essential features of personhood) that ought to be protected through human rights. But in 
contrast, according to the political conception, human rights are rights individual have as 
members of the global and political order that ipso facto, but contingently, includes 
everybody.
275
 Therefore the naturalistic approach ascribes human rights to all human beings 
unconditionally whereas the political conception ascribes them contingently to people living 
in a specific time and space, i.e. on the basis of specific qualifications such as citizenship, or 
legal entitlement. 
This contingent derivation of human rights affects the content of human rights in two 
apparently opposing ways. On the one hand, there are specific rights that are dependent on the 
specific historical contexts and conditions in which people live now. And, it does not make 
sense to think of them being universal in the sense of being timeless, as is immediately clear 
by looking at some examples of contemporary human rights, for instance, the human right to 
fair legal process, the human right to take part in government. This has the tendency to inflate 
human rights because of the associative relationships and conditions people have in modern 
societies that require certain rights. For instance the so-called economic and social rights, or 
welfare rights such as “a common entitlement to subsistence or medical care have mostly 
been added relatively recently to earlier enunciations of human rights, thereby vastly 
expanding the claimed domain of human rights.”276 Moreover, compared to a Lockean natural 
rights conception which conceives human rights to be moral rights individuals would have 
even in a pre-institutional state of nature, a political conception which takes into account the 
institutional setting embraces a more expansive list of rights than a minimalist account—in 
which rights are limited to protections of bodily security. On the other hand, if the role of 
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human rights is taken to be, within a political conception, the standards of internal sovereignty 
in order to be a member in good standing of the global society of peoples, this has a 
constraining effect or downward pressure on the list of human rights: the content of human 
rights is reduced to a list that is broadly shareable by peoples with different worldviews and 
conceptions of justice.
277
 This brings us to the matter of what it means for a list of human 
rights to be broadly shareable, hence to the matter of justification of human rights within a 
political conception. 
Recall that Rawls objects to the grounding of human rights on a theological, philosophical 
or moral conception of the nature of the human person. Then, the question is how human 
rights are justified within a political conception of human rights. One matter of controversy 
about the justification of human rights within the political conception is about the 
interpretation of Rawls’s notion of “the fact of reasonable pluralism” and the justification 
procedure depending on that interpretation. One possible interpretation is to take the word 
‘fact’ in the phrase literally as referring to an empirical matter of having different 
comprehensive world views and religions. Following this interpretation, the justification of 
human rights is taken to be finding ‘a lowest common denominator’ of distinct ethical and 
religious traditions—an ethical intersection. In order to secure broad shareability, one looks at 
the various traditions to find where they intersect or overlap on basic values and this lowest 
common denominator is then presented as the core set of human rights.
278
 It is frequently 
acknowledged that the drafters of the Universal Declaration agreed on a list of human rights 
but they remained silent on the deeper foundations of human rights; every tradition and 
religion has its own rationales for the same list. As such, Ignatieff argues, the UDHR makes it 
possible for human rights to become “less imperial” and at the same time “more political.”279 
However, this lowest common denominator approach leads in the end to an unnecessary 
substantive minimalism (i.e. a fairly minimal set of basic rights) and to a justificatory strategy 
that reflects a compromise with existing political powers.
280
 As Joshua Cohen convincingly 
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argues, the aim for broad agreement by appeal to a justificatory minimalism should not be 
confused with a substantive minimalism about the content of human rights.
281
 
Another possible interpretation of the fact of reasonable pluralism is that it is a claim 
about our (normative) reasoning capacities rather than an empirical fact. According to this 
interpretation in the absence of coercive institutions, “people will disagree with one another 
about matters of deep moral and religious value, and this disagreement cannot be chalked up 
to error or objectionable bias: even people reasoning in good faith and with a commitment to 
basic principles of sound reasoning, etc., will continue to disagree.”282 This feature of our 
human condition, Rawls thinks, has important political consequences: in the political arena 
we need to find a common ground or basis for dialogue rather than a search for truth.
283
 And, 
in Rawls’s understanding, human rights partly constitute this basis for dialogue as being an 
element of global public reason. Most adherents of the political conception whose accounts I 
have examined in the previous section conceive human rights as part of the global public 
reason and normative standards rather than being a matter of an empirical or de facto 
consensus.  
In the next section, I will reflect on some implications of the political conception of 
human rights with respect to the specific rights claims I have focused on: the right to work 
and the right to housing.  
3.5    Is there a human right to work; a human right to housing? 
In the previous chapter, reflecting on the implications of the naturalistic conception for the 
specific rights claims, I argued that the route taken by the naturalistic conception is to first 
develop a philosophical account of human rights with grounding, justification and content of 
human rights and then compare it with the main human rights documents. One of the 
objections by the adherents of the political conception is that the naturalistic conception does 
not take into account the practice of human rights and they argue that a conception of human 
rights should take the role human rights play in international practice into account. What 
difference does a political conception of human rights make with respect to the right to 
housing and right to work, compared with the naturalistic conception? Following the call 
made by the proponents of the political conception let’s start by looking at the practice of 
those rights. 
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To start with the right to housing, this right is codified as a human right in article 25.1 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states:  
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary 
social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, 
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control. 
The right to housing is also included in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (article 11.1), which states that: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate 
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, 
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.
284
 
In order to clarify the meaning and scope of the right to housing as expressed in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Covenant, the Committee on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the body that monitors this covenant issued 
its General Comment 4.
285
 Paragraph 6 of the General Comment 4 states that the right to 
adequate housing applies to everyone. The phrase “himself and his family” in the UDHR does 
not refer to any limitation in the right to housing to individuals, female-headed households, or 
other groups. Furthermore, individuals, as well as families, are entitled to adequate housing 
regardless of age, economic status, group or other affiliation or status, and enjoyment of this 
right must not be subject to any form of discrimination (Paragraph 6).  
Among other considerations the General Comment 4 draws attention to the connection of 
the right to housing with the fundamental principles upon which the Covenant is premised 
(namely, “the inherent dignity of the human person”) and with other rights (paragraphs 7 and 
9). It is mentioned that the right to housing should be interpreted in a broad and inclusive 
sense as the right to live in “security, peace and dignity” rather than a narrow or restrictive 
sense that equates it with merely having a roof over one’s head or views that see shelter 
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exclusively as a commodity. The right to housing is inextricably linked to other fundamental 
human rights and should been seen in conjunction with other human rights included in the 
two International Covenants and other international instruments. In addition to the concept of 
human dignity and non-discrimination, “the full enjoyment of other rights—such as the right 
to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of association (such as for tenants and other 
community-based groups), the right to freedom of residence (and the right to freedom of 
movement) and the right to participate in public decision-making—is indispensable if the 
right to adequate housing is to be realized and maintained by all groups in society. Similarly, 
the right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy, family, 
home or correspondence constitutes a very important dimension in defining the right to 
adequate housing” (paragraph 9). 
Finally, there are some assistance agencies and NGOs which monitor the global 
conditions of shelter and implementation of the right to housing such as the United Nations 
Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), the United Nations Housing Rights 
Programme (UNHRP), and the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE).  
One can infer from this brief overview of the institutional landscape comprised of 
declarations, regional and international documents and NGOs that there is already an existing 
practice which takes the right to housing as a human right. This can be observed 
independently of the question of how effectively it is implemented or exercised. One of the 
important aspects of the political conception of human rights is to perceive human rights 
mainly as claims against authorities (mainly states) and national and international institutions 
which are the main bearers of duties associated with the rights claims. One main line of 
objection to social and economic rights is what can be called the claimability objection.
286
 
According to this line of reasoning, to claim a right there must be identifiable others (either all 
other individuals or specified others) with corresponding obligations.
287
 To claim a right one 
must first specify who the respective duty-bearers are. While it is clear who the duty-bearers 
are with respect to negative rights (all individuals), it is not clear who are the corresponding 
duty-bearers with respect to the rights to goods and services.  
The claimability objection can be considered as a serious objection to the existence of 
socio-economic rights if one perceived human rights as natural rights conceived to be existing 
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in a pre-institutional state of nature.
288
 According to this perception, only those rights that do 
not need any institutional structure for their claimability will count as natural rights. This is 
the main reason why most natural rights theorists count only what is labelled negative rights 
as natural rights.
289
 However, if one perceives human rights within an institutional framework 
like the political conceptions do, then one does not need to claim in advance that social and 
economic rights are not human rights (based on the arguments such as that they are not 
claimable or they are not natural rights).
290
 In as much as political conceptions conceptualize 
human rights as claims against basic institutions and delineate how the corresponding 
responsibilities are allocated among the national and international bodies they do not restrict 
human rights to rights that can be conceived independently of the institutional and legal 
structure. From the perspective of a political conception, the states are the main duty-bearers 
to create the institutional structure to secure everyone’s access to socio-economic rights. 
There are also regional and international institutions which advocate, promote and monitor the 
realization of those rights. Therefore, political conceptions have the advantage over 
naturalistic conceptions with respect to socio-economic goods as they specify the duty-bearers 
and can answer objections such as the claimability objection. 
If we move to the human right to work, this right is associated with many other 
interconnected rights such as the human right to protection from forced labor, the human right 
to adequate, safe working conditions, and the human right to freedom of association. The 
human right to work and human rights of workers are included in many human rights 
documents including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 4, 20, 23, 24, and 
25), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 
11), the ILO Equal Remuneration Convention (No. 100), the ILO Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention (No. 111), the ILO Minimum Age Convention 
(No. 38), the ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize 
Convention (No. 87), the ILO Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 
98), the ILO Forced Labour Convention (No. 29) among others. The rights related to work are 
listed in the Universal Declaration as such: 
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No one shall be held in slavery or servitude. . . . Everyone has the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly and association. . . . Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of 
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal 
work. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if 
necessary, by other means of social protection. Everyone has the right to form and to join 
trade unions for the protection of his interests. Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, 
including reasonable limitation of working hours. . . . Everyone has the right to a standard of 
living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family . . . and the right to 
security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability . . . or other lack of livelihood--
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 4, 20, 23, 24, and 25). 
Current labor rights scholarship generally divides labor rights into two categories: 
fundamental human rights (the right to life; to protection against forced labor; to protection 
from the worst forms of child labor; and freedom of association) and other labor standards 
(wages; benefits; health and safety; and other working conditions deemed economic and 
social in nature).
291
 As I mentioned in the first chapter, with respect to labor rights practice, 
the human rights movement and the labor movement followed different tracks: the human 
rights movement focuses on fundamental human rights related to work, whereas the labor 
movement focuses on labor standards with a greater emphasis on freedom of association and 
collective bargaining.  
There are various views about the differences and convergences of human rights and 
labor rights both conceptually and practically. Some scholars argue that they are conceptually 
different in at least three ways. These three differences are the ways 1) they engage with and 
conceptualize the state and the private sphere, 2) the individual and the collective and 3) 
processes versus outcomes.
292
 The first important distinction between labor and human rights 
is that, although there is a growing body of literature that explores the application and scope 
of human rights in relation to non-state actors, human rights, by and large, regulate and apply 
to the relation between states and individuals whereas labor rights generally require state 
intervention in the private sphere. Another key difference is that the unit of analysis for 
human rights is the individual, i.e. the individual is taken as the primary subject. Labor rights, 
on the other hand, particularly freedom of association, emphasize the collective as the means 
of individual emancipation. The freedom of association serves to “self-actualize the 
individual, but it does so through the collective.”293 This focus on the collective rights 
matters, Kolben argues, because the rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining 
are linchpins in the labor rights canon as the ILO made clear in the Fundamental Declaration. 
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This is so because a central objective of workplace law is workplace democracy.
294
 The third 
way in which labor rights and human rights differ is that labor rights are conceptualized 
procedurally. The fundamental aspect of core labor rights is to facilitate a process of 
organizing and negotiating over work conditions; they provide a legal right for workers to 
form a collective that can negotiate work conditions against the background of state-
prescribed minimal standards. Human rights, on the other hand, do not possess the qualities of 
collective mobilization rights. Rather, they are likely to be legalistic guarantees of individuals 
in relation to the state. The process perspective of labor rights aims for contexts in which 
workers can collectively act toward obtaining their desired outcomes, a human rights 
perspective often focuses on the outcomes themselves.
295
 
On the other hand, there are scholars who argue that human rights and labor rights are 
conceptually linked and labor rights should be brought into the mainstream of human rights 
theory.
296
 While I leave the discussion of the availability and effectiveness of human rights 
discourse for securing labor rights (including the right to work) to chapter five, for the 
moment I will briefly reflect on the implications of the political conception of human rights 
with respect to labor rights. Among different accounts I have examined in section 3.3, only 
Risse’s account encompasses a right to work and labor rights.  
According to Risse’s membership account of human rights, in order to secure the co-
ownership status of individuals, states should make sure that individuals are capable of 
meeting their basic needs. And if it is the case that it is hard for individuals to satisfy their 
basic needs without participation in the formal economy in their respective society, we could 
then obtain “an elementary right to education and also a right to labor in the sense of those 
rights as protections against exclusion from labor markets.”297 However, the list of rights 
obtained from Risse’s account does not include the full range of labor rights, such as right to 
join trade unions, or to enjoy just and favorable conditions of employment. Risse argues that 
it is hard to imagine circumstances under which an individual’s ability to satisfy basic needs 
actually depends on their ability to join a trade union or enjoy just and favorable conditions of 
employment and therefore those rights would not be of global concern as far as the standpoint 
of collective ownership is concerned.
298
 Hence, in Risse’s view there is a human right to 
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 Ibid. This is the only argument Risse gives against the right to trade unions and right to just conditions of 
employment. To put it differently, he argues that to have their basic needs met individuals do not need to join 
freedom from obstructions to entering the labor market but neither association and collective 
rights nor rights against the government to create employment. Therefore, his account does 
not encompass the core labor rights recognized by the ILO as human rights. 
In short, the implications we can draw from the political conception of human rights with 
respect to the right to housing and the right to work can be summarized as follows. A political 
conception of human rights would count the right to housing as part of a right to a minimum 
standard of living and the right to work if it is the case that conditions in societies make work 
the most effective and necessary means to secure basic needs. This would mean a contingent 
derivation of these specific rights; they are contingent on the institutions and contexts of 
modern societies. The political conception also draws attention to the allocation of duties 
associated with rights and their inscription in national and international law. Yet, the political 
conception does not provide a justification of human rights and an explanation of how human 
rights bear the normative force they have. Moreover, most versions of the political conception 
arrive at a list of human rights which does not include a full list of liberal rights as human 
rights. They argue, for instance, that there is not a human right to democracy. This 
conceptualization radically differs from, for instance, an account of human rights which take 
human rights and democracy to be co-original such as Habermas’s—to which I will turn in 
the chapter 4. In the first instance, such a separation of democratic rights from human rights 
on the part of the political conception seems not to be accounting for the process role of labor 
rights which I mentioned above, namely the commitment to economic justice and workplace 
democracy that have long underpinned labor rights thought and practice. 
3.6    Objections to the political conception 
By seeing human rights having primarily an international political and legal existence, the 
political conception leaves the moral justification of human rights open. The political 
conception seems to provide only a formal rather than a substantive account of human rights. 
A formal account gives the criteria for distinguishing human rights claims from those that are 
not human rights claims. A substantive account, by contrast, provides criteria for generating 
the content of human rights.
299
 The accounts of human rights by Rawls, Beitz, Raz and Cohen 
do not give a substantive account of human rights. They only provide what we may call a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
trade unions or enjoy just conditions of employment. For Risse, from the standpoint of global ownership, what is 
required is that everybody has their basic needs met and the way these are met or further improvements are 
secondary to this. However, from the viewpoint of the labor rights movement, the freedom of being able to 
determine and control the conditions of work, an idea of workplace democracy, is also essential.  
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formal interventionist account. In their view what makes a right a human right is if violations 
of the right under some conditions (e.g. when the violation is on a mass scale) give pro tanto 
reasons for intervention. Therefore, political accounts are not sufficient to generate the 
content of human rights and they need to rely on naturalistic conceptions in order to generate 
a list of human rights.  
  Although some defenders of the political conception like Beitz do not deny the 
possibility that some values can play a foundational role in the account of the basis of 
individual human rights, others like Raz claim that human rights are not grounded in a 
fundamental moral concern but are dependent on the contingencies of the current system of 
international relations.
300
 But such a position of Raz would run the risk of being ‘political in 
the wrong way’, a mere modus vivendi lacking moral authority.301 If proponents of the 
political approach defend looking at international practice as a heuristic starting point in the 
process of discovery of an appropriate list of human rights, Gilabert argues, it is not an 
objectionable demand. But if “the practical view tells us, more ambitiously, that international 
practice already provides the justification of any such lists”, then it would risk sliding into an 
obviously problematic form of conventionalism.
302
  
  Although not all defenders of the political view are willing to pay the price of non-
foundationalism like Raz (namely leaving the standards of human rights to the contingencies 
of the current system of international relations), all political approaches, in line with Rawls, 
focus on the role of human rights in limiting sovereignty in the international realm. Hence the 
focus shifts from the ‘essentially human’ to the standards of legitimate sovereignty in the 
practical or political approach. This focus on the political-legal function of human rights in 
international law also poses some problems. As Forst argues:  
It is generally misleading to emphasize the political-legal function of such rights within 
international law (or political practice) of providing reasons for a politics of legitimate 
intervention. For this is to put the cart before the horse. We first need to construct (or find) a 
justifiable set of human rights that a legitimate political authority has to respect and 
guarantee, and then we will ask what kinds of legal structures are required at the 
international level to oversee this and help to ensure that political authority is exercised in 
that way. Only after we have taken that step will it become necessary to think about and set 
up legitimate institutions of possible intervention (as measures of last resort). The first 
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question of human rights is not how to limit sovereignty from the outside; it is about the 
essential conditions of the possibility of establishing legitimate political authority.
303
 
Forst draws attention to an important problem of the political-legal views on human rights. 
The focus on the role of human rights as that of setting limits to sovereignty and standards for 
legitimate intervention misses the intranational purpose of human rights, namely their role in 
setting standards of internal political legitimacy.
304
 This misplaced perspective of the 
political-legal views of human rights usually results in their defending minimalist conceptions 
of human rights (reducing the list of human rights to the lowest common denominator) as a 
broad list of human rights can serve to justify a wide range of interventions.
305
 In this sense 
they perceive the role of human rights to be mainly putting constraints on the power relations 
between states and are merely focused on inter-state relations. They ignore or downplay the 
role of human rights in establishing internal legitimation of political systems as well as their 
putting constraints on the power relations in the processes of state and policies formation. 
Forst argues that “one must be careful not to assume the role of an international lawyer or 
judge who presides over certain cases of human rights violations and who at the same time 
wields global executive power.” The primary perspective of human rights is from inside; 
human rights provide reasons for arranging a social and political structure in the right way; 
they do not provide concrete specifications of the arrangements of a society.
306
 They have a 
role in setting standards of internal political legitimacy; in establishing internal legitimation 
of political systems as well as their role in setting standards for state and policies formation. 
This is especially important for understanding the real-life rights struggles which I examined 
in chapter 1, because for the participants in these struggles, the primary perspective of human 
rights is from inside; human rights provide reasons for demanding the power to be involved 
in the arrangement of the social and political contexts they are concerned with. 
3.7    Conclusion 
In the last two chapters, I examined two stylized views on human rights in the philosophical 
literature: the naturalistic conception and the political conception of human rights. I examined 
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various versions of each conception with complex disagreements among them as well as the 
different philosophical commitments of each. I also reflected on the implications of each 
conception for the cases of the right to housing and the right to work.  
This dichotomous view within the mainstream of human rights theory—the perception of 
the naturalistic conceptions contrary to the political conception—can be misleading. There 
have been some recent attempts that challenge this stark opposition between naturalistic and 
political perspectives on human rights. Some scholars, for instance, have argued that these 
two conceptions are complementary and a reconciliatory perspective needs to be 
developed.
307
 Some scholars claimed that the two conceptions are about different things and 
what caused this dichotomy is that defenders of each conception claimed to have provided the 
conception of human rights.
308
 I also believe that the polarization in the human rights 
literature between naturalistic and political approaches is not fruitful and different strands of 
thought should be incorporated into the mainstream of human rights theory. The democratic 
approach which I will defend in chapter 6 aspires to motivate such an opening to different 
strands of thought such as discourse-theoretic accounts of human rights and agonistic theories 
of democracy. In my view, if one has the purpose of accounting for the struggle aspect of 
human rights and their role in democratic politics, one needs to move beyond the opposition 
between naturalistic and political approaches. In the next chapter, I will examine discourse-
theoretic accounts of human rights as a starting point to go beyond this opposition.  
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4    The Discourse-Theoretic Conception of Human Rights 
 
4.1    Introduction 
 
In previous chapters, I have argued that the mainstream philosophy of human rights is 
dominated by two stylized views. On the one hand, there is the naturalistic conception of 
human rights which perceives the nature and foundation of human rights without reference to 
their embodiment in law and politics. It emphasizes the moral aspect of human rights at the 
cost of ignoring their political aspect (Chapter 2). On the other hand, the political conception 
of human rights perceives the nature of human rights to be setting the standards of 
international law and politics. In this way, the political conception takes the political role of 
human rights into account but it leaves the question about the moral justification of human 
rights open and unaddressed. Moreover, within the political conception the main role of 
human rights is understood to be one of setting the standards of legitimacy from the outside, 
thereby ignoring the role of human rights in the constitution of internal legitimacy (Chapter 
3).  
Recently some scholars have argued that naturalistic and political conceptions of human 
rights are complementary rather than opposing views. Liao and Etinson, for instance, have 
offered a conciliatory perspective on the ongoing debate between proponents of the two 
conceptions. They argue that since the formal features of the two conceptions seem to be 
concerned with different things (political conceptions are concerned with the issue of duty-
bearers of human rights and naturalistic conceptions are concerned with the grounds of 
human rights), it is in principle possible that the two conceptions are compatible.
309
 They also 
argue that the two conceptions are not only compatible but because of the fact that political 
conceptions offer only a formal account of human rights they need to rely on a substantive 
naturalistic account for the determination of the content of human rights.
310
 Like Liao and 
Etinson, Gilabert also calls for a shift from framing naturalistic and political approaches in a 
contrasting way to understanding them in a complementary way.
311
 He suggests that we need 
both approaches to make good normative sense of the contemporary practice of human rights.   
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 Gilabert, “Humanist and Political Perspectives on Human Rights.” Gilabert calls “humanist conception” what 
is usually called naturalistic conception. I will continue to use the term naturalistic to be consistent throughout 
this dissertation.  
Part of my motivation in this chapter is to join Liao and Etinson and Gilabert in their 
attempt to move beyond this dichotomous view of human rights within the mainstream 
philosophical literature (naturalistic versus political approaches). Nevertheless, my strategy is 
different than theirs in the sense that I analyze a third conception of human rights, namely the 
discourse-theoretical model of human rights. Discourse-theoretic conceptions of human 
rights, as I will demonstrate, already account for ‘the dual nature’ of human rights—their 
being simultaneously moral and political—within a single understanding of human rights. 
Therefore, discourse-theoretic accounts can suggest a more systematic perspective to find a 
middle-ground between naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights than other 
reconciliatory attempts that look for different naturalistic and political theories and argue for 
their combination.
312
 
Those sympathetic to Habermas’s discourse-theory of morality have recently sought to 
extend his work into an account of human rights which can be called a discourse theory of 
human rights.
313
 Seyla Benhabib and Rainer Forst, for example, have independently provided 
accounts of human rights from a discourse-theoretic perspective.
314
 As Baynes argues, we can 
delineate a three-stage construction in the accounts of Forst and Benhabib: 
1) The identification of ‘the speech-act-immanent obligation’315 of speakers and hearers to 
provide reasons in support of the validity claims they make, 
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which is connected to the normative basis of speech; when agents speak they engage in a structure of mutual 
speech-act- immanent obligation to provide justification for the different sorts of claims they make. Simply by 
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2) Implication of a basic moral right—‘the moral right to justification’ (Forst), or ‘the 
right to have rights’ (Benhabib), 
3) This basic moral right (Forst) or ‘moral principle’ (Benhabib) is connected with a more 
extensive set of human rights.
316
 
A discourse-theoretic conception of human rights provides an intersubjective moral 
justification of human rights. Moreover, it gives a systematic account of how moral and 
political considerations are integrated into one conception of human rights. The proposed 
elements and aspects of the discourse-theoretic conception that I will examine in this chapter 
make it a viable conception of human rights that transcends the opposition between the 
naturalistic and political conception.
317
  
The democratic account of human rights, which I am constructing and defending in this 
dissertation (see chapter 6), is a modification of a discourse-theoretic conception of human 
rights—especially Forst’s account of human rights. In order to motivate my modification of 
the discourse-theoretic conception of human rights, in this chapter, I will closely examine 
discourse-theoretic conceptions of human rights, starting from an analysis of the basic 
influences of Habermas’s discourse theory of morality and his own work on human rights 
(section 4.2) followed by an examination of two recent versions pursued by Benhabib and 
Forst (sections 4.3 and 4.4). After this exposition of contemporary discourse-theoretic 
accounts, I will examine the implications of a discourse-theoretic conception for the 
justification of socio-economic rights as human rights, given the emphasis in this dissertation 
on struggles for socio-economic rights in particular (section 4.5). I will also argue that 
discourse-theoretic accounts fare better than the naturalistic and political conceptions in 
accounting for the struggle aspect of human rights. In section 4.6, I will discuss some of the 
most important objections directed to discourse-theoretic approaches. 
4.2    Habermas on human rights 
Habermas’s work on human rights has taken shape across a number of texts and it has at least 
two elements: 1) a rational reconstruction of the system of rights within constitutional 
democracies, 2) an analysis of the dual nature of human rights in relation to law and morality. 
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In the following, I will examine Habermas’s approach to human rights with respect to (1) and 
(2). 
4.2.1   The rational reconstruction of the system of rights  
In Between Fact and Norms, Habermas offers a sociologically informed conceptualization of 
law and basic rights that goes beyond the dichotomies that have been inflicted on political 
theory. The first dichotomy is the one between human rights (private autonomy) which is 
prioritized by classical liberal views and popular sovereignty (public autonomy) which is 
prioritized by civic republicanism in grounding legitimacy. Classical liberal views, stemming 
from thinkers like John Locke, tend to define legitimate government in relation to the 
protection of individual liberties, often specified in terms of human rights. According to these 
views, citizenship or participation in the political community is seen as valuable only 
instrumentally; as a means of securing individual rights and opportunities. Republican views 
influenced by thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, on the other hand, tend to ground 
legitimacy of government in notions of popular sovereignty emphasizing the importance of 
shared traditions, civic autonomy and an idea of the common good. On this view, individual 
rights and opportunities that the subjects enjoy derive from and depend on the values and 
ideas of the political community.
318
 In arguing for an ‘internal relation’ between private and 
public autonomy by providing an account of legitimate law in which both human rights and 
popular sovereignty play separate roles, Habermas aims to move beyond this dichotomy 
between civic republicanism and classical liberalism.
319
  
Habermas’s strategy for providing such an account is to anchor the legitimacy of law in a 
discourse principle (D):  
 D: Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons could 
agree as participants in rational discourses.
320
 
Each type of practical discourse involves a further specialization of the discourse 
principle (and corresponding sorts of reasons) depending on the question at issue. For 
the justification of moral norms, the discourse principle takes the form of a 
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universalization principle: 
  U: A norm is valid when the foreseeable consequences and side effects of its 
general observance for the interests and value orientations for each individual could 
be jointly accepted by all concerned without coercion.
321
  
According to discourse principle, a law may claim legitimacy only if all those possibly 
affected could consent to it after participating in ‘rational discourses’: 
As participants in “discourses,” we want to arrive at shared opinions by mutually 
convincing one another about some issue through arguments, whereas in “bargaining” we 
strive for a balance of different interests. . . . Now, if discourses (and bargaining processes) 
are the place where a reasonable political will can develop, then the presumption of 
legitimate outcomes, which the democratic procedure is supposed to justify, ultimately rests 
on an elaborate communicative arrangement: the forms of communication necessary for a 
reasonable will-formation of the political lawgiver, the conditions that ensure legitimacy, 
must be legally institutionalized. The desired internal relation between human rights and 
popular sovereignty consists in this: human rights institutionalize the communicative 
conditions for a reasonable political will formation.
322
 
Hence the aimed internal connection between popular sovereignty and human rights, 
according to Habermas, lies in the normative content of the very “mode of exercising political 
autonomy” which is secured through the communicative form of discursive processes of 
opinion- and will-formation.
323
 When the co-originality of private and public autonomy is 
revealed in discourse-theoretic terms (according to which addressees of laws are 
simultaneously the authors of their rights), then the substance of human rights is perceived to 
be residing in the formal conditions for the legal institutionalization of the discursive 
processes of opinion- and will-formation. According to this reconstruction, public and private 
autonomy mutually presuppose one another rather than one being prior to the other.  
By anchoring the legitimacy of law in the discourse principle, which is conceptually prior 
to the division between morality and law, Habermas aims to move beyond another dichotomy 
in the legal sphere between a normative conception of law (i.e. natural rights and natural law 
conceptions) and a normatively neutral conception of law which we find in legal 
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positivism.
324
 Law has a dual character: it has both a factual side (as a system of coercible 
rules and procedures it has an existence similar to social facts) and a normative side (laws 
embody a claim to legitimacy; they appeal to reasons that all citizens, ideally, find 
acceptable).  
Habermas claims that the “system of rights” for constitutional democracies can be 
reconstructed by the “interpenetration of the discourse principle and the legal form” and this 
interpretation is understood as a “logical genesis of rights” by Habermas.325 Some further 
clarification may be needed here. The idea of a logical genesis refers to the notion of a 
conceptual reconstruction rather than a historical depiction of the actual process of 
constitutional rights-making. It is an elaboration of the conceptual presuppositions of an idea 
of a legitimate legal system and a reconstruction of the rights inscribed within this legal 
system. The discourse principle (D) expresses “the post-conventional requirements of 
justification”, namely, the requirement of impartiality.326 According to Habermas, under the 
conditions of post-metaphysical thinking, the need for justification cannot be met by ethical 
deliberations which are oriented to the telos of my/our good (or not misspent) life but rather 
by impartial evaluations of moral discourses.
327
 The discourse principle (D) embodies this 
moral viewpoint of equal respect for each person and equal consideration for the interests of 
all. Finally, the ‘legal form’ consists in this: “Modern states are characterized by the fact that 
political power is constituted in the form of positive law, which is to say: enacted and 
coercive law.”328 The legal form refers to Habermas’s functional concept of modern law 
which is roughly the idea that in post-traditional morality, the backing of a shared religious or 
metaphysical standpoint for regulation and organization in societies is no longer possible. 
Habermas makes a sociological argument that due to its formal characteristics law 
complements post-traditional morality in fulfilling integrative functions for 
society.
329
According to the discourse-theoretic justification of Habermas, this genesis of 
rights occurs in two-stages: The first level involves a philosophical deduction of basic 
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categories of rights from the functional concept of modern law (legal form) and the normative 
idea of rational justification (the discourse principle), thus securing the minimal liberal 
requirement (the rule of law in which rights apply to everyone equally).330 The second level 
involves the political process of turning (or interpreting) these abstract principles of rights 
into a system of rights in accordance with the principle of democracy.
331
 This reconstruction 
of rights in a stepwise fashion is summarized by Habermas as follows: “One begins by 
applying the discourse principle to the general rights to liberties—a right constitutive for the 
legal form as such—and ends by legally institutionalizing the conditions for a discursive 
exercise of political autonomy.”332 In connection with this strategy, Habermas introduces five 
categories of basic rights: 
1) Basic rights that result from the politically autonomous elaboration of the right to equal 
individual liberties (these cover subjective liberties of freedom of speech, freedom of 
conscience, and the person); 
2) Basic rights that result from the politically autonomous elaboration of the status of a 
member in a voluntary association of consociates under law (rights to association);  
3)  Basic rights that result immediately from the actionability
333
 of rights and from the 
politically autonomous elaboration of individual legal protection (rights to legal protection, 
free trial and due process, and so forth);  
4)  Basic rights to equal opportunities to participate in processes of opinion- and will- 
formation in which citizens exercise their political autonomy and through which they generate 
legitimate law (rights to public offices);  
5)  Basic rights to the provision of living conditions that are socially, technologically, and 
ecologically safeguarded, insofar as the current circumstances make this necessary if citizens 
are to have equal opportunities to utilize the civil rights listed in 1 through 4 above (rights to 
welfare and other (material) conditions).334   
Two aspects of Habermas’s reconstruction of the system of rights are crucial for the 
discussions about the specific content of rights. First Habermas reconstructs a system of rights 
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such that different categories of rights are internally linked and intermingled. Second, there 
are five categories of basic rights; the specific content of each category is determined by the 
citizens themselves.  
4.2.2   The dual nature of human rights 
In Between Fact and Norms, Habermas argues that the connection between democracy and 
human rights is not a historically contingent but a conceptually ‘internal’ one: human rights 
legally institutionalize the communicative conditions for reasonable political will-
formation.
335
 
Although Habermas offers a reconstruction of the system of rights within constitutional 
democracies in Between Facts and Norms, in his recent works he has addressed the issue of 
international human rights.
336
 In this respect, he examines the objections to international 
human rights from Western and non-Western perspectives and explores the potentials of the 
system of rights for non-Western societies. Here, Habermas argues that human rights are 
“Janus-faced” with one face turned towards morality and the other, simultaneously, towards 
law:  
Because the moral promise of equal respect for everybody is supposed to be cashed out in 
legal currency, human rights exhibit a Janus face turned simultaneously to morality and to 
law. . . . Notwithstanding their exclusively moral content, they have the form of enforceable 
subjective rights that grant specific liberties and claims. . . Thus, human rights circumscribe 
precisely that part (and only that part) of morality which can be translated into the medium 
of coercive law and become political reality in the robust shape of effective civil rights.
337
  
Human rights are then special moral norms that require juridification. In this section, I will 
critically analyze Habermas’s position on the moral and legal side of human rights to see if 
his view has the necessary resources to find a middle-ground between the naturalistic and 
political conceptions of human rights.  
In terms of the moral side of human rights, Habermas argues that human rights are moral 
norms and hence they have moral validity. In this context, it is important to distinguish 
between the reconstruction of the system of basic rights and the moral justification of human 
rights. The reconstruction of the system of basic rights, as Flynn argues, shows how to anchor 
some abstract principles of human rights within the practice of democracy by showing how 
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they are internal presuppositions of the practice of constitution-making.
338
 The rational 
reconstruction, however, cannot be viewed as a complete moral justification of human rights. 
Habermas accepts that human rights are moral norms and hence have universal validity. 
However, he is not very clear on the justification of human rights. As moral norms they take 
the form of the principle of universalization (U). The principle of universalization introduces 
a rule of argumentation for moral norms. But unlike Kant’s categorical imperative, the 
principal of universalization does not rule out considerations of consequences, interests and 
values within the justification procedure of moral norms.
339
 Hence, reasons other than moral 
reasons such as prudential reasons and instrumental reasons can enter into the justification of 
a moral norm. Habermas claims that people from different worldviews can agree on a moral 
principle although their respective reasons can be different. 
In this context, one can object that Habermas’s approach does not properly account for 
the moral aspect of human rights. Forst, for instance, raises such an objection when he argues 
that human rights are something that moral persons must grant one another—rights we owe 
one another, in a moral sense.
340
 Forst argues that apart from the moral arguments for specific 
rights within the rights-generating process, there is also a moral argument for entering into a 
rights-generating process at all.
341
 He argues for a basic right to justification which I will 
examine in section 4.4. What is important for now is that Habermas does not provide a moral 
justification of human rights dependent on moral reasons only.  
Another aspect of Habermas’s account is the intersubjective character of the construction 
of both moral norms and human rights. As Thomas McCarthy argues, Habermas, like Kant, 
distinguishes between the types of practical reasoning and corresponding types of ‘ought’ 
proper to questions about what is practically expedient, ethically prudent, and morally right. 
Again like Kant, Habermas understands the type of practical reasoning about what is right and 
just to be universal in import: “it is geared to what everyone could rationally will to be a norm 
binding on everyone alike.”342 Habermas’s discourse theory of morality, however, replaces 
Kant’s categorical imperative with a procedure of moral argumentation in the sense that a 
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notion of reasoned agreement among those subject to a norm is centered at the core of the 
normative justification of the norm in question. Kant’s first formulation of the categorical 
imperative, “the formula of universal law”, runs as follows: 
  Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same will that it should 
become universal law (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 4: 421).
343
 
While according to Kant’s formal criterion of universalization each solitary individual 
establishes the validity of a moral norm for herself, according to Habermas’s dialogical 
principle of universalization (U) for a norm to be valid, its consequences for the satisfaction 
of everyone’s interests must be acceptable to all as participants in a practical discourse. This 
shifts the frame of reference from Kant’s monological procedure of moral reasoning of a 
solitary, reflecting moral consciousness to the dialogical process of reaching consensus within 
a community of moral subjects.
344
  
About the legal side of human rights, Habermas perceives an essential connection of 
human rights to law. In fact, he claims that human rights circumscribe that part of morality 
that requires juridification. Habermas asserts: “the concept of human rights does not have its 
origins in morality, but rather bears the imprint of the modern concept of individual liberties, 
hence of a specifically juridical concept. Human rights are juridical by their very nature.”345 
This emphasis of Habermas on juridification has been criticized by Thomas Pogge and Seyla 
Benhabib.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, Pogge emphasizes the importance of institutions for 
human rights. He argues that human rights are moral claims that require institutional 
guarantee. However, he argues that institutional guarantee does not need to take the form of 
legal rights. Pogge defines an understanding of human rights U3, “according to which human 
rights are basic or constitutional rights as each state ought to set them forth in its fundamental 
legal texts and ought to make them effective through appropriate institutions and policies.”346 
According to Pogge, Habermas’s approach to human rights exemplifies U3, because for 
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Habermas included in the meaning of human rights is that they should be enshrined in the 
system of constitutional rights.
347
 Pogge argues that this understanding has problems because 
the requirement of juridification is a strict requirement because particular human rights do not 
always require juridification. Pogge gives the example of the right to adequate nutrition and 
argues that a legal right to nutrition will be superfluous in a society that secures adequate 
nutrition without recourse to the legal system such as through a kinship system of food 
provision. Therefore, Pogge concludes the juridification component is not really essential to 
the concept of human rights. I referred to Pogge’s criticism of Habermas’s understanding of 
human rights to illustrate one of the problems of those views that subsumes the morality of 
human rights to their embodiment in a legal order. In the next sections, I will discuss other 
discourse-theoretic accounts of human rights that account for the political aspect of human 
rights without subsuming the moral side of human rights to their legality.
348
  
Seyla Benhabib, in a different line of argument, also criticizes Habermas’s emphasis on 
the juridification of human rights. Acknowledging the validity of Habermas’s conceptual 
distinction between private and public autonomy, Benhabib argues that “the ‘logical genesis 
of rights’ takes the teeth out of the experience of social struggles in history.”349 She argues 
that the experience of democracy is more complex and there is more historical indeterminacy 
than Habermas envisages. Moreover, not every democracy or legal system considered 
legitimate presupposes the kind of classification of rights Habermas postulates. Granted that 
the conceptual co-originality of private and public autonomy can be interpreted as a critique 
of the individualistic, natural rights construction of rights which places holders of rights 
outside the polity, it should not be interpreted as a historical necessity thereby 
underestimating the potential conflicts between public and private autonomy.
350
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In his most recent piece on human rights, Habermas acknowledges that in his previous 
work he ignored the struggle dimension of human rights. He moves his focus on this aspect of 
human rights and postulates the notion of human dignity as “the moral “source” from which 
all of the basic rights derive their meaning.”351 He claims that the notion of dignity serves the 
mediating role between the moral and legal side of human rights. Presenting a conceptual 
history of the concept of dignity and the role it played in the construction of human rights, he 
claims that “the social recognition of the dignity of others provides a conceptual bridge 
between the moral idea of equal respect for all and the legal form of human rights.”352  
[T]he experience of the violation of human dignity has performed, and can still perform, an 
inventive function in many cases: be it in view of the unbearable social conditions and the 
marginalization of impoverished social classes; or in view of the unequal treatment of 
women and men in the workplace. . . . In the light of such specific challenges, different 
aspects of the meaning of human dignity emerge from the plethora of experiences of what it 
means to be humiliated and be deeply hurt. The features of human dignity specified and 
actualized in this way can then lead both to a more complete exhaustion of existing civil 
rights and to the discovery and construction of new ones.
353
 
Although Habermas proposed a concept of human dignity mediating between the moral idea 
of equal respect for all and the legal form of human rights, he left aside the question whether 
this shift in focus has further consequences for the reading of the discourse principle as part of 
the justification of basic rights. In the following I will examine two approaches to human 
rights which attempt to provide a discourse-theoretic moral justification of human rights.  
4.3    Seyla Benhabib: Democratic iterations  
In her various works and most particularly in her book Dignity in Adversity, Seyla Benhabib 
defends a discourse-theoretic account of human rights which synthesizes insights from 
discourse ethics with the Arendtian notion of ‘the right to have rights’. According to 
Benhabib, there is one moral right, the right to have rights of every human being, which refers 
to a right “to be recognized by others and recognize others in turn, as persons entitled to moral 
respect and legally protected rights in a human community.”354 While Benhabib borrows the 
notion of the right to have rights from Arendt, contrary to Arendt, she uses it not principally 
as a political right to membership in a political community but rather as a moral right to be 
recognized as a moral being worthy of equal concern and protection. By engaging in what she 
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calls a “presuppositional analysis”, Benhabib attempts to show that we presuppose 
communicative freedom in any meaningful account of human rights.
355
 In Benbabib’s view, 
human rights articulate moral principles that protect the exercise of communicative freedom. 
Communicate freedom is the capability of saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to an utterance whose validity 
claim the hearer can comprehend and according to which she can act. All potential and actual 
speakers of a natural or symbolic language have a fundamental right to have rights as a moral 
being capable of communicative freedom. The exercise of communicative freedom is 
understood as an exercise of agency within the discourse-theoretic model whereas the 
individual agents are viewed as an individual embedded in contexts of communication as well 
as interaction.
356
 
Benhabib notes that discourses, differing from bargaining, coercive manipulation or 
brainwashing, are dependent on formal conditions of conversation. These conditions are:   
the equality of each conversation partner to partake in as well as initiate communication, 
their symmetrical entitlement to speech acts, and reciprocity of communicative roles - each 
can question and answer, bring new items to the agenda, and initiate reflection about the 
rules of discourse itself. These formal preconditions, which themselves require 
reinterpretation within the discursive process, impose certain necessary constraints upon the 
kinds of reasons that will prove acceptable within discourses, but they never can, nor should 
they be required to, provide sufficient grounds for what constitute good reasons.
357
 
In order to make the transition from these highly abstract and formal considerations of the 
right to have rights to specific rights regimes, legal systems and conventions of existing 
polities, Benbabib suggests the project of “democratic iterations.”358 Democratic iterations are 
processes of public argumentation, deliberation and exchange through which universalist 
rights claims are contested and contextualized, invoked and revoked throughout legal and 
political institutions.
359
 The universal and context-transcending validity of human rights is 
resituated and reiterated in concrete contexts by democratic iterations. Benhabib argues that 
‘democratic iterations’ is a normative concept with empirical import; it posits certain 
normative criteria to judge macro-processes of discourse and the justification of the criteria is 
derived from the program of communicative ethics.
360
  
According to Benhabib’s analysis, human rights are not just ethical demands tied to 
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notions of freedom, agency, etc., they also have political character as they are closely tied to 
claims of legitimacy and just rule. In this sense, like Habermas, Benhabib argues that there is 
an intrinsic connection between human rights and democratic self-determination.
361
 With 
respect to the practical conceptions, she argues that rather than limiting the conceptions of 
human rights to a functional role of their position in international relations and intervention, 
we should see them as “instruments of critique.”362 Universal human rights as one of the most 
prominent cosmopolitan norms empower local movements.
363
 In this sense, Benhabib’s 
account straddles the divide between the naturalistic and political conceptions of human 
rights. Yet, her justificatory strategy is not free from critique. Before examining some 
objections in section 4.6, I will examine one other discourse-theoretic account of human rights 
provided by Forst.  
4.4   Rainer Forst’s constructivist conception of human rights 
Recently, Rainer Forst has provided what he names a constructivist conception of human 
rights. Before examining Forst’s account of human rights, I will clarify my usage of the terms 
constructivist and discourse-theoretic. Forst calls his account of human rights constructivist as 
it is part of his constructivist account of the source of moral normativity. According to Forst, 
morality derives its normativity and validity not from God or any other independent source 
but from itself. So, in this sense Forst’s account is a specific form of Kantian constructivism in 
which morality is autonomous; it draws its validity from itself. Yet, the validity of moral 
norms is granted by a procedure of justification. In other words, the moral norms are 
constructed by the procedure of a general and reciprocal justification. Forst formulates the 
core insight of constructivism as follows: “there is no objective, or in any sense, valid order of 
values that takes priority over the justification procedure. Only those norms that can 
successfully withstand this procedure count as valid.”364 I cannot here go into a more detailed 
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discussion of constructivist positions in moral theory. It is worth noting, however, that to the 
extent that Forst offers “a moral construction of a conception of human rights” in which the 
right to justification and the criteria of reciprocity and generality serve as the basis (there is 
more detail on this below), his account of human rights is a ‘constructivist’ one.  
Granted this general constructivist program of Forst’s account of moral normativity, I 
consider his conception of human rights to be a version of discourse-theoretic conception of 
human rights. This is because the constructivism Forst proposes is ‘discursive’, the procedure 
of construction is not a hypothetical thought experiment like Rawls’s original position, rather 
“a procedure of reciprocal and general argumentation within certain contexts.”365 Moreover, 
there is a moral construction of human rights not just a political construction as Rawls 
proposes. For these reasons, although it is different form Habermas’s view on human rights in 
the sense of giving a moral justification of human rights, Forst’s account is more similar to a 
discourse-theoretic conception of human rights than it is to a political conception.
366
 
Forst has provided a reflexive argument for the justification of human rights based on the 
right to justification. By ‘reflexive’ Forst means “the very idea of justification itself is 
reconstructed with respect to its normative and practical implications.”367 This idea is similar 
to what Forst elsewhere calls a ‘recursive analysis’.368 This type of argument states that a 
normative claim, which has a reciprocal and general validity claim (e.g. a rights claim), has to 
be justifiable on the basis of criteria presupposed by its claim to validity. This is the recursive 
principle of justification: a moral norm can claim reciprocal and general validity, which 
means that each person should adhere to this norm as an agent and can demand its observance 
from all others. “If one asks recursively about redeeming this validity claim, then this calls for 
a discursive justification procedure in which the addressees of the norm can assess its 
reciprocal and general validity, in which the criteria of reciprocity and generality are 
decisive.”369  
In moral contexts of justification, criteria of reciprocity and generality are essential: the 
former means that nobody claims special privileges and everyone grants others all the claims 
one raises for oneself, without projecting one’s own interests, values, or needs onto others and 
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thereby unilaterally determining what counts as a good reason; the latter means that no 
affected person’s objections may be excluded to achieve general agreeability.370 The moral 
basis for human rights, as Forst reconstructs it, is “the respect for the human person as an 
autonomous agent who possesses a right to justification, that is, a right to be recognized as an 
agent who can demand acceptable reasons for any action that claims to be morally justified 
and for any social or political structure or law that claims to be binding upon him or her.”371 
This means that one claim, namely, human beings’ claim to be respected as autonomous 
agents who have a right not to be subjected to actions and institutional norms that cannot be 
adequately justified to them, underlies all human rights.
372
 
When it comes to the grounding of human rights, the starting point must be a claim to be 
respected as a normative agent who can give and who deserves justifying reasons. This notion 
of respecting other’s autonomy, Forst argues, is neither attached to a contestable notion of the 
good nor does it require “a translation of a prudential ethical value for me to a moral reason 
for all.”373 Forst argues that the right to justification and the criteria of reciprocity and 
generality serve as the basis for the moral construction of a conception of human rights. 
Human rights are seen as the result of intersubjective, discursive construction of rights claims 
that cannot be reciprocally and generally denied between persons who respect one another’s 
right to justification. Forst claims that this kind of respect is owed in a deontological sense 
which is necessary to carry the weight
374
 of what we mean by human rights. Respecting other 
people’s autonomy and human rights cannot depend, in a deontological understanding, on a 
belief that doing so contributes to the good life of the person who shows respect or contributes 
to the good life of others. Respect rests on other grounds: on recognition of oneself and others 
as having the capacity of practical reason, of being reasons-giving and reasons-deserving 
agents. According to Forst’s view the ground of human rights is this moral recognition of the 
other as having a right to justification and that kind of recognition is an imperative of moral 
practical reason.  
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374
 I believe that by ‘weight’ Forst means ‘moral significance’. 
Forst’s account of human rights avoids some of the problems associated with the 
naturalistic and political conceptions discussed in chapters 2 and 3. 
First, Forst offers a moral justification of human rights. In contrast to the political 
conception of human rights which leaves the question of the moral grounding of human rights 
open and unaddressed Forst offers a moral constructivist justification of human rights on the 
right to justification.  
 Second, Forst proposes a moral (not an ethical) justification of human rights. Similar to 
Griffin’s account, a notion of normative agency lies at the center of the idea of human rights 
in Forst’s account. However Forst’s notion of normative agency differs from Griffin’s in the 
sense that it is a deontological notion rather than a teleological one. In other words, a notion 
of personal agency is morally important for human rights not because of its contribution to the 
good life but independently of that. The normative notion of agency or personhood that lies at 
the center of the idea of human rights, Forst argues, “is one of an agent as a reason-giving and 
reason-deserving being―that is, a being who not only has the ability to offer and receive 
reasons but has a basic right to justification.”375 
  Third, and most important for my purposes here, unlike the political conception, Forst’s 
account and discourse-theoretic accounts in general can account for the political significance 
of human rights without ignoring their moral importance as well as their role as standards of 
internal political legitimacy. As discussed in chapter 3, Rawls’s refraining from a moral or 
ethical justification of human rights was deliberate in order not to be susceptible to the 
ethnocentrism charge. Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, grounding human rights on a 
religious and comprehensive worldview would not be acceptable to people holding different 
comprehensive worldviews. However, in order to avoid the ethnocentrism charge, the 
political conception has left the justification of human rights open and reduced human rights 
to a minimal list. As such human rights have been reduced to a foreign policy tool for liberal 
societies. Forst argues that focusing on the role of human rights as setting limits to 
sovereignty and standards for legitimate intervention is misleading as it misses the 
intranational purpose of human rights, namely their role in setting standards of internal 
political legitimacy.
376
 Rather, he argues, the primary perspective of human rights is from the 
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inside; human rights provide reasons for arranging a social and political structure in the right 
way; they do not provide concrete specifications for the arrangements of a society. Even the 
views labelled as political tend to neglect that the primary perspective of human rights is from 
the inside, about the conditions and grounding of the internal legitimacy of a social and 
political structure rather than the perspective of an outsider who observes a political structure 
and asks whether there are grounds for intervention (as Beitz and Raz argue). 
Therefore, similar to Benhabib’s account, Forst’s account of human rights also straddles 
the divide between the naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights. My broader aim 
in this dissertation is to propose a conception of human rights that is not susceptible to the 
objections raised against the naturalistic and political conception of human rights. Discourse-
theoretic approaches are one possible candidate for such a conception. Thereby, the account 
of human rights that I propose in chapter 6 relies on the discourse-theoretic accounts, 
specifically their intersubjective justification of human rights based on the right to 
justification. However, I will offer an interpretation of the right to justification such that this 
right takes the form of the right to resistance in concrete instances when the right to 
justification is not respected (see section 6.3). This interpretation of the right to justification, 
as I shall demonstrate, immunizes the discourse-theoretic accounts from some objections that 
I will examine in section 4.6; especially the objections by postmodern critics that they are 
consensus-centric. Before looking at the objections to the discourse-theoretic accounts, let me 
briefly reflect on the implications of the discourse-theoretic conception for the right to work 
and the right to housing.  
4.5    Is there a human right to work, a human right to housing? 
Defenders of both discourse-theoretic and political conceptions of human rights reject the 
identification of human rights with natural rights. They both reject grounding the idea of a 
human right on metaphysically controversial assumptions about human nature. Discourse-
theoretic approaches to human rights are, however, peculiar in connecting the legitimacy of 
human rights to democratic deliberation and consensus.
377
 The basic insight of the discourse 
theory of rights is that principles and norms (including principles of rights and duties) can 
claim validity only if they are the outcome of a rational discourse in which all possibly 
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affected persons participate equally. In this sense, democratic participation is not perceived as 
a separate right, but rather as an (institutionalized) procedure in the construction of rights in 
the first place. So far, I have been focusing on the justification of human rights within 
discourse-theoretic accounts. What about their scope: what do discourse-theoretic accounts 
imply for the content of human rights?  
As discussed in section 4.2.1, Habermas offered a reconstruction of the system of rights 
with five categories of basic rights. To recapitulate, these categories, in brief, are: 1) rights to 
equal individual liberties, 2) rights to political membership and association, 3) rights securing 
equal protection under law, 4) rights to equal political participation and 5) social and 
economic rights in so far as they are necessary to exercise the rights in the first four 
categories. However, this is the reconstruction of the system of rights within constitutional 
democracies, not international human rights.
378
 Moreover, these are categories of rights; their 
concrete content needs to be worked out discursively by participants in various contexts.
379
 
Similarly, Forst and Benhabib are silent on the content of human rights. In other words, they 
do not offer a complete list of human rights. Because of this silence about the content of 
human rights, discourse-theoretic accounts can be accused of being ‘empty’ formal accounts. 
In this sense, discourse-theoretic accounts are faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, they 
refrain from imposing the moral theorist’s view on the content of human rights. They refrain 
from deriving a fixed and complete list of human rights from the best moral theory a priori 
like the naturalistic conceptions do (e.g. in Griffin’s account, normative agency is the 
foundation of human rights and from that foundation a substantial list of human rights is 
derived). Instead, they argue that the form that human rights take must be determined 
discursively.
380
 On the other hand, they do not want to compromise with the status quo or 
existing power relations and accept the determination of the content of human rights 
according to the contingent standards of international law as the political conceptions do. 
Recall Forst’s objection to the political conceptions, that by focusing on the political-legal 
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role of human rights within international law, they miss the intranational aspect of human 
rights (see section 3.6).  
As an alternative to naturalistic and political conceptions in the determination of the 
content of human rights, discourse-theoretic accounts pose ‘a dual nature of human rights’: 
they are moral rights that require institutionalization. Habermas argues that human rights 
exhibit a Janus-face turned simultaneously to law and morality.
381
 Similarly, Forst argues that 
there is an integrated two-tiered aspect of political and moral constructivism:  
In their concrete form and their positive-legal sense, human rights are of a juridical nature, 
but their core content is of a moral nature. Where they arise, demands for human rights are 
moral demands, and they are primarily justified with moral reasons. Their core content is 
not—and here the integrated two-tiered aspect of moral and political constructivism is 
significant—prior to political justice in the sense of natural rights; rather, it is always 
concretely legitimated and recognized in specific discourses of justification.
382
 
What about specific human rights claims? Is there a right to work, a right to housing 
according to discourse-theoretic accounts? According to Habermas’s system of rights, “the 
category of social and ecological rights (the fifth category) can be justified only in relative 
terms” whereas four categories of civil rights are justified absolutely (items 1-4).383 David 
Ingram argues that this could mean either of two things: the first four categories of rights are 
prior only in the logical order of justification and the fifth category is deduced from the other 
categories, or the fifth category is less binding and imperative (less prior in the logical order 
of institutionalization).
384
 Now, in the logical order of justification, it is reasonable to give the 
fifth category a derivative and relative status as it would be hard to argue that such a category 
is an implicit conceptual presupposition of the practice of constitution making. But when we 
shift to realization and institutionalization (the second-stage of the genesis of rights), every 
valid human right, including social rights, has to have a moral justification for all of them to 
be equally valid.
385
 However, Habermas has not been clear on this point when he states that 
social and economic rights can be justified only in relative terms.  
Therefore, Habermas provides no clear answer as to how ‘political and civil rights’ and 
‘classical human rights’ need to be ranked with respect to economic, social and cultural rights. 
Like Rawls, he seems to privilege civil and political rights above social, economic and 
cultural rights on some occasions. At other times, he argues that the negative freedom to 
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“pursue one’s private conception of the good” without interference is meaningless apart from 
the positive freedom to be protected and supported in this endeavor.
386
 This ambiguity of 
Habermas’s position with respect to the status of socio-economic rights has been criticized for 
not accounting for the complementarity of human rights or giving too many concessions to 
realism.
387
 
Forst’s account, on the other hand, has a more secure justification of social and economic 
rights. His right to justification forms both procedural and substantive foundations for “the 
justification, determination, and recognition of all rights that citizens cannot reasonably deny 
one another, whether they be liberal rights to security of person, political rights to 
participation, or social and economic rights.”388 All human rights including social and 
economic rights have their moral justification on the basis of the right to justification. In 
political and social contexts the rights claims can take various forms but to the degree that 
they are demanded based on the moral arguments resulting from the right to justification, that 
fundamental moral right substantiates all human rights. In chapter 6, I develop an account of 
human rights which grounds human rights on the right to justification interpreted as a right to 
resistance and I will argue that this grounding of human rights unlike Rawlsian and 
Habermasian systems of rights does not privilege civil and political rights over social and 
economic rights.  
4.6    Objections to discourse-theoretic approaches 
Objections to discourse-theoretic approaches can come from various philosophical traditions. 
In the following, I will discuss the most common lines of objection to discourse-theoretic 
accounts which are also pertinent for a discourse-theoretic understanding of human rights.  
4.6.1   The circularity objection 
One well-known objection is the circularity objection. The circularity charge is frequently 
leveled at Habermas’s rules of discourse, derivation of the principle of U and the overall 
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argument of discourse ethics.
389
 The circularity objection arises because the programme of 
discourse ethics is originally conceived as a philosophical justification of the moral principle 
or the moral standpoint.
390
 As Habermas sets out his original programme in his Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action in 1983, the formal derivation of principle (U) 
from non-moral premises is central to this programme. If the principle (U) can be derived 
from non-moral premises, then (U) can be justified on the non-moral grounds of Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action and the pragmatic theory of meaning.
391
 However, the rules of 
discourse smuggle in moral assumptions and raise the threat of circularity.  
Perhaps, it is important to briefly mention Habermas’s notions of discourse and rules of 
discourse to understand the circularity objection. Discourse is exchange of reasons for validity 
claims of different sorts whereas certain rules of discourse are what Habermas calls 
“idealizing pragmatic presuppositions of discourse.”392 Habermas identifies three levels of 
rules. On the first level, there are the basic logical and semantic rules, such as the principle of 
non-contradiction and the requirement of consistency. On the second level, there are norms 
governing procedure, such as the principle of sincerity, namely that every speaker may assert 
only what she genuinely believes; and the principle of accountability, that every speaker may 
either justify upon request what they assert or provide reasons for not offering a 
justification.
393
 On the third level, there are the norms that immunize the process of discourse 
against coercion, repression, and inequality. These include the rules that:   
1)  Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in the discourse.  
2) a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatsoever.  
    b) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatsoever into the discourse.  
    c) Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.  
3) No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as 
laid down in (1) and (2) above.
394
  
Habermas calls the rules of discourse ‘pragmatic presuppositions’, because they are 
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implicit presuppositions of the practice of discourse. These pragmatic presuppositions of 
discourse are necessary, because no one who participates in a discourse—in the give and take 
of reasons—can avoid making them. These presuppositions are also counterfactual in the 
sense that real discourses cannot empirically assure full-inclusion, non-coercion, etc. 
Moreover, the rules of discourse are idealizing such that they direct participants inwards the 
ideal of rationally motivated consensus. A discourse, in which the voices of all concerned are 
included, in which no argument is arbitrarily excluded from consideration and in which only 
the force of the better argument prevails, will result in a consensus on the basis of reasons 
acceptable to all. In real life, where time is limited and participants are prone to error and 
coercion, discourses will only ever approximate these ideals to a greater or lesser degree.
395
 
Yet these ideals are regulative—they serve as “a critical standard against which every actually 
realized consensus can be called into question and tested.”396  
The circularity objection entails that rules of discourse (especially rule 2. c) and 3)) have 
prima facie moral significance and cannot count as a non-moral premise in an argument for 
(U).
397
 The implication of this circularity objection for discourse-theoretic accounts of human 
rights is that formal conditions of discourses (e.g. equality, symmetry and reciprocity in 
Benhabib’s account, and reciprocity and generality in Forst’s account) already presupposes a 
moral standpoint and corresponding understanding of ‘good reasons’. As a consequence, only 
those moral viewpoints that are compatible with the recognition of communicative freedom 
and their reasons enter into discourses. So, the objection goes, discourse-theoretic 
justifications are mired in circularity.  
Benhabib acknowledges that there is circularity in this reasoning but she claims that it is 
not a ‘vicious circle’.398 Rather the circularity in discourse ethics is the hermeneutic 
circularity of practical reason. Practical reason is different from theoretical reason in the sense 
that it cannot start from uncontested first principles.
399
 Benhabib argues an essential feature of 
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reasoning in morals and politics is that we always assume some understanding of equality, 
reciprocity and symmetry in order to frame the justificatory enterprise. Hence it is 
unavoidable to have some normative presuppositions if we are engaging in the enterprise of 
justification at all.
400
 According to Benhabib any justification of human rights, will 
presuppose some conception of human agency, of human needs, of human reason, as well as 
making some assumptions about the characteristics of our social-political world. While 
Gewirth and Griffin build their justification of human rights on a conception of human 
agency, Rawls’s project of developing ‘public reason’ presupposes that the late-modern world 
is characterized by inevitable pluralisms and the burdens of judgment as well as by the 
presence of distinct (liberal, decent hierarchical, outlaw) societies.
401
 Therefore, what 
distinguishes discourse-theoretic justifications of human rights from other justificatory 
strategies is not that they make normative presuppositions but that they presuppose 
‘communicative reason’ in the justification.  
Another possible response to the circularity objection is to drop the ambition of justifying 
moral premises on the basis of non-moral premises. Forst takes this route. According to Forst, 
one of the central insights of Kantian moral philosophy is that a categorically valid morality 
requires an unconditional ground.
402
 Morality requires an autonomous justification which is 
based not on prudential or empirical reasons but on moral reasons only. The implication of 
this for human rights, according to Forst, is that a moral justification of human rights should 
be based on moral reasons only. Grounding morality (exclusively) on moral reasons, does 
mean, though, that the discourse theory of morality won’t be in a position to convince the 
moral sceptic, but that may be too much to ask for any moral theory.
403
 Forst is very clear on 
this issue. For him, moral justification is not a matter of providing a “moral skeptic” with a 
reason to be moral.
404
 Even if the question of how to convince a moral skeptic does not arise, 
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4.6.2   The critique of rational consensus 
Another common objection is the criticism of the idea of rational consensus that underpins 
discourse theory. One such criticism is prominently put forward by Chantal Mouffe, 
especially with respect to discourse-theoretic models of democracy.
406
 Mouffe argues that 
discourse- theoretic accounts share with liberal democratic theory its “individualistic, 
universalistic and rationalist framework.”407 She claims that Habermas, like Rawls, denies 
that there is a paradoxical nature of modern democracies and a fundamental tension between 
the logic of democracy and liberalism. They both try to reconcile what is irreconcilable and 
they both mistakenly search for “a final rational resolution.”408 According to Mouffe, by 
perceiving the central issue of politics as one of reason and rational argumentation, 
deliberative democratic theories have a moral model of the dimension of the political and as 
such they cannot envisage the nature of a pluralistic democratic public sphere in an adequate 
manner.  
In order to assess how destructive such criticisms of the notion of rational consensus can 
be for discourse theory and to see if discourse-theoretic accounts of human rights have 
theoretical resources to answer such objections, I divide the objection of the idea of rational 
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consensus into two parts: namely a) the critique of consensus and b) the critique of reason.  
a) The critique of consensus: When Mouffe criticizes Habermasian forms of deliberative 
democracy, part of her objection is directed to this view’s aiming to solve political problems 
through a procedure of rational argumentation which aims to arrive at consensus. She 
challenges the very idea of a neutral or rational dialogue and claims that “far from being 
merely empirical, or epistemological, the obstacles to the ideal speech situation are 
ontological.”409 She uses Wittgenstein’s insights to challenge Habermas’s conception of 
procedure and his emphasis on arriving at consensus (rather than persuasion, for example) as a 
result of reasoned argumentation.
410
 She argues that pluralism is not merely a matter of fact as 
Rawls envisages but an axiological principle.
411
 Nor are conflicts empirical impediments that 
prevent the realization of consensus as Habermas envisages. Instead, she argues that conflicts 
are constitutive of all communication and deliberation and as such they are central to politics. 
Deliberative democracy should acknowledge the dimension of power and antagonism, which 
are ineradicable. Otherwise the utopia of a neutral and rational consensus not only remains 
unrealistic but it also becomes a dangerous utopia because the pursuit of consensus in practice 
masks and serves power.  
Mouffe’s alternative proposal is an agonistic model of democracy or what she calls 
“agonistic pluralism.”412 The main question of democratic politics for her is not the elimination 
of power but to constitute forms of power that are compatible with democratic values. For the 
basis of this alternative view, Mouffe makes a distinction between “the political” and 
“politics”:  
By “the political,” I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in all human 
society, antagonism that can take many different forms and can emerge in diverse social 
relations. “Politics,” on the other hand, refers to the ensemble of practices, discourses and 
institutions that seek to establish a certain order and to organize human coexistence in 
conditions that are always potentially conflictual because they are affected by the dimension 
of “the political.”. . .  [The fundamental question for democratic politics], pace the 
rationalists, is not how to arrive at a rational consensus reached without exclusion, that is, 
indeed, an impossibility. Politics aims at the creation of unity in the context of conflict and 
diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an “us” by the determination of a 
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“them”.413 
In Mouffe’s formulation the political (the dimension of antagonism) is a relation between 
enemies whereas politics (the dimension of agonism) is a relation between adversaries. An 
adversary, Mouffe says, is a legitimate enemy, “an enemy with whom we have in common a 
shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of democracy.”414 It is this part of Mouffe’s 
argument—the alleged transformation from antagonism to agonism via some ethico-political 
principles—that is frequently criticized by proponents of deliberative democracy.415 They 
claim that contrary to what Mouffe claims, her agonistic pluralism presupposes a notion of 
consensus. Mouffe acknowledges that pluralist democracy demands a certain amount of 
consensus but she claims that it concerns only some ethico-political principles and those 
ethico-political principles can only exist through many different and conflicting 
interpretations so that the consensus about them is bound to be a “conflictual consensus.”416 
The question is then how enemies turn to adversaries if they do not agree on some values of 
democracy and what (moral) status these ethico-political principles have. 
Apart from exposing the presupposition of consensus underlying Mouffe’s notion of 
agonistic democracy, another way of responding to such objections that discourse theory 
relies on consensus is the argument that it is possible to incorporate conflict and dissent in 
discourse theory. Benhabib, for instance, claims that the motivation for moral discourses 
indeed arises when “the certitudes of our life-worlds break down through conflict, dissent, and 
disagreement.”417 Discourses are indeed initiated when there is a disagreement on the validity 
of a statement. In other words, there is always room for dissent; for saying ‘no’ within the 
discourse. Benhabib also notes that discourses are not simply “hypothetical thought 
experiments or conversation chambers we choose to enter into or exit at will, they are 
reflexive dialogues the need for which emerges out of the very real problems of our life-
worlds.”418  
Forst also claims his account allows for dissent rather than pure consensus as the basis of 
morality especially in virtue of the fact that his right to justification includes a veto right: 
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These two criteria [criteria of reciprocity and generality] taken together confer upon moral 
persons a basic, if qualified, veto right: the basic right to justification. This veto right is 
“qualified” in the sense that the moral appeal as “veto” itself must observe the criteria of 
reciprocity and generality. Consequently, on the basis of this fundamental right, human 
rights are established as rights that no one can reasonably—that is, with reciprocal and 
general arguments—reject and deny others. The advantage of this negative formulation lies 
in the fact that it makes use of a qualified, instead of a simple, criterion of consensus that 
allows us to assess the justifiability of different positions in cases of dissent.
419
 
Therefore it may be argued that discourse-theoretical accounts of human rights like 
Benhabib’s and Forst’s have the potential to incorporate elements of dissent and conflict in 
society. In this way, it is possible to move beyond the interpretations of Habermasian 
discourse theory as one based on a positive notion of consensus.
420
 However, Forst’s 
formulation of the veto right remains underspecified: he does not demonstrate how the cases 
of dissent can be accounted for within the framework of the right to justification. In chapter 6, 
I will offer an interpretation of Fort’s right to justification as ‘a right to resistance’ and I will 
argue that real-life struggles can be understood as instantiations of the right to justification in 
the form of resistance to bad justifications. This interpretation, I will argue, makes the implicit 
potential of discourse-theoretic accounts of human rights to incorporate dissent and conflict 
into the foundations of human rights explicit by exposing how the contestations and conflicts 
over right-claims can be interpreted as demanding justification and resisting bad justifications 
of the policies, institutions, and laws one is subjected to. In this way, the cases of dissent and 
conflict over rights can be accounted for by the right to resistance and consequently dealt with 
more precisely. Although discourse theory makes room for disagreement and conflict to enter 
into discourses, they are nevertheless forms of ‘reasonable disagreement’. This brings us to 
the second part of the critique, namely the critique of reason. 
b) The critique of reason: Apart from pointing to the tension between consensus and 
conflict, Mouffe’s objection to Habermasian theory of deliberative democracy relies on the 
critique of the emphasis on rational deliberation in Habermas’s discourse theory of morality: 
One of those approaches, the aggregative model, sees political actors as being moved by the 
pursuit of their interests; the other, the deliberative model, stresses the role of reason and 
moral considerations. Both of these models leave aside the central role of ‘passions’ in the 
creation of collective political identities. In my view one cannot understand democratic 
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politics without acknowledging passions as the moving force in the field of politics.
421 
Mouffe argues that not only rational arguments and reasonable claims but also emotions, 
passions and different identity positions should be included in the public political sphere. She 
claims that “[b]y privileging rationality . . . [we] leave aside a central element, which is the 
crucial role played by passions and affects in securing allegiance to democratic values.”422  
Although Mouffe directs her critique of reason mainly to Rawls’s theory of political 
liberalism and Habermas’s theory of deliberative democracy, similar objections are also 
raised against Forst’s account of morality by other scholars. For example, Andrea 
Sangiovanni argues that not only rational deliberation and action but also social emotions and 
particularly the emotion of empathy grounds morality.
423
 In reply, Forst argues that in his 
account he does not claim that in order to be a rational agent or person at all one needs to 
follow the precepts of morality. His position is more modest, he suggests: to be fully 
reasonable in a practical sense, one must be willing and able to give reasons for one’s morally 
relevant actions.
424
 He agrees with Sangiovanni that a certain form of empathy belongs to 
being a responsible moral agent. However he does not think that emotions in general and 
empathy in particular have any grounding role. “The kind of empathy required for morality”, 
Forst claims, “is a form of reasonable empathy, guided by principles such as treating like 
cases alike, treating all persons equally and so on.”425 This can be interpreted that passions 
can be used in explaining one’s behavior but they do not do any justificatory work. Extending 
Forst’s reasoning in his response to Sangiovanni to his account of human rights grounded on 
the right to justification, one can argue that not only reasoned argumentation and deliberation 
but also passions enter into actions which can be considered within the realm of the politics of 
human rights. Rage and anger against injustices and wrongs can motivate political actions of 
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standing up to those wrongs. Nevertheless, passions would not do any justificatory work in 
the construction of the moral right to justification.  
The upshot of the debate is that discourse-theoretic accounts of human rights can be 
criticized for focusing on the role of consensus and the exchange of reasons in the justification 
and politics of human rights. In chapter 6, I shall argue that it is possible to develop an 
account of discursive democracy and human rights that is more contestatory (that is including 
elements of conflict) than an exclusive emphasis on reasoned debate and consensus. For this, I 
suggest an interpretation of Forst’s notion of the right to justification as a right to resistance. 
This interpretation will push the discourse-theoretic conception to the agonistic direction 
thereby not making it susceptible to objections that it is consensus-centric. The critique of 
reason, on the other hand, remains as an objection to my account too. Yet, in my view this 
does not need to concern us, since I believe, as I have argued in this section, that this critique 
can be properly responded to.   
4.7    Conclusion  
In the last three chapters, I have examined three different theoretical approaches to human 
rights in the philosophical literature: the naturalistic conception, the political conception and 
the discourse-theoretic conception of human rights. I have examined various versions of each 
conception. I also reflected on the implications of each conception for the cases of the right to 
housing and the right to work. Given the diversity of different views, it appears to be 
inconceivable that there would be a plausible conception of human rights which is coherent 
and cogent with a normative grounding as well as justifying a more than minimum set of 
rights including the rights claims I have focused on as human rights. The next step is an 
attempt to propose such a conception. Before that, however, there is one more step to take 
which is to examine the fundamental objections to the idea and human rights discourse in 
general and socio-economic human rights in particular. If the approach I propose can take into 
account these objections and answer the relevant ones, it will become more attractive 
theoretically and more effective practically. In the next chapter, I therefore turn to 
examination of some fundamental objections to human rights. 
 
 
5    Critiques of Human Rights 
 
5.1     Introduction 
It is repeatedly stated that human rights have become the lingua franca of modern politics. 
The notion of human rights is increasingly used by many groups to articulate their demands 
and protests. However, this increased prominence of the discourse of human rights has been 
accompanied by a growing skepticism about the value and political efficacy of rights. 
Skepticism about human rights takes various forms ranging from the wholesale rejection of 
morality to the claim that human rights are not a logically coherent idea; from claims that 
although human rights are an appealing moral idea, in practice they turn out to be ineffective 
or, even worse, an instrument of domination and oppression, to claims that not individual 
rights but considerations of social utility, community and solidarity should be prioritized. 
These forms of skepticism are not necessarily mutually exclusive, instead they can go 
together. 
 In chapters 2, 3 and 4, I discussed some objections raised against the naturalistic, 
political and discourse-theoretic conceptions of human rights respectively. These objections 
were not targeting the very discourse of rights but rather the specific conceptualizations of 
human rights as natural rights, political rights or according to the discourse theory of morality. 
In this sense, one can call those objections to human rights internal objections, as they are 
objections within the framework of a certain conception of human rights. In this chapter I will 
examine external objections to the very discourse and framework of human rights. These 
objections attack what are perceived to be core assumptions of a theory of human rights, 
namely that rights principles are abstract, individualist, ethnocentric, bourgeois.
426
 These I 
will examine in section 5.2. Given that I am focusing on the right to work and the right to 
housing, I will, in section 5.3, focus on critiques that are specific to socio-economic rights 
since they are more under fire than civil and political rights. Finally, I will examine how the 
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relevant insights from these critiques can be incorporated into our thinking about the notion 
and politics of human rights (5.4). 
5.2     Objections to human rights in general 
When the rights of man were formulated at the end of the eighteenth century, first in the 
United States and then in France, they were criticized by conservatives with the claim that 
they were disastrous for the existing social order. Aside from conservatives of the day such as 
Edmund Burke and Joseph de Maistre, the idea of the rights of man was also criticized by 
radical thinkers of the time, most famously by Karl Marx. These critiques have continued to 
be influential until today not only among some conservatives and communitarians but also 
among the political left.   
Below, I shall consider some early and contemporary objections to the idea of human 
rights under four headings: the abstraction objection, the individualism objection, the 
ethnocentrism objection and the (capitalist) ideology objection. I will also briefly assess how 
the different conceptions of human rights I have discussed so far, are vulnerable to these 
objections. These objections are not mutually exclusive; instead they are closely connected 
and can go together. Neither is this list of objections exhaustive: rather I will limit myself to 
objections that I deem important that a conception of human rights needs to take into account. 
In the next chapter, I will offer an account of human rights which, I will argue, withstands 
these objections.  
5.2.1   The abstraction objection 
The abstraction objection to human rights has been voiced by various scholars. As Onora 
O’Neill claimed, despite grave differences of view among them, Burke, Bentham, Hegel and 
Marx, all criticized certain ethical theories, in particular theories of rights for being too 
abstract.
427
 Burke, for instance, attacked the abstract formulation of the ‘rights of man’ in his 
1790 essay “Reflections on the Revolution in France.” He thought that the abstract 
formulation of rights made them practically ineffective. Burke asks: “What is the use of 
discussing a man’s abstract right to food and medicine? The question is upon the method of 
procuring and administering them. In that deliberation I shall advise to call in the aid of the 
farmer and the physician rather than the professor of metaphysics.”428 Burke accused 
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proponents of the abstract rights of man being metaphysical rationalists or “speculatists” who 
believe that political practice should be guided by theory.
429
 He argued that the realm of 
politics is complex involving contingency and depending on particular historical and spatial 
circumstances. Political judgments need to take into account these particular and concrete 
circumstances rather than taking an abstract and universal standpoint. Burke also criticized the 
abstract formulation of the subject of human rights. For Burke, there was no such a thing as 
an abstract man and his rights but only socially determined people and their rights created by 
their particular history, tradition and culture.
430
 Both conservative and radical critiques of 
Burke’s time agreed with some aspects of Burke’s criticism of the abstract subject of rights of 
man. One of the most notable adversaries of the French Revolution, Joseph de Maistre in 
criticizing its declaration and constitution stated that: 
The constitution of 1795, like its predecessors, has been drawn up for Man. Now, there is no 
such thing in the world as Man. In the course of my life, I have seen Frenchmen, Italians, 
Russians, etc.; I am even aware, thanks to Montesquieu, that one can be a Persian. But, as 
for Man, I declare that I have never met him in my life.
431
  
Hence, the conservatives of the time were criticizing the talk about abstract rights of man and 
they were putting emphasis on the superiority of national rules and rights.  
When Burke was criticizing the abstract formulation of the rights of man and their 
subjects, he was pointing to the positive aspects of rights, i.e. they are products of local 
conventions and rules rather than derived from abstract ethical principles. Later, Hannah 
Arendt took up Burke’s criticism of the rights of man in chapter 9 of her 1952 book The 
Origins of Totalitarianism.
432
 Here, she agreed with Burke’s double insight: first that all 
rights depend upon laws, and second that all political legislation, hence the protection of 
rights, inescapably has a local character.
433
 Arendt, herself being forced to flee Nazi 
Germany because she was Jewish, was one of the earliest thinkers who recognized the 
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dramatic transformations in the traditional understanding of rights with the rise of masses of 
refugees and stateless people after the Second World War. She objected to the fact that the 
modern concept of human rights merely repeats the traditional declarations of the eighteenth 
century despite the crisis that the idea of human rights faces in the totalitarian regimes of the 
20
th
 century.  
Arendt claimed that the conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence 
of a human being as such, breaks down at the very moment when we are confronted with 
people who have lost all their qualities (e.g. their citizenship, social status) and specific 
relationships except their humanity. “The world found nothing sacred in the abstract 
nakedness of being human.”434 Abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was the 
greatest danger for the victims of extermination and concentration camps, for stateless people 
and refugees. The human being who had lost her place in a political community, her political 
status in the struggle of her time, and her legal personality, is left with those qualities which 
can become articulated only in the sphere of private life and reduced to “mere existence” in 
all matters of public concern.
435
 Refugees, stateless people, asylum seekers and internally 
displaced people of the world are deprived of their “right to have rights” in Arendt’s famous 
formulation.
436
 Therefore, Arendt’s criticism of abstract human rights was that unless those 
ideas are connected with the political status of being the bearer of rights as a citizen they 
would remain “philosophically absurd and politically unrealistic claims.”437 
The charge of abstraction is also popular in recent Hegelian and Aristotelian views 
which stress the importance of virtues or particularities of different traditions and 
communities against universal moral principles.
438
 What is the reasoning behind the charge 
of abstraction?   
First, it is a charge against the importance given to principled thinking in moral matters. 
Ethics of principles in general and the theories of human rights in particular are often 
charged with “formalism and emptiness of practical reasoning that invokes principles or 
rules.”439 This charge of empty formalism is frequently levelled against Kantian ethics. It is 
said that the Kantian principle of duty in the Categorical Imperative lacks the determinate 
                                                          
434
 Ibid, emphasis added. 
435
 Ibid., 301. 
436
 Ibid., 341, 343. 
437
 Arendt, “The Rights of Man”, 34 quoted in Menke, “The ‘Aporias of Human Rights’,” 739. 
438
 See, among others, Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers, Vol. II 
(Cambridge University Press, 1985); Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (London: 
Duckworth, 1981); Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982). 
439
 O’Neill, “Abstraction, Idealization and Ideology in Ethics,” 57. 
implication of action. Hence, one interpretation of the abstraction charge can be directed to 
the abstract principles of the rights, duties, etc. which do not give determinate answers as to 
how to behave in particular contexts. Those who criticize abstract, universal principles such 
as human rights defend local customs, practices and experiences against abstract principles. 
In this respect, the abstraction objection is connected to the universalism and particularism 
debate about moral reasoning in general and about human rights in particular. A universalism 
of abstract moral principles applying to everyone, everywhere and anytime is contrasted with 
particular norms and local conventions. 
Second, as mentioned, Burke also criticized the abstract formulation of the subject of 
rights; the abstract view of man isolated from particular social and historical environments. 
As O’Neill argues, most of the time the abstraction objection is not directed only to the 
abstraction away from historical and social features but is also directed to the idealization of 
human agents in ethical and political theory. In this sense, she argues for a distinction 
between abstraction and idealization and claims that abstraction in itself is neither 
objectionable nor avoidable. The idealized perceptions of the human agent such as rational 
economic man, ideal moral spectators, utilitarian legislators underlying ethical theories, on 
the other hand, might be objectionable.
440
 These complaints about the abstract view of the 
subjects of rights form the core of Hegelian and Marxian criticisms of “abstract 
individualism” which resurface in recent objections to deontological liberalism.441 I shall 
consider this individualism objection in the next sub-section.  
5.2.2   The Individualism objection 
Another classic critique of rights which continues to be influential in contemporary objections 
to human rights, especially among the political left, is Marx’s critique of rights. Similar to 
Burke, Marx also thought that not abstract man but only concrete individuals, who are 
historically and socially determined by their class positions, exist.
442
 In his work entitled ‘On 
the Jewish Question’ where Marx presented his famous attacks on the idea of the rights of 
man, he hints at the rights as being also individualistic. Looking at the representation of the 
so-called ‘rights of man’ in late eighteenth century first in the United States and then in 
                                                          
440
 Ibid., 56. 
441
 See Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 
442
 Although both Burke and Marx criticized the abstract subject of the rights of man, their respective viewpoints 
were radically different; Burke’s critique was a conservative and particularist one in the name of history of past 
tradition and concrete communities whereas Marx’s critique was a universalist and revolutionary one in the 
name of the forward-looking history and true universality to be realized in the future against the false 
universality of human rights.  
France, Marx asks “Who is homme as distinct from citoyen?”: 
Let us notice first of all that the so-called rights of man, as distinct from the rights of the 
citizen, are simply the rights of a member of civil society, that is, of egoistic man, of man 
separated from other men and from the community.
443
 
This paragraph is usually taken to be the heart of Marx’s radical critique of the rights of 
man―that of civil and political rights. Marx had the conviction that the idea of the rights of 
man provides a cover for the dissociation of individuals in society. Marx derives from these 
propositions a series of consequences for specific rights about the status of opinion, in 
particular religious opinion, liberty, equality, property and security. Freedoms of opinion and 
expression, according to Marx, are the spiritual equivalents of private property. Liberty 
defined in negative terms, as that of an individual’s right to do everything that harms no one 
else, is concerned with “the question of the liberty of man regarded as an isolated monad, 
withdrawn into himself.”444 The right to property makes every men see in other men the 
barrier to his freedom instead of the realization of his own freedom. Finally, the right to 
security, “the supreme social concept of civil society; the concept of police”, serves as an 
assurance of the egoist man (his person, rights and property).
445
 In sum, Marx denounces the 
rights of man as he claims that none of the so-called rights of man go beyond egoistic man, 
beyond man as a member of civil society—that is, an individual withdrawn into himself, 
separated from the community. 
Burke and Marx criticized the abstract and individualist representation of the idea of the 
rights of man especially as they were proposed by the natural rights ideologues of their time. 
The doctrine of natural law was part of the early liberalism evolving under particular 
historical circumstances and major social transformations of the late seventeenth century such 
as the struggle against absolutism, the rise of the bourgeoisie, the reformation of the church 
and the decline of the traditional and hierarchally structured view of the world which is 
legitimated metaphysically. The objections of Burke and Marx that the rights of man are 
abstract, individualist and ahistorical echoes the objections raised by the proponents of the 
political conception against the naturalistic conception which I examined in section 2.5. The 
defenders of the political conception argued that the idea that human rights are rights all 
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people have—at all times and places— is too abstract and ahistorical and irrelevant to 
contemporary practices of human rights. Instead, they argued, human rights should be 
understood as part of international law and practice. However, the contemporary 
communitarian and Marxist objections to the discourse of rights not only attack the 
conception of human rights as natural rights but they are also attacking the very conceptual 
framework of rights within liberal political theory. When they criticize the abstractness and 
individualism of rights their target is the atomic conception of the person and the way the 
relationship between the individual, society and state is conceptualized within the liberal 
political theory. In this sense, the metaphysical abstractedness of the naturalist position and 
the legal positivist position of the practical view (especially the principle of the priority of 
right over the good which I will discuss below in connection to Rawls) fall within the same 
liberal corpus that is criticized. Communitarian and Marxist critics have different perceptions 
of the actual ‘nature’ of the person which they claim is ‘misread’ by liberal theory. But what 
they have in common is that they both criticize that the normative focus is attached to the 
‘liberal self’ and the fact that liberal political theory is concerned with the defense of the 
rights of this individual which is herself an artificial product of the theory.
446
 
Now, contemporary liberalism today proves to be a multifaceted set of (sometimes 
conflicting) political theories and doctrines with fundamental methodological and normative 
differences. Therefore, keeping in mind that liberalism is not a homogenous political and 
moral theory, one can argue that contemporary radical critiques of rights are directed to one 
particular version of liberalism and its conceptualization of power, namely pluralist liberalism 
and a juridical understanding of power.
447
 Correspondingly, the critique of the atomistic 
conception of the human being is directed especially to the liberal conception of the nature of 
the human which underlies the liberal theory of rights and the contract theory of the state. 
According to the liberal contract theory of the state, the political institution of the state is the 
outcome of a contract among free, equal and autonomous persons. The individuals entering 
the social contract have their identities and interests formed at a pre-political state of nature. 
Hence, the question of politics is a question of creating a legitimate political power and 
setting limits to it. Rights protect the agents’ freedom, circumscribing the individual which 
the state power shall not cross. In fact, according to Locke, we will “agree to leave the state of 
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nature—in which our freedom and equality and the sanctity of our life and property are 
protected by the law of nature—if we can take our natural rights with us.”448 Hence, liberal 
theory is dominated by a negative conceptualization of rights and freedom. Freedom is being 
free from power, and rights are protections against the infringement of this freedom. Of 
course this ideal juridical view of power is an ideal-type and the idea of the state of nature is 
not taken to be literally true. However, the critiques of the liberal conception of rights argue 
that this conceptualization of power and rights is dominant within the liberal theory of 
rights—both in early natural rights theorists such as Hobbes and Locke and within 
contemporary approaches such as Rawls’s.449 
Without doubt, contemporary naturalistic conceptions have evolved a lot since the natural 
law views of Hobbes and Locke. There has been a process of secularization of the idea of 
natural law and there is no longer an explicit reference to a transcendental moral order. 
However the naturalistic conceptions continue to ground human rights on the notion of the 
ethical-personal autonomy of the individual. Human rights are seen as protection of an 
individual’s interests and (ethical) autonomy to pursue what he/she considers to be good. The 
defenders of the political conception criticize ethical justifications of the naturalistic 
conceptions (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.5.1) whereas communitarians and Marxists criticize the 
placement of the normative importance on the individual.
450
 However, as I will argue below, 
this critique can be directed not only against the naturalist conception but also against the 
political conception.  
Political liberalism asserts the deontological principle of “the priority of the right over the 
good” at the face of plurality of comprehensive worldviews. The aim of political liberalism, in 
Rawls’s view, is to provide a political framework that is neutral between such comprehensive 
worldviews. Nevertheless, they also face the critique of atomic individualism. For instance, 
Charles Taylor, one of the contemporary communitarian critics of liberal theory’s 
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450
 For instance according to Griffin’s theory there are no moral group rights so he argues that we cannot talk 
about human rights for groups such as self-determination, etc.  
understanding of the ‘self’ argues that atomism represents a view about human nature and the 
human condition which renders the doctrine of the primacy of rights plausible.
451
 Similarly, 
when Rawls used the theory of social contract in a modified form for constructing the 
principles of a theory of justice, there was a range of immediate objections that linked it with 
the atomistic perception of the individual.
452
 Using Taylor’s thesis that liberal deontological 
theories are based on “situationless” and atomistic concepts of the subject, Michael Sandel 
provided a critique of Rawls’s theory of justice.453 He argues that Rawls’s theory is based on 
a conception of an “unencumbered self.” The parties of the original position, Sandel argues, 
are based on a “philosophical anthropology”; on a conception of the self as “a pure, 
unadulterated, essentially unencumbered subject of possession.”454 Rawls’s self is a subject of 
possession that has ends, values and conceptions of good and is not identical with these. The 
identity of this individuated self is antecedent to its environment and is not constituted by its 
relation to its surroundings and other selves. Moreover, Rawls insists on the essential plurality 
of human subjects with different ends and he faults utilitarianism for not taking the 
distinctiveness of people seriously and treating the whole society as one person.
455
 The 
plurality, Sandel claims, is essential for the idea of contract whether real or hypothetical 
because only a plurality of people can form a contract; I cannot, except in a metaphorical 
sense, make a contract with myself. However, Rawls unties the parties to the original position 
from their individuating characters by the assumption of the veil of ignorance. The 
assumption of the veil of ignorance means that the parties are assumed to be deprived of any 
knowledge of their place in society, their race, sex, or class, their wealth or income, their 
intelligence, strength, or other natural assets and abilities. Nor do they know their conceptions 
of the good, their values, aims, or purposes in life. Yet, these make the parties to the original 
position apparently identical parties. It, therefore, is not clear how the principles of justice are 
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agreed by way of a contract, even though it is a hypothetical one. In this sense, Sandel argues, 
Rawls’s principle of “the priority of the right over the good”, with the underlying theory of 
the self (constituted prior to communal ties and values) and the contractarian account of 
justification to be “puzzling and problematic.”456  
Similarly, international lawyer Martti Koskenniemi argues that the principle of the 
“priority of the right over the good” results in “a colonization of political culture” by 
technocratic rights- language that leaves no room for articulation of values and interests that 
are not translatable into that language.
457
 The rights-language, he argues, is based on an ideal 
of autonomy that perceives social conflict and morality in terms of interpersonal relationships: 
“for every right there is a correlative duty, and for every duty, there exists a correlative 
right.”458 But, there are many normative demands that cannot be reduced to the duty-right 
relationship; for example, religions impose duties without designating correlative rights. Nor 
can aspirations to virtue or personal excellence, civic virtue or citizenship be translated or 
reduced to rights-language. Moreover, rights-talk perceives the matters of social and cultural 
goods such as peace, art, clean environment, health, education, etc. to be a matter of private 
interests and rights of the individual which fails to grasp the social meaning of those goods. 
Hence, to the extent that they can be classified within this broad framework of the 
conceptualization of the individual and her rights within (pluralist) liberal theory, the 
communitarian critique of human rights can be directed to both naturalistic and political 
conceptions of human rights. Discourse-theory of morality, on the other hand, is not subject to 
the individualism objection to the degree that it sees issues which are matters of 
intersubjective conflicts to be matters relevant for morality. This is connected to the 
Habermasian division between morality and ethics. I will not get into that discussion for the 
moment. What is relevant for my discussion at this moment is that within the discourse theory 
of morality in general and the discourse-theoretic account of human rights in particular, the 
moral norms and principles are justified through a process of intersubjective justification 
rather than from the standpoint of a solitary individual. For this reason, the discourse-theoretic 
conception of human rights is not subject to the individualism charge, at least not to the same 
extent as naturalistic and political conceptions are.  
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5.2.3   The ethnocentrism objection  
The ethnocentrism objection to human rights usually refers to their being Western. The 
criticism that human rights are Western usually takes two forms. The first form is about the 
historical genesis and normative validity of the notion. The concept of a right individuals have 
as human beings historically originated and evolved in the context of the secularization and 
modernization of the European community. Other communities did not have such a concept 
and tradition. The second form is about the ideological role of human rights: human rights 
reflect Western values and interests, they are used as a tool by Western societies to dominate 
non-Western societies (in this form criticism can be varied: human rights are (neo)colonial, 
imperial, capitalistic, etc.).  
Criticism based on various combinations of these two forms of the claim that human 
rights are Western has been provided prominently by postcolonial scholars. They argue that 
the discourse of human rights is permeated by assertions of the moral and civilizational 
superiority of the West. Imperial and exploitative ambitions are concealed by the ideological 
use of the term human rights. For instance, in her essay “Human Rights in the 21st century: 
Take a Walk on the Dark Side”, Ratna Kapur argues that there is a dark side to the project of 
human rights. She claims that the abstract universality of human rights is in fact, a 
“discriminatory universality”. Claims to universality and inclusion of the Enlightenment 
project co-existed with exclusion and subordination; when Europe was in the midst of a 
struggle for liberty, equality and freedom, Europe’s ‘Others’ continued to be subjugated by 
colonialism and slavery.
459
 She claims that advocates of human rights need to embrace this 
colonial history. Asserting the universality of human rights while at the same time ignoring 
this dark side—the historical reality that the project of human rights incorporated (and 
continues to incorporate) arguments about the racial and religious superiority of the West— 
turns it into a “hegemonising move.”460 Another post-colonial thinker, Upendra Baxi, makes a 
similar point. He claims that the modern conception of human rights was based on the 
“discursive devices of Enlightenment rationality” which were in fact devices of “violent 
social of exclusion”. The ‘Rights of Man’ were human rights of all men capable of 
autonomous reason and will; and vast numbers of human beings were excluded by this 
peculiar ontological construction.”461 Post-colonial thinkers, like communitarians, also make 
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an objection to the “liberal subject” that lies at the heart of the human rights endeavor. This 
subject is “free, unencumbered, self-sufficient and rational, existing prior to history and social 
context.”462 They also pointed that ‘the Other’ of the liberal subjects are excluded from the 
human rights project. In connection to human rights project this ‘Other’ is addressed at least 
in three ways: they are assimilated, tolerated or rejected. Hence the proclaimed universality of 
human rights in practice continued discriminatory practices. 
As mentioned in chapter 2 (especially sections 2.3.2 and 2.5) the ethnocentrism or 
‘parochialism’ objection has been frequently raised against the naturalistic conception of 
human rights. It is argued that the perception of the nature of the human person underlying the 
naturalistic conceptions is one that is biased towards one worldview (Western or liberal) and 
cannot be held by other worldviews. For instance, Griffin’s theory of human rights is 
grounded on the notion of normative agency which Griffin acknowledges as a value of the 
Enlightenment project of human rights. As discussed with respect to the criticisms of ethical 
justifications, it is subject to criticism if this emphasis on autonomy and agency will be held 
by non-Western or non-liberal worldviews. For instance, some people can give more 
importance to their duty to their community or a deity than their autonomy. It was exactly 
because of this possibility—of being perceived to be ethnocentric from various worldviews— 
that Rawls rejected the grounding of human rights on a religious or ethical perception of the 
nature of the person (what I called following Liao and Etinson, the ordinary moral reasoning 
concern in section 2.5.1).
463
According to Rawls, if the law of peoples were justified by 
ordinary forms of moral reasoning, whether religious, philosophical, or moral, this may render 
the law of peoples unacceptable from the point of view of some well-ordered peoples who 
hold incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral views. The alternative to the political 
conception was either denying the necessity to provide any justification of human rights (e.g. 
Raz’s position) or accepting the moral importance of human rights yet leaving the matter of 
moral justification of both human rights or the international system of human rights open and 
unaddressed (e.g. the positions of Beitz, Pogge).  
However, I think the options for philosophical thinking on human rights given the charge 
of ethnocentrism is not necessarily between ‘no justification at all’ and ‘an ethical justification 
with ethnocentrism charge’. It is possible to provide a moral and non-ethical justification of 
human rights which does not rely on a religious or ethical perception of the nature of the 
person. The moral justification of human rights on the right to justification provided by Forst 
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is such a justification.  
As I discussed in section 3.6, Forst argues that focusing on the role of human rights as 
setting limits to sovereignty and standards for legitimate intervention is misleading as it 
misses the intranational purpose of human rights, namely their role in setting standards of 
internal political legitimacy. Rather, he argues, the primary perspective of human rights is 
from inside; human rights provide reasons for arranging a social and political structure in the 
right way; they do not provide concrete specifications for the arrangements of a society. Even 
the views labelled political tend to neglect that the primary perspective of human rights is 
from the inside, about the conditions and grounding of the internal legitimacy of a social and 
political structure. They rather take the perspective of an outsider who observes a political 
structure and asks whether there are grounds for intervention (as Beitz and Raz argue).  
Grounding human rights on the right to justification, on the other hand, captures the 
political and social meaning of human rights as standing against older and modern forms of 
oppression and social exclusion. The moral point of human rights does not only lie in the 
protection of normative agency but also in expressing our normative agency and autonomy in 
a practical sense as norm-givers. The right to justification, in Forst’s view, is a right to ‘count’ 
socially and politically, to be authors as well as subjects of rights. The understanding of 
human rights primarily from the point of internal legitimacy immunizes this conception of 
human rights from the charge of ethnocentrism without losing its moral authority. In Forst’s 
words: 
Thus it is possible for a conception of human rights to avoid the objection that it is an 
external invention or that it has an ethnocentric character without thereby losing its moral 
authority. Beyond contextualist particularism bias and context-indifferent globalism, this 
conception locates the primary goal and the meaning of human rights where they belong: in 
the heart of political discussions and conflicts about a more just social order — one that 
actually justifies itself to those who are its subjects.
464 
In the next chapter, I will defend a democratic account which justifies human rights on the 
right to justification interpreted as a right to resistance. Relying on Forst’s justification 
strategy, the democratic account withstands the ethnocentrism objection to the extent that 
Forst’s strategy of justification is immune from this objection.465 
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the history of Western modernity and the moral development in the West. I will not go into this discussion here 
as it is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
5.2.4   The ideology objection 
The bourgeois nature of human rights is critically analyzed most famously by Marx. As 
mentioned in the previous section, in his early essay On the Jewish Question, Marx argued 
that the rights of man as distinct from the rights of citizens were an insurance for the egoistic 
man in civil society: egoism, individualism and private property were central to the idea of the 
rights of man. Another aspect of Marx’s detailed and nuanced critique of rights was that the 
rights of men were the dominant ideology of the bourgeois revolution. He argued that the 
ideal of universal rights of men promoted the class interest of the bourgeoisie in reality. 
Following Hegel, he claimed that the French Revolution split the unified social sphere of 
feudalism into a political domain which is confined to the state and a predominantly economic 
one, a civil society. The individuals were ‘freed’ from the communal bonds of the ancien 
régime and became atomized.
466
 In this context, the idea of rights of man and the principle of 
equality and liberty of all men are presented as ideological fictions whereas in reality they 
served to sustain the daily existence of exploitation and oppression. In his later works 
Grundrisse and Capital in which Marx examines the laws of capitalist production, he unfolds 
the connection of the ideas of equality and freedom to market exchange. He argues that the 
idea of formal/legal equality facilitates the constitution of the worker-capitalist relation and 
commodity production. It is required, for the capitalist accumulation to take place that 
capitalists and workers freely match in the market. The worker is free in the double sense: “as 
a free individual he can dispose of his labour-power as his own commodity, and that, on the 
other hand, he has no other commodity for sale, i.e. he is rid of them,  he is free of all the 
objects needed for the realization of his labour-power.”467 Marx describes how the natural 
rights of man, liberty and equality work in a market where self-interest rules in these words: 
The sphere of circulation and commodity exchange, within whose boundaries the sale and 
purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the 
exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer 
and seller of a commodity, let us say of labour-power, are determined only by their own free 
will. They contract as free persons, who are equal before the law. Their contract is the final 
result in which their joint will finds a common legal expression. Equality, because each 
enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they 
exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his 
own. And Bentham, because each looks only to his own advantage. The only force bringing 
them together, and putting them into relation with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and 
the private interest of each.
468  
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Hence, Marx argues that abstract notions of freedom, equality and rights of men, in reality, 
worked for the constitution of the ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie within the 
capitalist system.  
The bourgeois aspect of human rights is central to contemporary Marxist and post-
Marxists criticism of especially liberal human rights discourse which gives a certain emphasis 
on the right to private property. Some critics of human rights argue that in the era of global 
capitalism, the discourse of human rights is used to legitimize the economic interests of 
powerful states. Marx’s ideology critique is especially relevant when we think about the 
discussion of socio-economic rights. We can see that within the naturalistic conceptions of 
human rights the questions about socio-economic rights are treated mainly as questions 
relevant to conceptual matters (whether material substance is necessary for agency, freedom) 
unconnected to the structural economic relations. Whereas in Rawls’s system of rights socio-
economic rights are treated as derivative rights required to secure civil rights. In Habermas’s 
system of rights socio-economic rights similarly have a derivative status (“can be justified 
only in relative terms”) to secure political rights.469 These strategies result in the prioritizing 
of civil and political rights and attesting a secondary level to socio-economic rights which are 
derived from civil and political rights. The democratic account which I defend in the next 
chapter does not have this hierarchical conceptualization of negative/positive or socio-
economic/civil-political rights. Hence, it will include socio-economic rights in the list of 
human rights and not as a ‘derived’ right. Before moving to this democratic account in the 
next chapter, let me analyze these conceptual objections to socio-economic rights in more 
detail in the next section.  
5.3     Objections to socio-economic rights 
Modern human rights declarations have extended the list of human rights to include ‘new’ 
rights which are usually categorized as socioeconomic or welfare rights. The final clauses of 
the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights include several such rights which are 
further elaborated in the UN’s International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights. They include rights to social security, including security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability or old age, rights to food, housing and clothing, rights to 
medical care and education. They also include the right to work, to free choice of 
employment, to just and favorable conditions of employment and remuneration, to protection 
against unemployment, to form and join trade unions, to rest and leisure, including periodic 
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470
 
5.3.1   Historical background 
Social rights pose a significant conceptual difficulty and practical challenge to the 
construction of rights as individual entitlements. Hence, their inclusion among human rights 
has been a source of controversy. Although inclusion of socio-economic rights in 
international statements of rights is historically recent (hence they are sometimes called ‘new’ 
rights), the idea is that there have always been struggles for their recognition as human rights. 
Some historical background can be illuminating to see that what is counted as a human or 
natural right has always been a matter of controversy and debate. When the demand of the 
rising bourgeoisie was voiced in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen which limited those rights to males and free tax-payers, in other words, to male 
property owners, simultaneous demands also arose from the working and dispossessed 
classes.
471
 There were demands for social equality and social rights during the 18
th
 century 
revolutions. Gracchus Babeuf and his friends who defended the idea that the revolution of 
1789 should be completed by a social revolution, claimed, in their Manifesto of Equals, a 
community of goods, “the common enjoyment of the fruits of the world”. They claimed that 
all differences among people other than sex and age need to be eliminated and there should be 
common food and common education for all.
472
 The French constitution of 1793, in contrast 
to the 1789 Declaration, included general suffrage and the right to public office for all males. 
It also included an original statement of social rights in this form: “Public relief is a sacred 
debt. Society owes maintenance to unfortunate citizens, either procuring work for them or in 
providing the means of existence for those who are unable to labor.”473 This was the first time 
that ‘the right to work’ and ‘right to social security’ for those who cannot work was included, 
in an implicit manner, in a constitution. Nevertheless, this constitution could not be 
effectuated and supplemented by the Constitution of 1795 after the defeat of the Jacobins.
474
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 Jacobins or the Jacobin club which was formally called the Society of the Friends of the Constitution (1789–
92), or Society of the Jacobins (1792–94) was one of the most famous political groups of the French Revolution. 
Led by Maximilien de Robespierre, Jacobins became identified with extreme egalitarianism and violence and 
they led the Revolutionary government from June 1793 to July 1794. 
The principle of the “right to work” (droit au travail) was established after the February 
Revolution of 1848 and its provisional government created “National Workshops” for the 
unemployed. Up to and after the founding of the International Workingmen’s Association 
(First International) in 1864, many workers’ associations and workers’ parties in Germany, 
France, England and Russia struggled for various rights and freedoms ranging from extension 
of the civil and political rights to proletarians and women, to freedom of association, to the 
right to health care, from the banning of child work to free child care and even free libraries. 
Therefore, demands for social rights have historically been connected to demands for political 
rights for the working classes and from the nineteenth century onward, radical and reformist 
socialists alike called for redefining the liberal agenda to include increased economic equity, 
the right to organize trade unions, child welfare, universal suffrage, restriction of the workday, 
the right to education and other social welfare rights.
475
  
5.3.2   Contemporary philosophical critiques 
It is important to bear in mind this historical record and that some of the struggles for 
universal suffrage, social justice and worker’s rights—principles endorsed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (articles 18-21) and in the two international Covenants adopted 
by the United Nations in 1966—were socialist in origin.476 After the Second World War, 
especially with the rise of modern welfare states throughout the Western countries, socio-
economic rights entered the mainstream corpus of human rights. However, the representation 
of welfare rights as human rights proved to be controversial and has been the subject of 
persistent philosophical skepticism. We can classify objections to socioeconomic rights under 
(not mutually exclusive) three headings: the nature-of-rights objection, the practicality-
justiciability objection and the urgency-importance objection. Let me present and analyze 
these objections here in turn. 
According to the nature-of-rights objection, to speak of a right there must be a correlative 
duty. A rights claim entails a corresponding duty and obligation assigned to others: either a 
person/peoples or an institution. However, people who raise this concern argue that with 
respect to socioeconomic rights there are no clearly identifiable duty-bearers. Bernard 
Williams articulates such a worry specifically for labor rights. He argues that the fact that 
having the opportunity to work is a good thing does not mean that people have a right to 
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work. “The problem is: against whom is this right held? Who is to be blamed if it is not 
observed?” 477 Onora O’Neill, too, articulates such a concern; she argues that in order to talk 
about a right there must be corresponding identifiable duty-bearers (either all others or 
specified others). In the case of classic liberty rights the duty-bearers are all others and the 
duty is a negative duty of non-interference. However, in the case of socioeconomic goods 
(perceived as human rights) it is not possible to talk about the corresponding duty of all others 
of non-interference. There must also be positive action of other peoples or institutions to 
supply the goods in question.478 Maurice Cranston also thinks that it is not only the case that 
for every right there must be a duty bearer but human rights are universal and hence they are 
claims against all other individuals. My right to life for instance imposes a duty on all other 
individuals not to threaten my life. Socio-economic rights, on the other hand, are claimed 
from particular states or particular political communities so they are not universal in this 
sense.479 
The practicability objection is concerned with the practical possibility of guaranteeing 
socio-economic rights. Cranston argues that practicability is the “first test” of both rights and 
duties. I cannot have a duty to do what is physically impossible for me to do. One cannot be 
said to have a duty to save a child drowning in the Charles River in Cambridge if that person 
was not at Cambridge at the time the child was drowning. This is equally true of duties; if it is 
impossible for a thing to be done, it is absurd to claim that it is a right. And, he claims that 
political and civil rights are not difficult and costly to institute. They require a system of law 
and simple legislation that recognizes those rights and negative duties on the part of other 
people: do not injure, arrest or imprison the person, “leave him alone: let him live as he 
decides to live and enjoy what is his; let him speak, meet with others, publish what he wishes, 
and worship as he chooses.”480 However, Cranston claims, it is different with the case of 
socio-economic rights; governments need to have access to great wealth to enforce them 
which is impossible to have. “How can governments of those parts of Asia, Africa, and South 
America, where industrialization has hardly begun, be reasonably called upon to provide 
social security and holidays with pay for the millions of people who inhabit those places and 
multiple so swiftly?”481  
Another objection to socio-economic rights, related to the practicability objection, which 
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comes not from philosophers but legal scholars, is that they are not judicially enforceable or 
they are not justiciable.
482
 For example, in her work on social rights in the South African 
Constitution, Erica De Wet argues that meaningful judicial review is possible only if these 
rights are guaranteed as individual subjective rights, in other words, only if having the right to 
housing means that an individual can go to court and receive an order awarding him a house. 
De Wet asserts that the normative contents of social rights are too vague to be legally 
enforceable: a court would have no judicially discoverable standards by which to measure the 
state’s compliance. She claims that the core values of political and civil rights, on the other 
hand, are more easily ascertained.
483
 
Finally, the urgency-importance objection takes various shapes. Cranston, for example, 
asserts that social and economic rights will not pass the test of “paramount importance”: “it is 
a paramount duty to relieve great stress, as it is not a paramount duty to give pleasure.”484 
Williams also offers arguments as to why socio-economic rights are not of the same 
paramount importance as civil and political rights. He believes that the clearest cases of 
human rights violations are those that amount to “unmediated coercion” and the violation is 
gross such that avoiding such coercion has urgency.485 According to the importance-urgency 
objection, it is not to deny socioeconomic goods have importance but rather that there is a 
hierarchy of importance. Nevertheless, the importance attached to socio-economic goods does 
not qualify them as human rights but as mere ideals or moral aspirations. Cranston and 
Williams also voice a political concern that thinking about socio-economic rights in terms of 
human rights decreases the effectiveness of the human rights discourse and thus may render it 
ineffective even when it is appropriate (i.e. for civil and political rights).486 
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5.3.3   Responses to the philosophical critique 
Various responses can be given to these objections. The immediate response is perhaps to the 
importance-urgency claim: material goods are essential to human life perhaps even more so 
than civil and political goods. A person lacking basic material necessities of food, clothing, 
shelter and health care would not be able to enjoy civil and political rights such as freedom of 
movement and public speech. Hence the test of paramount importance is not plausible to 
discredit socio-economic rights. Perhaps this is why even the minimalist theories in the 
contemporary human rights literature incorporate the basic welfare rights (like material 
subsistence) necessary to have agency, freedom, dignity into the corpus of human rights. 
The nature-of-rights and practicability objections pose greater difficulty on the part of 
socio-economic rights. Yet, some responses can be, and have been, given. With respect to the 
nature-of-rights objection for instance, one can argue against the aforementioned connection 
between rights and duties. It might be argued that rights are not (1) necessary claims for 
actions of others, hence imposing duties (negative or positive) on the part of others and (2) 
rights do not entail duties but give reasons for the imposition of duties. (1) It can be asserted 
that they are instead, claims to resources (of course duties on the actions of others can follow 
from this claims of resources). This is particularly important with respect to socio-economic 
goods. When Locke asserted that there is a natural right to property, he argued that it is 
justified on the basis of “ownership of the person”. This is also called the self-ownership 
argument: “every man has a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but 
himself”. Following from this right to one’s body, he said the fruits of the labour of that body 
are also the property of the person: “The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we 
may say, are properly his.”487 However the labour of the body interacts with natural materials 
to produce these fruits. At the face of the conditions under which those natural resources are 
scarce and unevenly distributed between people, one can claim entitlement to those resources.  
Risse, as mentioned in chapter 3, provides an account of human rights from the standpoint 
of common ownership of the earth and on that account some socio-economic human rights 
(e.g. the right to work) are justified.488 (2) Rights and duties are not two sides of the same 
coin. Rights can be seen as protections of some aspects of those interests of humans that are 
of prominent importance that they give reasons for imposing duties on others. From the 
perspective of an interest view of rights which was examined in chapter 2, one can argue that 
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there are rights which are derived from interests that are sufficiently important to impose 
duties on others. However, the proponents of the nature-of-rights objection hold a view closer 
to a choice perception of rights. According to the choice theory of rights having a right 
implies that the right-holder has control over another’s duty. For instance, O’Neill argues that 
there is an asymmetry between liberty rights and welfare rights. This asymmetry, O’Neill 
argues, cannot be eliminated by saying that liberty rights, too, need positive duties and 
institutional structures for their enforcement.489 This is because welfare rights are unlike 
liberty rights: welfare rights are claimable and waivable only if a system of assigning agents 
to recipients has already been established and counterpart obligations are distributed. By 
contrast, liberty rights do not need institutional structures to be claimable and waivable.490 
However, this distinction relies on a choice conception of rights. In fact, liberty-rights, in 
Hohfeldian terminology, have corresponding no-rights on the other parties. However it is 
possible to perceive human rights as a combination of Hohfeldian instances, which combine 
Hohfeldian claims, liberties, powers and immunities and are not necessarily limited to liberty 
rights. Similarly, it is possible to make a combination of choice and interest perception of 
rights and argue that the material interests of people are of paramount interest that gives 
reasons for claiming basic socio-economic goods as human rights and subsequently imposing 
duties on others.   
With regards to the practicability-judiciability concern, one of the responses is that 
perhaps immediate practicability and judiciability are not necessary for a claim to be 
considered as a human right. It is reasonable to consider the feasibility conditions for a moral 
claim (i.e. ought implies can) and one cannot be obliged to do something beyond one’s 
capacity. However, what it is in our capacity to do is a complicated question and it can be 
perfectly the case that the full realizability of civil and political rights can be as utopian as that 
of socio-economic rights. Moreover, as Amartya Sen argues, it is not a great embarrassment 
for ethical claims that they do not have the presumed precision of legal rights. The normative 
framework can allow the variations between what is called perfect and imperfect obligations 
and one can argue that some rights impose “loosely specified” imperfect obligations. Yet, 
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“loosely specified obligations should not be confused with having no obligations at all.”491 
For some rights, the obligations can be loosely specified. Still, Sen argues, imperfect 
obligations similarly correlate with rights as perfect obligations. The difference lies in the 
nature and form of the obligations not in the general correspondence between rights and 
obligations.492 The overuse of rights language and perhaps conflicting rights claims as human 
rights might undermine the effective realization and exercise of human rights. However, this 
is a matter of political judgment and strategy, not conceptual determination.493 Socio-
economic rights nevertheless might be included in the broad class of human rights, which 
impose both perfect and imperfect duties depending on the specific institutional arrangements.   
In addition, Cranston’s objection that socio-economic rights are held against particular 
governments (which are not capable of guaranteeing them) applies mutatis mutandis, to civil 
and political rights. Those rights are also held against the respective governments. Recall 
Arendt’s claim that it was the greatest danger for the victims of extermination and 
concentration camps, for the stateless people and refugees to lose their citizenship status and 
protection of their respective states. But those atrocities experienced in the twentieth century 
showed that protections of those rights have been the subject of international concern and 
protection of those rights required international coordination. Similarly, at the end of World 
War I, the Treaty of Versailles codified the concern for labor rights at the international level 
and the International Labor Organization was founded to coordinate states, workers and 
employers. This was partly a result of the labor movement’s reaction to pitiful working 
condition caused by the industrial revolution. As the markets were internationalized, the 
working conditions were also affected by the conditions of relevant markets and required 
international remedy. Without the plausibility of effective regulation of labor conditions, we 
can still hold the claim that because of global capitalism and the resulting interconnectedness 
of the local economies the wellbeing of an individual is a subject of global (and moral) 
concern.  
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5.4     Which critique of human rights? Towards a dialectical understanding 
of human rights 
What needs to be done in the face of persistent and various forms of skepticism against the 
idea of human rights in general and to socio-economic rights in particular? Can one still 
believe in the conceptual coherence and political efficacy of human rights given the fact that 
they are attacked from all sorts of directions by communitarians, conservatives, socialists, 
postcolonial thinkers, etc. for being abstract, individualist, Western, bourgeois, and so forth? 
If we cannot talk about universal human rights and worse, under the mask of emancipation, 
they serve to conceal and perpetuate oppression, exploitation and unequal relations of power, 
then shall we drop the talk and politics of human rights? This is the main the question of 
Samuel Chambers’s article “Giving up (on) Rights?” 494 Shall we give up rights? However, 
this question is in a certain sense rhetorical; even very strong critiques of rights and rights 
politics acknowledge the reality that rights are deep-rooted in our moral and political thinking 
and practices such that it is impossible to eliminate them from our moral and political 
vocabulary.  
One possible reaction to these problems associated with the notion and politics of human 
rights is to take a position of what can be called rights-pessimism. This position emphasizes 
the problems and paradoxes the language and politics of rights offer. Wendy Brown recently 
articulated a powerful example of such a position, especially with respect to the identity-based 
rights. Combining the Marxist critique of rights with a Foucauldian analysis of disciplinary 
power, she argues that rights do not advance emancipatory aims, instead they offer paradoxes. 
She argues that appeals to rights for particular groups based on differences naturalize and 
depoliticize those differences. For example, to claim rights on behalf of women, such as the 
right to abortion or right to adjudicate sexual harassment, feminists must render the category 
of women legible to liberal legal norms. Yet, to do this means, in a Foulcadian vein, to subject 
the identity of women to regulatory norms. “To have a right as a woman is not to be free of 
being designated and subordinated by gender. Rather, while it may entail some protection 
from the most immobilizing features of that designation, it reinscribes the designation as it 
protects us, and thus enables our further regulation through that designation.”495 Hence, rights 
can do more harm than good especially if they are closely bound to particular identities.  
Another position to take can be what I call moral agitation. Theorists such as Kapur and 
Rorty seem to take this position; against the essentialist idea of universal human rights they 
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propose paying attention to the ‘particular’ and taking the suffering of that particular 
seriously. The unending task that lies ahead of us is, for Baxi, “one of humanizing human 
rights, going beyond rarefied discourse . . . to histories of individual and collective hurt. . . . 
To give language to pain, to experience the pain of the Other inside you, remains the task, 
always, of human rights narratology.”496 This position slides into a moralizing direction; 
voicing moral outrage and concern for the other, it brings unmediated particularity against the 
discriminatory universality. Rorty, in a different vein, argues a similar sentimentalist attitude 
to human rights. In his anti-foundational approaches to human rights, he argues that universal 
human rights are not to be based on a belief in a “metaphysical” idea of human rationality, but 
on a pragmatic idea of sensibility to cruelty.
497
 There also some mediocre positions of 
defending an intercultural translation of values and coming to a multicultural conception of 
human rights.
498
 Or, to refer to a core “thin morality” underlying human rights that is 
shareable by all cultures.
499
 
It is my contention that it is a mistake to take generally and unequivocally one or the 
other position. For in any given case, one or more critiques of human rights may be sound, 
and also respectively the position to take might vary. One makes the situation too easy, if one 
a priori takes every single demand of human rights as a tool of emancipation or as a 
concealed attempt to oppress. One needs to look at who brings the demand, against whom and 
to what? And, if we want to keep the critical power of human rights we should not also be 
satisfied with attesting to local moralities and customs. We should examine the possibilities of 
developing a conception of human rights that is both culturally sensitive and culturally 
neutral; a conception which is universally valid and applicable to particular cases. This is 
perhaps the classic problem of the relation between universal and particular applied to the 
subject human rights. How to designate norms those are both context-immanent and context-
transcending; they have to claim validity for a particular community but at the same time hold 
up a moral-critical stance to that community. In the next chapter, I will explore the possibility 
of developing an account of human rights that has a dynamic formulation of the relationship 
between the universal and particular.  
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5.5     Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have examined some external criticism of the general discourse of human 
rights under the headings of abstraction, individualism, ethnocentrism and the ideology 
objections. I have also analyzed objections to socio-economic rights in particular. In the next 
chapter, I will argue for a democratic account of human rights that can withstand those 
objections and which can account for socio-economic rights as human rights without giving 
them a derivative status.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6    In Defense of a Democratic Account of Human Rights 
 
6.1    Introduction 
The two dominant ways of conceptualizing human rights do not properly account for the 
political significance of human rights: naturalistic conceptions slide into an understanding of 
human rights as pre-political moral principles whereas political conceptions perceive human 
rights as contingent standards of real politics. Moreover, these conceptions do not properly 
account for the political role and struggle aspect of human rights. The usual route taken by the 
naturalistic conception in order to answer whether a specific right is a human right is first to 
develop a philosophical account of human rights with ground, justification and content of 
human rights and then to compare that account with the main human right documents. Giving 
authority to moral theories in the determination of what counts as a human right, naturalistic 
approaches delegitimize everyday rights struggles (chapter 2). Political conceptions, on the 
other hand claim to emphasize practice rather than moral theory in the determination of what 
counts as human rights. However, by practice they mean the role of human rights in 
international relations, especially that of putting standards of state sovereignty and for 
legitimate intervention. In this sense, political conceptions miss the intranational purpose of 
human rights, namely their role in setting standards of internal political legitimacy, and cannot 
account for the social struggle aspect of human rights (chapter 3).  
Discourse-theoretic accounts of human rights integrate both the moral and political 
aspects of human rights within a single conception of human rights. In this sense, they open a 
new way of philosophical thinking about human rights that goes beyond the naturalistic and 
political conceptions. Moreover, they integrate a principle of democracy in the justification of 
specific rights claims: according to the discourse theory of rights, norms can claim validity 
only if they are the outcome of the discourse of all possibly affected people. So construed, the 
specific meaning and force of human rights is perceived to be the outcome of a political 
struggle within the discourse-theoretic approaches. Therefore, they fare better than the 
naturalistic and political approaches in accounting for the social struggles aspect of human 
rights (chapter 4). However, as old as the philosophical thinking on human rights is the 
persistent skepticism of the notion and politics of human rights from various schools of 
thought such as communitarians, Marxists and post-colonial thinkers. They have claimed that 
the abstract, individualist discourse of human rights did not help to eliminate oppression, 
domination and suffering and it may even perpetuate them (chapter 5). For postmodern critics, 
the discourse-theoretic accounts are not immune from these objections especially because of 
their focus on rational consensus (see Mouffe’s critique discussed in section 4.6). These 
different conceptions of human rights, the main objections raised against them and their 
implications for the two cases I focused on are summarized in Table 2 below.
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According to the naturalistic conceptions human rights are grounded in a philosophical 
anthropology or understanding of human nature which is important enough to require 
protection by human rights. Gewirth posed action and the generic goods of action (freedom 
and well-being) as the justificatory basis for human rights. Griffin posed the normative 
agency as the ground that forms the basis of human rights. Tasioulas argued that there can be 
plural grounds for human rights. Defenders of the political conception objected to naturalistic 
views for being ahistorical and not taking the practice of human rights into account in their 
conceptualizations. They take the nature of human rights to be the role they play in 
international law and practice. Following Rawls’s insight that different peoples with different 
comprehensive worldviews might not agree on the grounds of human rights but they can 
agree on the role they play, Beitz and Raz defended the view that the nature of human rights is 
constituted in their discursive role in international law and politics. Cohen and Risse, on the 
other hand, defended membership accounts of human rights whereby human rights define the 
contingent conditions of political membership in the global community. However, a dominant 
position within the political conception has been to limit the role of human rights to the 
standards of state sovereignty, violations of which can provide legitimate reasons for 
intervention. Especially defenders of the discourse-theoretic approach have criticized this 
exclusive focus on the role of human rights in international politics. Contrary to the political 
conception, defenders of the discourse theoretic accounts perceived human rights and popular 
sovereignty to be internally connected: human rights institutionalize the communicative 
conditions for democratic opinion and will formation in which the sovereignty of the people 
assumes a binding character.
501
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Table 2: Conceptions of human rights 
 
              
         Conception of  
                HR 
      
   HR 
 
 
 
 
Naturalistic conception 
 
 
Political conception 
 
 
 
Discourse-
Theoretic 
 conception 
HR are based 
/grounded in 
normative agency 
(Griffin) 
pluralist accounts 
(Tasioulas) 
their role in 
international political-
legal practice of; 
justifying intervention 
setting limits to 
sovereignty 
basic moral right 
to justification 
(Forst) 
the right to have 
rights (Benhabib) 
Mode of justification ethical  
justification (Griffin) 
monological moral 
justification (Gewirth) 
*public reason (Rawls) 
*no justification (Raz, 
Rorty) 
intersubjective 
(moral) 
justification 
Content of HR basic rights and 
practicalities (Griffin) 
*minimum list (Rawls) 
*what is in the 
conventions  
criteria of 
reciprocity and 
generality 
Duty-bearers all people Institutions; 
mainly states but also  
companies (e.g. Raz) 
all people but as a 
political 
community 
Objections to  
the conception 
*ahistorical 
*irrelevant to practice 
*it is individualistic 
*it is ethnocentric 
(especially those with 
ethical justification) 
*has no substantial 
grounding of HR 
*it is state- and 
international relations-
centric 
*it has no moral 
foundation 
(Habermas) 
*its justification is 
circular 
*it is consensus-
centric 
Implications for the 
specific rights to 
work and housing 
The moral principle or 
moral theory is 
authoritative in the 
decision whether there is 
a right to work or 
housing.  
International law and 
the role of human rights 
in setting the limits to 
state sovereignty are 
authoritative. 
Citizens’s debates 
and argumentation 
for specific rights 
are authoritative. 
 
Discourse-theoretic accounts such as Benhabib’s and Forst’s, provide intersubjective 
justification of human rights by grounding them on a moral right or principle which is derived 
from a speech-act-immanent obligation of speakers to give reasons for the validity claims they 
make in their utterances. According to discourse-theoretic accounts, rights are necessarily 
social or political from the beginning; they are not given a priori or natural. They are not held 
by individuals prior to social interaction; rather they are recognized as the presuppositions of 
intersubjective relations of collective will formation.
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 Although, in this way, discourse-
theoretic accounts can answer some of the objections like the individualism or ethnocentrism 
objections, they have been subject to other objections such as that they are circular, they are 
consensus- and reason-based.  
In this chapter, I explore the possibility of developing an account of human rights that 
goes beyond the naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights and that can answer 
some general critiques of human rights such as the individualism objection and the 
ethnocentrism objection and the consensus-centrism objection directed at the discourse-
theoretic accounts. I call this the democratic account of human rights. It is democratic in two 
senses. The first is democratic in the conceptual sense; there is an internal connection between 
human rights and democracy. The second is in the political sense; human rights have a 
political role in democratic politics. The moral grounding of human rights I offer is an 
interpretation of Forst’s basic right to justification as a right to resistance. What I propose is a 
modification of the right to justification into a right to resistance whereby I show how in 
concrete rights-struggles the abstract right to justification is instantiated as a right to 
resistance. It is my contention that in virtue of this modification it is possible to demonstrate 
how Forst’s abstract right to justification can be used in concrete political struggles for rights 
for justifying the rights claims that arise as a denial of bad justifications.   
 In what follows, I will lay out some of the key theoretical elements of such an account. 
The democratic perspective of human rights is threefold. First, it conceives an internal 
connection between democracy and human rights (section 6.2). Second, it grounds human 
rights on the right to justification, which can take the form of the right to resistance in real-life 
rights struggles (section 6.3). Third, the democratic account has an understanding of human 
rights which conceives social rights as human rights and it also embraces the political 
significance of human rights within democratic politics (section 6.4).  
The democratic account of human rights, in my understanding, has the following 
characteristics. First, it incorporates the element of dissent (in addition to consensus) and 
political contestation into the justification of human rights, hence it allows conceptualization 
of human rights as ‘struggle concepts’ justified in real-life rights struggles. Second, it does not 
make a hierarchy between civil and political human rights and socio-economic rights, 
whereby socio-economic rights have a lower status (in the sense that they are derived from 
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civil and political rights). Third, it understands human rights as constitutive of democratic 
politics. This means struggles for rights are part of democracies, democracy understood as 
including agonistic elements such as conflict, contestation and power struggles. From this 
perspective, one can think of human rights having re-iterated universality: as a constitutive 
element of democracy and an open-ended process of collective will formation, human rights 
are subject to continuous reformulation and transformation.  
It is crucial, for the purposes of this dissertation, to reflect on how the democratic account 
of human rights perceives struggles for specific rights claims in general and the cases for the 
right to work and right to housing which have been my main focus. This will be the concern 
of section 6.6. The democratic account does not fall prey neither to the ethnocentrism, 
individualism and ideology objections nor the consensus-centrism objection that is directed at 
discourse-theoretic accounts (section 6.5). Yet, other objections might still be posed to the 
democratic conception of human rights which I will briefly address in section 6.7. 
6.2    The co-originality of human rights and democracy 
The mainstream literature on human rights and democracy is to a large extent divided.
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Human rights as moral claims are universally valid; they transgress the boundaries of political 
communities. Democracy, on the other hand, takes for granted some kind of demos. This 
division can be discerned in the naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights. 
According to naturalistic and political conceptions, the question of the relation of human 
rights to democracy is the question whether there is a human right to democracy. Or is 
democracy necessary for the realization of human rights?  
As mentioned before, some prominent versions of the political conception of human 
rights do not count democratic rights as human rights.
504
 Democratic rights are not included in 
Rawls’s list of human rights (as part of a law of peoples). Similarly, Joshua Cohen makes a 
distinction between rights implied by justice and human rights and then he argues that there is 
not a human right to democracy.
505
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conception, also claims that it is unlikely that there is a human right to democracy.
506
 For the 
discourse-theoretic conception of human rights on the other hand there is a conceptual 
connection between human rights and democracy. That connection is theorized as ‘co-
originality’, ‘internal connection’, or ‘mutual constitution’. I have discussed Habermas’ thesis 
that human rights and popular sovereignty are internally linked within the reconstruction of 
the system of rights before (see section 4.2.1). Here I will briefly revisit Habermas’s argument 
and then extend it to a different argument by Claude Lefort who also perceives an internal 
connection between human rights and democracy though he understands democracy 
differently than Habermas.  
In the Universal Declaration, democratic participation is in fact recognized as one of the 
human rights, whether in the less explicit form that it takes in Article 21 of the Declaration of 
Human Rights or in its fuller formulation in Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, although neither article uses the term ‘democracy’ itself. Article 21 of 
the Declaration approaches a conception of democratic political participation by stating that: 
1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives.  
2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country. 
3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall 
be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage 
and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. 
The somewhat more explicit version in Article 25 of the Covenant states that:  
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without . . . Unreasonable 
Restrictions 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and 
equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will 
of the electors. 
A number of other rights which are thought to be essential for democracy such as the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression (article 19); and the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association (article 20) are included in the Universal Declaration and following 
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covenants. Much can be said about the conception of democracy envisaged by these 
documents. The famous distinction between the concept and conception of X (applied to 
justice, human rights so far) is also applied to democracy. As a concept, democracy is 
understood to be popular self-rule; a mode of decision-making about collectively binding 
rules and policies over which people exercise control. There are also different conceptions (or 
theories) of democracy, which have different claims about how much democracy is desirable 
or practicable, and how it might be realized in a sustainable institutional form.507 
 Liberal democracy perceives some components of liberalism to be indispensable to 
democracy at the level of the nation state, such as securing basic freedoms and individual 
rights, separation of powers between executive, legislature and judiciary and the related idea 
of the rule of law, representative assembly elected by popular and periodic elections, the 
principle of limited state, and a separation between the public and private spheres. The 
experience of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes have proved, in a bitter way, that attacking 
those elements (e.g. attacking individual rights in the name of popular will, the collective 
good or the realization of a higher form of freedom, attacking the separation of powers in the 
name of people’s justice) threatened democracy itself. However there have been subsequent 
struggles between liberals and other democrats. Socialists and social democrats have argued 
that formal political rights and freedoms proved to be of limited value if major economic 
decisions taken by private institutions are beyond the control of people. In a parallel manner, 
feminists have argued that the private spheres of the family and gender relations are not free 
from power and they need democratization as well. Furthermore, under conditions of 
globalization, some commentators argued that the power of nation-states declined such that 
governments are unable to exercise the necessary authority to secure democratic outcomes or 
offer protection for human rights, most notably, but not exclusively, claims for economic and 
social rights.
508
 Instead of creating a post-cold war order that offers the prospect of protecting 
human rights through democracy and the rule of law, for some commentators globalisation 
has created the conditions for disorder, authoritarian rule beyond the territorial state, the 
reformation of the state entity and the potential for continued violations of human rights.
509
 In 
this context, some argue that “we must treat the claim that human rights and democracy share 
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a symbiotic relationship with great caution.”510 
What is important for my purposes here is to go beyond the truism that democracy is one 
of the human rights or the empirical question of whether (liberal) democracies are the most 
effective means of securing human rights.
511
 Instead, I aim to examine the conceptual relation 
between democracy and human rights without limiting the former to liberal democracy and 
the latter to civil and political rights.
512
 Is it possible to develop a conception that accounts for 
the political role of human rights as an interior criterion of legitimacy without thereby losing 
their moral importance? 
An analysis of the conceptual link between democracy and human rights, formulated 
variously as ‘co-originality’, ‘equiprimordiality’, and ‘mutual constitution’, has been pursued 
within different philosophical traditions. The basic insight that connects law and popular 
sovereignty, namely the idea that if people are subjects of the law (i.e. if the law binds them) 
they must also be the makers of it is closely associated with classical and contemporary 
republican positions. In The Social Contract, Rousseau persuasively defended that political 
legitimacy rests on the will of the people. However, Rousseau also maintained that there must 
be some constraints on democratic decisions. It was Habermas in the contemporary republican 
(Kantian) tradition, who argued for a reconciliation between the principle of (democratic) 
republicanism—the public autonomy of citizens—and the liberties of private individuals, 
between popular sovereignty and human rights.
513
 In Between Facts and Norms, Habermas 
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pursues an analysis of the “co-originality of rights and democracy” (see section 4.2).514 
Habermas argues that one cannot impose human rights as external limitations on state 
sovereignty and also cannot make human rights instrumental to state sovereignty. Instead 
there is an internal connection between human rights and state-sovereignty. As, mentioned in 
chapter 4, Habermas’s claims on the legality of human rights have been subject to objections 
from some scholars such as Pogge and Benhabib.  
Is it possible to have an understanding of the internal connection between human rights 
and democracy that does not limit human rights to the legal system or process of constitution-
making and does not limit democracy to the institutionalization of this process? I think one 
can develop such an understanding following the footsteps of French political theorist Claude 
Lefort who has also pursued an analysis of the ‘co-originality of rights and democracy’. 
In an original interpretation of Marx’s critique of rights, Lefort suggests that Marx 
himself is “captivated by the bourgeois ideology of the rights of man” which he criticized.515 
Lefort argues that Marx is mistaken in confusing the ideological dimension of rights with the 
idea of rights or in his terminology with the ‘symbolic dimension of rights’. According to 
Lefort, Marx was rightly pointing out the ideological function of right’s talk that it transposes 
and disguises the relations of domination and exploitation – which is an analysis that I 
endorse. However he ignored its symbolic dimension.  
From the moment rights of man are posited as the ultimate reference, Lefort argues, the 
language of rights (and with it a certain abstract and indeterminate conception of man as the 
bearer of rights) has become a constitutive element of political society. For Lefort, democracy 
and rights mutually suppose one another; human rights bear an internal and indissoluble 
relation to a conception of democracy. In fact, they are “one of the generative principles of 
democracy.”516 This interpretation of rights by Lefort suggests a dialectical relationship 
between their abstract universality and the concrete particularity rather than an undialectical 
opposition between the universal and the particular.
517
  
Moreover, and most important for our own purposes here, the struggle for human rights 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Kantianism than to constitutional Kantianism to the degree that human rights norms are justified democratically 
by intersubjective procedures of general and reciprocal justification instead of being derived from general moral 
principles. Nevertheless, it differs from the Habermasian type of republican Kantianism to the degree that it 
accounts for the moral content of human rights by grounding it on the right to justification. As such, it offers an 
alternative combination of moral and political constructivism.  
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makes a new relation to politics possible. Lefort emphasizes that once rights are ‘declared’, 
they belong to the sphere of the political and provide a critical principle for their constant 
reformulation and introduction of new rights. For Lefort, democracy and rights mutually 
presuppose one another in a way that the relation between the universal (the abstract idea of 
human rights) and the particular (particular needs, demand, identities) are open to contestation 
and continuous revision or reformulation.   
[Democracy] tests out rights which have not yet been incorporated in it, it is the theatre of a 
contestation, whose object cannot be reduced to the preservation of a tacitly established pact 
but which takes form in centres that power cannot entirely master. From the legal 
recognition of strikes or trade unions, to rights relative to work or to social security, there 
has developed on the basis of the rights of man a whole history that transgresses the 
boundaries with which the state claimed to define itself, a history that remains open.
518
 
The conceptual link between democracy and human rights (variously identified as co-
originality, equiprimordiality, mutual constitution, etc.) is one of the building blocks of the 
account of human rights which I argue for. This is because making the connection between 
human rights and democracy allows incorporating a principle or procedure that accounts for 
right-holders not being only subjects but also authors of rights. As I will explain in more 
detail in the next section, a democratic justification of a human right norm means that it has 
the general and reciprocal consent of those who are influenced by the norm. So construed, the 
specific meaning and force of human rights is perceived to be the outcome of a political 
struggle.
519
 
 Despite accounting for the co-originality of human rights and democracy, Habermas does 
not give a moral justification of human rights. Although he appeals to the dual nature of 
human rights in relation to law and morality, he asserts: “the concept of human rights does not 
have its origins in morality, but rather bears the imprint of the modern concept of individual 
liberties, hence of a specifically juridical concept. Human rights are juridical by their very 
nature.”520 Habermas uses a combination of the legal principle and discourse principle for his 
logical genesis of rights (see section 4.2.1). Notwithstanding his acknowledgement of the 
moral side of human rights, he does not provide a moral justification of human rights or a 
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justification of his systems of rights; instead he relies on the juridical essence of rights.
521
 
Lefort, on the other hand, does not belong to the philosophical tradition of giving 
justifications of moral principles and ideas. I will argue that it is possible to construct an 
account of human rights which combines this perception of co-originality of human rights and 
democracy with a moral justification of human rights.  
6.3    The justification: the right to resistance 
Habermas’s discourse principle is mainly a principle of consent; it emphasizes the consent of 
those affected to the norms and actions. Forst’s principle of justification incorporates dissent, 
since the right to justification accords to each moral person “a veto right against basic norms, 
arrangements, or structures that cannot be justified reciprocally and generally to him or 
her.”522 In this section, I shall argue that this negative formulation of a veto right can be 
interpreted as a right to resistance: a right to denounce unjust structures and orders one is 
subjected to.
523
 
Perhaps a clarificatory remark is in place here. When I say a negative formulation of the 
right to justification, I do not use the term negative as it is used in the distinction between 
negative and positive rights defended frequently by libertarians. According to this distinction 
a negative right is a right not to be subjected to an action and it implies that others have 
negative duties to avoid certain actions. A positive right, on the other hand, is a right to be 
subjected to an action and it implies that other people have positive duties to take certain 
actions.
524
 In contrast, when I say a negative formulation of the right to justification, I mean 
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that the basis of rights is the critique or negation of an experience of wrong treatment such as 
experience of injustice or domination. In other words, the claim of the right in question 
defined negatively (liberation from those structures that are unjust, dominates, violates rights, 
etc.). The right to justification is interpreted as a negative notion (the other or absence of 
injustice, domination) in this sense of being a reaction to what is perceived as an injustice, 
domination, etc. In the cases on which I focused in chapter 1, the participants in the real-life 
rights struggles formulate their reactions to a policy, an experience of injustice, domination, 
etc. in the form of rights claims. 
Turning back to the right to resistance, the emergence of the right to resistance and right 
to revolution is a long-term and complex process that goes back to Greek tyranicides and 
Monarchomachs. The classical political theorist Josiah Ober argues that the revolutionary 
uprising of the citizens of Athens in 508-507 BC was an important moment for the 
establishment of the form of government that would soon come to be called dēmokratía. 
Using Hannah Arendt’s imagery, Ober argues that the Athenian revolution “marks the 
moment at which the demos stepped onto the historical stage as actor in its own right and 
under its own name”.525 
Discussions about rights to resistance and revolution have been made during other 
revolutionary moments in history such as during the French Revolution, the Glorious 
Revolution and the American Revolution among others. The right of revolution was included 
in the preface to the French Constitution of 1793. This preface contained a declaration of the 
rights of man and citizen including right to rebellion in §35: “When the government violates 
the rights of the people, insurrection is for the people, and for every portion thereof, the most 
sacred of rights and the most indispensable of duties.”526 Similarly, it was expressed in the 
United States Declaration of Independence in 1776 that the people were “endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights” and could alter or abolish government “destructive” 
of those rights.
527
  
Philosophers of the period such as Locke, Kant and Hegel supported revolutions historically. 
Nevertheless, they (especially German idealists) were reluctant to incorporate an explicit right 
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in their philosophical system of rights. In Two Treatises of Government, Locke affirmed a 
natural right to revolution: 
[W]henever the Legislators endeavor to take away, and destroy the Property of the People, or to reduce 
them to Slavery under Arbitrary Power, they put themselves into a state of War with the People, who are 
thereupon absolved from any farther Obedience, and are left to the common Refuge, which God hath 
provided for all Men, against Force and Violence. Whensoever therefore the Legislative shall transgress 
this fundamental Rule of Society; and either by Ambition, Fear, Folly or Corruption, endeavor to grasp 
themselves, or put into the hands of any other an Absolute Power over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates 
of the People; By this breach of Trust they forfeit the Power, the People had put into their hands, for 
quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the People, who have a Right to resume their original Liberty.
528
 
The historical support for revolution stemmed from the idea that when there was an oppressive 
order and a tyranny it is legitimate to overthrow (through revolutions) that order and to put in 
place a new social order. Most nation-states are formed through such revolutions or wars of 
independence. However, when an order is put in place such as a state and a constitution is 
formed, there is no place for a right to revolution within that constitution. The rule of law is 
constructed through the historical fact of revolution but the right to revolution as part of that 
law cannot be justified formally.  
I shall offer a weaker moral right to resistance as the ground of human rights in the sense 
that the grounding right to justification when it is not honored entails a right to resistance. I do 
not put it as a right to revolution for the following reasons. Contemporary rights struggles 
which is the main starting point of this dissertation, do not target the central state power in the 
sense of overthrowing the social order and its political authority and building a new one. Yet, 
it is also not a priori denied as a possibility that combination of different forms of resistance 
accompanied by mass support can turn into a revolution in some political conditions and 
historical circumstances. Nevertheless, I take it to be that it is a sense of being done injustice 
and wrong, which sparks the struggles for rights. Rights are not just matters of giving consent 
to norms and institutions imposed on one, but they are also matters of dissent: a matter of 
raising a veto against unjust norms and institutions and an aspiration to change it.  
If we recall Forst’s foundational right to justification:  
The insight into the principle of justification corresponds to a practical insight into the 
fundamental moral right to justification of each person (and the unconditional moral duty of 
justification), a right that grants persons a moral veto against unjustified actions or norms.
529
   
Forst acknowledges the social aspect of human rights, namely that whenever they are 
claimed, they have been a voice of protest to forms of oppression and/or exploitation. 
According to Forst, this social aspect of human rights can be analyzed on the basis of the 
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principle of justification: 
Claims for social equality and recognition, in whatever particular language they have been 
expressed (and they always come in a “thick” form), did and do follow a dynamic that can 
be analyzed; on the basis of the principle of justification: in social and political conflicts; 
people questioned the reasons that could no longer, in their eyes, legitimate existing 
relations of power and domination. 
530  
The negative interpretation of the right to justification as a right to resistance can then be 
formulated in the following way:  
1) The (ideal) moral right to justification entails a right to resistance in non-ideal 
circumstances if the right to justification is not honored. 
In circumstances of social and political conflicts, people pose a claim that reasons given for 
the forms of oppression or exploitation are not good reasons (they do not fulfill the criteria of 
generality or reciprocity or they are denied to be given at all), and therefore their right to 
justification is not honored. In these contexts, the resistance of people (whether it is 
formulated in terms of rights or justice) is grounded on their right to justification. This can 
also be seen as the moral right to justification is the fundamental principle of morality and in 
practical (non-ideal) circumstances in which this right to justification is not fulfilled a right to 
resistance is justified. 
This formulation requires some elucidation. By ‘non-ideal circumstances’, I mean 
concrete forms and practices of justification where a justification that can gain the assent of 
all affected people is not given. The moral right to justification is an abstract right that 
transcends the concrete practices of justification aiming at an ideal justification that gain 
assent by all free and equal people. This moral right to justification when not fulfilled (the 
ideal justification is not given) serves as “a deep normative grammar of social conflict and 
emancipatory aims” by providing a structure of asking for better justifications.531 So in my 
understanding the ideal right to justification is a ‘regulative idea’ that imprints a critical power 
to concrete practices to search for better justifications.  
A more radical formulation can be:  
2) The fundamental right to resistance (which is prior to the right to justification) 
entails both the right to justification (engaging in discursive forms of action of 
demanding and giving reasons) and non-discursive forms of action (e.g. civil 
disobedience, mass revolt, etc.). 
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In other words, one can argue that the right to resistance rather than the right to 
justification is the fundamental or the grounding right. I do not endorse such a position, 
because in my view, the right to justification as Forst constructs it has firm-enough 
grounding and it allows to account for a right to resistance in virtue of the fact that it 
incorporates a veto right.  However, there are some scholars who perceive the right to 
resistance to be the fundamental or basic right that underpins all human rights.  
Costas Douzinas, for instance, seems to hold such a position. He argues that there is “an 
indelible right to resistance” and revolution as the modern expression of free action has 
become a normative principle.
532
 For Douzinas, there is a pre-discursive and metaphysical 
source of the right to resistance.
533
 Then, the question is how this fundamental right to 
resistance is grounded? Douzinas talks of two “metaphysical resources”, the publicly 
recognized will and a right founded contra fatum on “a will that wills what does not exist.”534 
But, in his formulation this source or sources remain mysterious. He sometimes talks about a 
moral idea of autonomy that motivates individuals to resist existing forms of domination and 
oppression. At the same time although these individual starting points of resistance from a 
concern for autonomy are collectivized, there always remain an excess which is not 
incorporated in the legal form. This excess gives the dynamic that the right to resistance 
always returns; hence there is “the eternal return of resistance and revolution.”535 To avoid 
this elusive and mysterious concept of the source (or sources) of the right to resistance, I 
suggest the following formulation. 
3)  The (ideal) moral right to justification entails a right to resistance in non-ideal 
circumstances if the right to justification is not honored. The right to resistance can 
be claimed in discursive and/or non-discursive forms.  
In practical contexts, the right to justification is instantiated as a right to resistance, a negation 
of bad justifications of, for example, policies, rules, social structures one is subjected to. 
Therefore, each person’s right to ask for reasons for norms imposed on him or her is the 
fundamental moral right which underlies rights claims. In circumstances when people 
question the legitimacy of policies and conditions imposed on them they can ask for 
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justifications; they can ask for reasons. If they are denied justifications or they judge the 
reasons to be invalid or bad reasons, then a right to resistance is entailed in such non-ideal 
circumstances. Moreover, this right to resistance is not necessarily practiced in discursive 
forms (such as engaging in discourse, etc.) but can also take non-discursive forms (such as 
civil disobedience, blockades and occupations). Douzinas mentions that contemporary acts of 
resistance, insurrection and revolt such as in Tunis, Cairo, Athens and Istanbul did not 
demand the reopening of debate nor did they prioritize the defense of fundamental rights. 
Instead, the aim of changing the operation and scope of politics is central to democratic 
disobedience.
536
 To give another example, the residents in Dikmen Valley in Ankara that I 
discussed in chapter 1, started a meeting with the local authorities. However, in one of their 
meetings the mayor of Ankara left the meeting. Hence one side withdrew from the 
engagement in discourse and the discourse was interrupted. As a result, the residents practiced 
civil disobedience and they refused to leave their houses when the authorities came to 
demolish them. One can multiple such examples but what is important is that all these forms 
of resistance (discursive, non-discursive, reasoned argumentation or passionate performance) 
can be analyzed through the dynamic that the right to justification of the people in question 
were not honored.  
6.4    The content, universality and political role of human rights 
In the previous section, I examined the grounding right to justification of the democratic 
account which is interpreted as implying a right to resistance. Here, I will examine the 
features of the democratic account in relation to (a) content, (b) universality and (c) the 
political role of human rights.  
a) Human rights are social and social rights are human rights. Firstly, I shall explain 
why human rights are social along the democratic account. The right to resistance is a moral 
right in the sense that it expresses the critical aspiration in every situation and social order, 
that those who are wronged by the structural inequalities, oppression or discrimination in that 
situation have the moral right to dissent and act to change that structure. However, this right is 
not derived from a normative importance attached to the human individual, its agency, 
dignity, etc. Although every human individual has this right, the right and its justification are 
social in two senses. First, it is based on an intersubjective justification; human rights are seen 
as the result of intersubjective, discursive construction of rights claims that cannot be 
reciprocally and generally denied between persons who respect one another’s right to 
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justification. Second, the right is social in the sense of being a right to resist collectively 
constituted unjust social relations and structures. I will explain more about the social aspect of 
human rights when I examine the objections in the next section.  
Secondly, I will examine the feature that social rights are human rights. A justification of 
human rights on the basis of the right to justification (and hence also on the right to 
resistance) does not impose a hierarchy among different types of rights. As I mentioned in the 
previous chapter, other conceptions of human rights have a hierarchal ordering of different 
categories of rights in their justification such that civil and political rights come first and 
social and economic rights are derived from them or justified with respect to them. In the 
dominant paradigm of human rights civil rights are prioritized as genuine human rights. Some 
political rights like democratic rights and socio-economic rights even more so are thought to 
be derived from those basic rights. This is the case in political and naturalistic conceptions of 
rights and also in Habermas’s logical genesis of rights. For the naturalistic conceptions, in the 
old natural law school only negative rights, which have correlative negative duties, are 
genuine rights (recall the nature-of-rights objection to socio-economic rights). Contemporary 
versions of the naturalistic conception such as Griffin’s include basic socio-economic rights 
like the right to subsistence as part of human rights because they think it is necessary for 
agency. For the political conception the reasons for limiting the list of human rights are rather 
different; they focus on the main role of human rights as setting standards to legitimate 
intervention to internal sovereignty of states. Hence, socio-economic rights are usually not 
included in the list of human rights. The democratic account of human rights, by contrast does 
not have such a hierarchical relation between rights. If the economic structure and material 
relations of production and distribution dominant in a society creates grave injustices of 
structural inequality and oppression, there is not an a priori principle that precludes that the 
resistance to such structural inequality and oppression is articulated in a rights claim of an 
economic sort. Table 3 represents this non-derivative status of social rights within the 
democratic conception 
b) Humans rights have re-iterated universality. The interpretation of the right to 
justification—that it is instantiated as a right to resistance—allows conceptualizing the 
universality and particularity of human rights in a dialectical manner. The right to resistance is 
universal in the sense of an empty placeholder; it is a moving moral aspiration that motivates 
criticism of wrongs. It is not substantiated with a comprehensive or metaphysical worldview. 
Yet, it has a re-iterated universality; the idea of universality is re-iterated in every particular 
 
rights claim as a human right without referring to a fixed substantive content. This 
understanding of the universality of human rights gives not only to consensus and agreement 
but also to dissent and conflict a central place in thinking about both human rights and 
democracy. It also keeps the moral justification provided by Forst. In this sense it forges a 
synthesis between discourse-theoretic justification of human rights and the tradition of radical 
democracy. I will examine this feature of the democratic account in the next section where I 
review the responses to the consensus-centrism objection to discourse-theoretic accounts of 
human rights.  
Table 3: The right to resistance and the grounding of human rights 
 
Forst’s constructivist conception of                           Democratic          
human rights                                                              account of human rights 
 
                                                                                                                                               
normative ground:                intersubjective         veto right           
right to justification     justification 
  
+ 
 normative criteria:                                                                           right to resistance 
reciprocity, generality + 
                                                            
                                                                                 normative  criteria:                  
                                                                                reciprocity, generality 
                                              non-violence
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list of human rights                                                                             
socio-economic rights are derived from                                              
civil-political rights  
 
 
                                                                                                 social rights as (1st ground)  human rights     
c) Human rights are constitutive of democratic politics. An understanding of human 
rights as grounded in the right to justification as entailing a right to resistance embraces the 
political role of human rights within democratic politics. In this sense the realm of rights is 
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not conceptualized as a pre-political sphere of moral rights based on metaphysical or 
naturalistic grounds. Such naturalistic conceptions take the politics of human rights as a 
politics of implementation and institutionalization of moral human rights, their embodiment in 
law and public culture. According to the democratic account’s understanding of human rights, 
on the other hand, morality is not a realm which is pre-political or distinct from the political; 
rather morality cuts across political and practical spheres. The right to justification serves as a 
dynamic referent within political and practical contexts. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter Lefort refers to this dialectical relation 
between rights and politics. Here, it can be helpful to compare the democratic conception I 
proposed with some similar approaches to human rights such as those put forward by scholars 
like Christophe Menke, Étienne Balibar and James Ingram. All these three scholars propose 
an alternative understanding of Hannah Arendt’s view on human rights. 
According to Christophe Menke, Arendt’s criticism of the idea of human rights needs to be 
understood as “internally linked to an alternative understanding of the idea of a human right” 
whose premises “do not depend upon the traditions of modern natural law or liberalism, but put 
into question the essential, basic presuppositions of these traditions.”538 According to Menke, 
by her criticism of the declaration of human rights, Arendt was hinting to this endeavor’s 
aporetic character: equality is not an attribute of people as individual natural beings but as 
political members.
539
 Hence, demanding equal rights for human beings as natural beings who 
are essentially non-equal is aporetic. In Menke’s words: 
There are only equal rights for political members, which are thus not human rights. And 
there are only different needs or claims of human beings as natural beings, and these are 
thus not human rights. The idea of human rights is a contradiction in terms.
540
 
According to Menke, by showing the declarations’ failure to distinguish between the rights of 
man and the rights of a member of a polity, Arendt shows the urgent need to make this 
distinction rather than demonstrating that the distinction is untenable. Arendt’s famous notion 
of the right to have rights indeed makes this distinction. It delineates the one human right, the 
right to have rights that are derived from membership in a political community. Menke claims 
that, according to Arendt, this right to have rights is, as distinct from the “so-called Rights of 
Man”, indeed the “only” human right, “the one right without which no other can 
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materialize.”541 Hence, there is the one basic human right of every human being to 
membership in a political community.  
However, if this human right to membership does not already presuppose the status of 
membership but have it as its object, where can it be traced back? In other words, where is 
this right to membership founded? Menke argues that there are two premature ideas for the 
origin of this right in Arendt’s writing. The first idea is to trace back the fundamental right to 
membership to the constitution of humankind as a political entity. According to this solution 
the human right to have rights is the fundamental right brought forth by an international law 
which through mutual agreement and guarantee constitutes humankind as a ‘political entity’. 
According to Menke, this solution simply turns back the substitution of a ‘historical’ law by a 
‘natural’ law which the traditional declaration of human rights had undertaken. The one 
human right is traced back to the historical fact of a political entity of humankind. Moreover, 
the linking of the human right to have rights to an act of legislation of the political entity of 
humankind contradicts Arendt’s own insight that it was precisely the historical development 
of such an entity that dramatically aggravated the situation of the excluded and stateless, a 
situation which human rights were meant to counteract. There is no guarantee that a 
politically constituted humanity would not also commit the same acts of expatriation that are 
today done by regionally limited political communities.
542
 
A more promising source for tracing back the human right to membership, Menke argues, 
is a concept that Arendt only in passing mentions, the concept of ‘human dignity’. Arendt 
introduces the notion of human dignity to designate what lies prior to “all so-called Rights of 
Man”: “Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential 
quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from 
humanity.”543 Connecting this remark by Arendt with her other remarks about the concept of 
human dignity whose content is understood to be the politico-linguistic existence of human 
beings, Menke argues that we should provide an understanding of the concept of human 
dignity that does not relapse into the natural law understanding of human dignity as a natural 
property human beings are endowed with individually. We should break with the 
naturalization of human rights, without however, positivistically or historically equating 
human rights with the regulations of a new, postnational, international law.
544
 For this, Menke 
argues we should provide a concept of human dignity that “introduces an entirely different 
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anthropology than that of modern natural law, namely an anthropology of politico-linguistic 
form of life as opposed to an anthropology of quasi-natural “needs” or “interests”.”545  
Grounding human rights on one basic right to justification (which entails a right to 
resistance), has such an anthropology. According to an understanding of human existence as 
one of justificatory beings, human rights are predicated on a notion of dignity which is 
understood in relational terms, i.e. human beings essentially have dignity through, with and 
vis-à-vis others in their speaking, acting and judging capacities of giving and asking for 
justifications. According to the democratic account, dignity is bestowed on individual human 
beings neither by their nature, God or reason (as naturalistic conceptions claim) nor by the 
historical or institutional inscription in law (as political conceptions claim) but it is “a general 
characteristic of the human condition”; of the politico-linguistic existence of the human 
being.
546
 This aspect of the democratic account’s delineating a ground and politics of human 
rights that is alternative to naturalistic and political conceptions can be further clarified by 
taking on board some other interpretations of Arendt’s notion of the right to have rights.  
Étienne Balibar, for example, in his article entitled “Hannah Arendt, The Right to Have 
Rights, and Civic Disobedience” attempts to reconstruct what in his view may be Arendt’s 
central philosophical problem: that of “the politics of human rights and its foundation, or 
rather its absence of foundation, its unfounded character.”547 Balibar claims that according to 
a radical interpretation of Arendt’s view on human rights, dissidence—in the specifically 
modern form of civic disobedience—is made the touchstone of the founding of rights. Hence, 
according to Balibar human rights is an antimonic conception with “a principle of 
disobedience or dissidence is included at the heart of obedience.”548 To the extent that the 
principle of justification incorporates an element of resistance, dissidence, my position is 
similar to Balibar’s position. However, while Balibar defends a ‘groundless’ idea of human 
rights, I reflect this questioning of a static ground onto itself. The right to justification with its 
denial entailing a right to resistance provides a dynamic grounding for human rights. 
Finally, similar to my aim to propose an approach of human rights that accounts for the 
struggles aspect of human rights within real-life rights struggles, James Ingram also offers an 
understanding of the politics of human rights as an active, critical democratic politics from the 
viewpoint of the bearers of rights. Ingram compares this understanding of ‘human rights 
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politics as democratic action’ with two other understandings which he labels as ‘human rights 
politics as implementation’ and ‘human rights politics as right’. On the first view, which 
Ingram associates with Weber, politics involves the use of power to achieve certain ends, and 
the politics of human rights is understood as the use of power to advance the moral imperative 
of protecting these rights. However, this combination of universalistic moral aspirations with 
a statist conception of power raises the paradoxical situation that for the implementation of 
human rights for failed states a greater power than the one that is oppressing must intervene 
on behalf of those oppressed. However in this way, the call for protecting people from state 
power leads to the risk being subjected to a greater power. Moreover, this dependence of 
rights and their bearers to a superior power contradicts the idea that rights express a principle 
of autonomy and equality. 
On the second understanding of human rights which Ingram associates with Kant, human 
rights are moral imperatives which should be embodied in institutions. Here law takes up the 
burden the first view leaves to power. Habermas and Benhabib hold such an understanding: 
they see in the spread of regional and international legal regimes which limit state 
sovereignty, the chances for human rights protection. Ingram argues that although the second 
understanding offers an ideal to aim for, it offers no guidelines on how these institutions are 
to be created or maintained. In order to fill this gap between fact and norm, Ingram offers the 
third understanding of the politics of human rights as democratic action. Human rights, on this 
account are a principle internal to politics that identifies human rights politics first and 
foremost by the activity of rights claimants.
549
 
This understanding of the politics of human rights as democratic action is very similar to 
my understanding of the politics of human rights to be constitutive of democratic politics. 
Shifting the focus from morality or law to politics, democratic conception of human rights see 
the potential right-bearers as “the authors of their rights in a deeper sense—not only ideally, 
from the standpoint of justification, and not only within the framework of a constitutional 
state, but actually, as they engage in the practice of claiming rights.”550 
6.5    Responses to specific objections to human rights 
In chapter 5, I examined the most common objections proposed to human rights in general and 
socio-economic rights in particular. Some of the objections were that human rights are abstract, 
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individualist, ethnocentric and ideological. The democratic account, in my view, is not 
susceptible to these objections, at least not to the same extent as other conceptions. First, the 
democratic account is less vulnerable to the abstraction objection. Indeed, by claiming that the 
abstract right to justification is instantiated in the form of the right to resistance in practical 
contexts and within rights struggles it shows how this abstract right is claimed in practice. The 
rights struggles, in this sense, can be considered as concrete practices of justification in which 
the abstract right to justification is instantiated and concretized as a right to resistance to bad (or 
no) justifications. 
Second, as claimed above (a) in section 6.4, according to the democratic conception human 
rights are moral norms that are justifiable from the viewpoint of all those possibly affected. As 
participants in the practice of reciprocal justification—of reason-giving and reason-asking 
practice—participants are not passive recipients of rights but active authors of them. Unlike the 
classical liberal theory of rights, according to the democratic conception, human rights are not 
understood as pre-political moral rights that circumscribe the liberties of each individual from 
the interference of others and the state. Demands for rights and the right-making process is a 
relational, intersubjective process with a moral core based on the right to justification and a 
political concretization of this right in specific contexts. Hence, the democratic conception is 
not susceptible to the individualism objection because it embraces the intersubjective and 
relational aspects of human rights. 
Finally, the democratic conception of human rights does not fall prey to the charge of 
ethnocentrism. In contrast to some naturalistic conceptions, the democratic conception of 
human rights does not ground human rights on a notion of human nature or on a comprehensive 
worldview. The right to justification is neutral to any conception of the good. It also does not 
rely on an empirical or hypothetical moral denominator among different cultures. The right to 
justification is an unconditional moral right substantiated by a practical insight into the 
principle of justification and in non-ideal circumstances it implies the right to resistance. In this 
sense, unlike ethical or religious justifications of human rights, the democratic conception is 
not biased toward one conception of the good life. Demands for justification and resistance to 
injustices and oppression can arise in all societies and contexts. One cannot claim that the 
demands in the name of human rights are an imposition of Western or liberal values on non-
Western or non-liberal societies if there are internal demands and moral claims in the name of 
rights within those societies. If such societies claim to have cultural integrity and a notion of 
the common good to which human rights are foreign, that common good must be legitimate 
from the viewpoint of insiders to that society if it claims to have integrity. The primary political 
context where the moral right to justification is practiced is the domestic society. If some 
citizens raise demands for justifications of the social and political structure and policies that 
affect their rights in the currency of rights claims, one cannot say that such a demand for rights 
is an external imposition or ethnocentric.
551
 
Apart from these objections to the idea of human rights in general, the democratic account is 
not susceptible to the consensus-centrism objection raised against the discourse-theoretic 
account. To the extent that conflict and dissent over different rights claims and their 
justifiability is expressed in rights-struggles (for instance in the form of asking for justifications 
for the institutions, law and policies implemented and denouncing bad justifications), the 
democratic account can precisely incorporate elements of conflict and dissent into an 
understanding and justification of human rights due to the prominent role it assigns to the right 
to resistance. 
6.6    Revisiting the cases 
A democratic account of human rights based on the right to justification understood as taking 
the form of the right to resistance starts from practice, namely the raising of a right-claim in a 
concrete political context. However this account justifies any rights claim based on the moral 
core underlying human rights, namely the right to justification understood as a right to 
resistance. It is important to note that saying that human rights are grounded on one basic 
moral right, namely the right to justification does not mean that specific rights are ‘derived’ 
from this basic right. It only serves as a moral core, as the basis of the justification of concrete 
rights. Which specific rights claims are not ‘reasonably rejected’ is a matter of political 
construction and intersubjective establishment in the political context. So with respect to the 
right to housing and right to work claims, the point is not whether these rights can be derived 
from a right to justification, but rather whether the right to justification can serve as a 
normative referent behind the concrete rights struggles.
552
 It is my contention that it can. 
According to the democratic account, the specific force and content of human rights is 
perceived to be the outcome of a political struggle. The naturalistic conceptions, by contrast 
derive the specific rights from ethical principles or from the importance attached to humanity. 
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This assessment of specific rights claims by the naturalistic conception can be perceived as 
what Raymond Geuss calls “the ethics-first reading” of the slogan “politics is applied 
ethics.”553 According to this view, we should start studying politics by first trying to get to 
what is sometimes called the “ideal theory” of ethics and historically invariant general 
principles (such as human beings are rational, they seek pleasure and avoid pain, principle of 
utility, categorical imperative, etc.). Then, in a second step, one can apply that ideal theory to 
the action of political agents. One can also derive judgments from the theory about how 
political actors should behave. According to this view, “pure” ethics as an ideal theory comes 
first. Then comes applied ethics, and politics is a kind of applied ethics.
554
 When the 
naturalistic conceptions assess whether a specific rights claim is a genuine human right, it is 
putting into practice this ‘ethics first’ view of politics. According to this perception of politics, 
the realm of politics is subordinated to ethics; politics is the application of abstract moral or 
ethical principles (principles of right in this case) to specific contexts. Whether the people in 
rights struggles are justified in demanding a human right to X is a matter of theoretical 
resolution; whether there is a human right to X is dictated by the best available moral theory. 
The practice or actions of political agents come to the picture, at best, as a matter of 
application of moral principles to specific contexts.
555
 The democratic account of human 
rights by contrast, takes a principle or procedure of expressing consent and consensus into 
account in the construction of rights claims in the first place. 
In the two cases I discussed in chapter 1, the residents of Dikmen Valley and the TEKEL 
workers have raised claims to participate in the political structures that they are subjected to 
and which determine which rights and duties they have. In other words, they are demanding 
their right to justification. In other words, whatever the object of their right-claims (adequate 
housing, work, water, natural resources, etc.) the grounds for their demanding those rights are 
to be respected as beings with dignity that deserve justifications for the structures and 
conditions they are subject to, the right to ask for such justification and deny bad justifications 
by resistance. With respect to the case of the right to housing, one can argue that the residents 
of the Dikmen Valley were not denied their right to justification; they were given the option 
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of moving to the newly built houses. It is not the case that their right to justification is not 
respected but they are pursuing other strategic or prudential interests by resisting and refusing 
to leave their houses. It is informative to refer to an interview of Tarık Calışkan, one of the 
spokespersons of the right to housing movement in Dikmen Valley. He explains that third-
parties listening to their struggle might think that they are problem-makers and denying the 
housing opportunities offered to them by the state authorities.
556
 However, he argues that in 
the contracts that are offered to them for buying houses there is no clear indication of how 
much money, for how long and with what interest rate they have to pay in order to buy the 
houses that are designated to them. So, what they are protesting is not being part of a process 
of the determination of the conditions and discussion process of a policy which fundamentally 
affects their lives.   
Behind the rights claims in real-life rights struggles, there is a demand for justification of 
laws and institutions people are subjected to. Participants in these struggles do not find the 
reasons satisfactory and out of this dissatisfaction they protest at being unjustly treated as 
citizens and also as human beings. “They may have no abstract or philosophical idea of what 
it means to be a ‘human being,’ but in protesting they believe that there is at least one 
fundamental moral demand that no culture or society may reject: the unconditional claim to 
be respected as someone who deserves to be given justifying reasons for the actions, rules, or 
structures to which he or she is subject.”557 Hence, there is a deep normative grammar of 
social protests and struggles in which concrete demands for justification are associated with 
the language of rights.
558
 This normative grammar is the conception of the person who has a 
basic right and duty to justification which serves as a “dynamic normative referent” for 
struggles for the concrete realization of this right.
559
  
6.7    Limitations of the democratic account 
Without doubt, it will not be possible to convince everyone about the grounding of human 
rights on the right to justification (and my interpreting it as a right to resistance). First of all, 
there is the anti-foundationalist position claiming that the attempt to justify morality—whether it 
is the idea of justice or human rights— is unnecessary or doomed to failure. Doubts about 
grounds are as old as Thrasymachus’s assertion in Plato’s Republic that justice is merely 
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whatever the powerful say it is. As Forst claims, as telling as Thrasymachus’s claim is, it can 
only be true as a critical claim and hence the question of the firm ground of justice is posed 
anew.
560
 Similarly, when one asks questions of why ground human rights, we are back in the 
game of giving and asking reasons for the justification of human rights. By grounding justice 
and human rights on the right to justification this question of justification is reflected on 
itself.
561
  
One other doubt about the democratic account of human rights might be that it is an 
empty formal account. It does not say anything about the substance of human rights. It is true 
that there is an openness to the democratic conception of human rights that it does not give a 
complete list of human rights and leaves it open for the decision of people who are both 
authors and subjects of their rights and obligations. To the extent that the principle of 
justification “includes a veto right —against basic norms, arrangements, or structures that 
cannot be justified reciprocally and generally—democracy is understood as involving not only 
consensus and agreement but also conflict and contestation. Hence, the term democratic also 
signifies that the authorship of rights claims is an open process of continuous contestation, 
transformation and revision rather than a closed system of principles and procedures.”562 This 
does not mean that all rights claims including sexist or, fascist claims, etc. count as human 
rights. This is because the right to justification together with the criteria of generality and 
reciprocity serve as a filter for claims and reasons that can ‘be reasonably rejected’. 
One other matter of concern is whether the right to resistance entails the right to violent 
forms of resistance. The criteria of equality and reciprocity might already suggest that only 
non-violent forms of resistance are entailed. However, there can be non-ideal circumstances 
where violent means of resistance can ensure that a discourse is initiated. For instance, in 
extreme forms of oppression (state oppression of ethnicities, groups) oppressed ethnicities or 
groups might consider forms of armed resistance as the only way of resistance in order to 
secure that their right to justification is honored.
563
 The democratic account of human rights, 
as developed in this dissertation, does not have the theoretical resources to give a general 
answer to when violence can be justified or not.  
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6.8    Conclusion  
In this chapter I offered a democratic account of human rights which 1) by interpreting the 
right to justification as taking the form of the right to resistance in rights-struggles 
incorporates the element of dissent (in addition to consensus) and political contestation into 
the justification of human rights, hence allows conceptualization of human rights as ‘struggle 
concepts’ justified in real-life rights struggles, 2) does not make a hierarchy between civil and 
political human rights and socio-economic rights, whereby socio-economic rights have a 
lower status (they are derived from civil and political rights), 3) understands human rights as 
constitutive of democratic politics. This means struggles for rights are part of democracies, 
democracy understood to include agonistic elements such as conflict, contestation and power 
struggles. From this perspective, one can think human rights having re-iterated universality: 
the idea of universality is re-iterated in every particular rights claim as a human right without 
referring to a fixed substantive content. Furthermore, as a constitutive element of democracy 
and an open-ended process of collective will formation, human rights are subject to 
continuous reformulation and transformation. Justification of human rights on the right to 
resistance allows for conceptualization human rights in a dialectical and dynamic manner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
 
I opened this dissertation by sketching a paradox within the praxis of human rights. Human 
rights, especially since the second half of the twentieth century, have turned to a lingua franca 
of moral and political claim-making. The language of rights is invoked in various contexts 
and practices. The philosophical response to this political ‘success’ of human rights has been 
mixed. Philosophers sympathetic to human rights embarked on a process of ‘tidying’ the 
concept: cutting out its excesses, bringing determinateness to the concept, specifying the 
criteria or ‘existence conditions’ of a human right in order to restore its value. Some skeptics, 
on the other hand, take the strategic uses of human rights, especially their being arsenals of 
power with imperialistic repercussions, to be a legitimate reason to deny any emancipatory or 
critical role to a politics of human rights.  
My starting point, on the other hand, has been the perspective of those who invoke the 
language of rights in everyday political constellations and conflicts which I have called real-
life rights struggles. Whether they were deprived segments of an urban population asking for 
their right to the city, peasants or indigenous people claiming their rights to natural resources 
or workers who have lost their jobs asking for their right to work, participants in these real-
life struggles have made moral and political claims for their own rights. In chapter 1, I 
illustrated such struggles with reference to two struggles for specific rights, namely the 
struggle for their right to housing of the residents of squatter houses in Dikmen Valley and the 
protest of TEKEL tobacco workers in Turkey. Therefore, I have not assumed, from the start, 
the role of a theoretician who tries to bring determinateness to the meaning and usage of a 
concept in practice. Rather I explored which of the available conceptions could account for 
these real life struggles and how they can be modified depending on the insights gathered 
from those practices.  
Turning round the question from what theory implies for practice to what practice 
contributes to the theoretical thinking on human rights, calls for a transformation in the 
familiar ways of philosophical thinking about the justification and politics of human rights. I 
have tried to contribute to this transformation by first bringing familiar ways of 
conceptualizing human rights under critical scrutiny. I provided a taxonomy of the 
conceptions of human rights by examining them under the groups of naturalistic, political and 
discourse-theoretic conceptions. I reconstructed the essentials of each conception, examined 
the theories of the prominent defenders of each conception and elaborated on the implications 
for the politics of human rights by testing their position vis-à-vis specific rights claims. In 
particular, the specific rights claims to housing and work have been a major thread running 
throughout this dissertation. 
The main strategy of the naturalistic conception with respect to a specific rights claims 
has been to authorize the moral theory to decide whether the right in question qualifies as a 
genuine human right. Whether there is a human right to X is decided depending on the 
condition of whether X signifies an important interest or essential feature of human beings 
that requires protection, or if X is implied by the grounding value or basic principle of right 
designated by the moral theory. Hence, according to the naturalistic approach, the politics of 
human rights is perceived to be a matter of the implementation of pre-political moral rights: 
i.e. what are the most effective or efficient ways to implement moral human rights into 
practice? How are these abstract moral rights specified in practical and historical contexts? 
The implication of these for the everyday rights struggles would be that if the rights claimed 
by participants in those struggles are not implied by the best available moral theory, then 
those people are not justified in claiming those rights. These would however invoke the 
familiar objections: who has the authority to decide what human rights really are and what is 
their content? Is it legitimate to impose a list of human rights derived from one particular 
worldview on all people around the world? Things get even more complicated when one takes 
into account that different moral theories arrive at completely different contents of human 
rights even from very similar grounds. For instance, both Alan Gewirth and James Griffin 
defend a notion of agency as the basis of human rights. However, Gewirth defends an 
expansive list of human rights including the right to work whereas Griffin denies the right to 
work to be a human right. Last, but not least, there is the objection frequently raised by the 
defenders of the political conception that human rights are not ahistorical and pre-political 
moral rights but they are political-legal rights that are incorporated into international law and 
practice. 
For the political conception of human rights, on the other hand, the question of whether 
there is a human right to X is judged depending on the role such a right plays within and its 
incorporation into international law and practice of human rights. Accepting John Rawls’s 
basic insight that different nations might not agree on the grounds but on the role of human 
rights, defenders of the political conception hold the view that the main role of human rights 
is setting standards for state sovereignty violation of which justifies intervention. In my view, 
this type of political approach has some shortcomings especially from the viewpoint of those 
who struggle for their rights. First, granted the role human rights play in international 
relations and politics, this is not their sole role. Human rights also play a role in setting 
standards of internal political legitimacy. This is especially the case for the local struggles for 
rights. In those cases, whether people are protesting against an urban transformation project 
which forces them to leave their houses or against a dam or hydroelectric power plant that 
will impede their access to local water resources, they are raising a (rights) claim in the first 
instance toward their own government and its policies although there can be third parties 
involved such as local and multinational companies. Second, and related to the first problem, 
perceiving human rights as standards of internal sovereignty and legitimate intervention 
conceptualizes right-bearers as passive recipients of rights, rather than active authors of them. 
This is especially apparent when one considers the fact that according to the defenders of the 
political conception of human rights, human rights and democracy are separate issues and one 
cannot talk of a human right to democracy. Third, moving to the practice and especially the 
practice in international relations, the doctrine downplays the moral and critical aspect of 
human rights as moral aspirations to the extent that the question of the moral justification of 
human rights is not addressed by the political approach. This invokes one other frequent 
objection that human rights (without solid moral standards) are vulnerable to ideological use 
and exploitation, for instance by powerful states for their strategic aims. 
Discourse-theoretic accounts steer a middle-ground between political and naturalistic 
conceptions in as much as they perceive the question of whether there is a human right to X to 
be a matter of reasonable and mutual agreement of the community of citizens as rights-
makers. In this sense, there is an internal and conceptual (not a contingent or merely 
empirical) connection between democracy and human rights according to discourse-theoretic 
accounts. Moreover, against the background of the different types of justifications I have 
delineated, discourse-theoretic accounts of human rights (especially Rainer Forst’s account in 
this respect) provide an intersubjective moral justification of human rights. Thanks to this 
intersubjective justification of human rights, discourse-theoretic accounts are not vulnerable 
to individualism and (some sorts of) ethnocentrism objections (i.e. they do not impose one 
perception of the good life as the grounds of human rights). Although faring better than 
naturalistic and political conceptions of human rights in accounting for the struggle aspect of 
human rights, discourse-theoretic accounts have received their share of criticism. What is 
crucial for my purposes in this research is that discourse-theoretic conceptions relied on 
rational consensus and some accounts (such as Jürgen Habermas’s) do not legitimize socio-
economic rights directly but in a derivative manner. However, when the participants within 
the struggles for rights that I have focused on resisted the urban transformation project and 
defended their right to housing or when tobacco workers resisted losing their social rights due 
to a change in their contracts, the political and economic content of rights was not separated a 
priori. Rather, whatever the specific objects of the right in question are, their demand within 
everyday rights struggles signifies the expression of right-claims politically. 
In this dissertation, I explored the possibility of a transformation in our philosophical 
thinking on human rights that goes beyond these dominant ways of thinking on human rights  
transformation not only in terms of a modification in the justification of human rights but also 
a transformation in thinking of the political role of human rights. In the introduction, I 
specified two questions that have motivated this dissertation: What does it mean that a person 
(or a group of people) is justified in claiming a right? And, can questions about the nature, 
content and justification of human rights be taken in a different philosophical manner than the 
two dominant positions (naturalistic and political conceptions) such that it better illuminates 
the real-life struggles?  
To address the first question—what claiming a right in practice mean—I proposed a 
differentiation between different modes of justification (section 2.6) and the notion of 
practices of justification. I have claimed that real life rights-struggles can be understood as 
concrete practices of justification in which the right to justification is instantiated as a right to 
resistance to bad (or no) justifications. In addition, I have argued that an intersubjective mode 
of justification which takes the viewpoint of all people affected by the principles and norms 
into account, fares better  than a monological justification in taking the struggle aspect of 
human rights into account. In this way, I hope to have shown what it means for a right to be 
justified as a human right from the viewpoints of those who demand that right.  
In order to address the second question—how the nature, content and justification of 
human rights can be addressed philosophically—I offered a democratic account of human 
rights, which is an alternative to those supplied by the dominant conceptions of human rights 
in the philosophical literature. It is not an alternative in the sense that it is incompatible with 
other  conceptions of human rights (although it is with some such as those that provide an 
ethical justification). Rather it is an alternative that focuses on other aspects of human rights 
such as the struggle aspect of human rights, thereby drawing different conclusions as to how 
to justify human rights.  
As a ground for the democratic account, I suggest a right to justification, which entails a 
right to resistance in non-ideal conditions or within concrete practices of justification. The 
point of grounding human rights on a notion of resistance is to consider the dynamic role the 
politics of human rights plays through negating and contesting exclusions, oppressions and 
false universals in particular cases in the name of the universals they betray. With the 
principle of resistance an element of openness is injected into the politics of human rights that 
allows for continuous reformulation and transformation of the rights claims without losing 
their moral authority. The contributions to a democratic account of human rights laid out in 
this dissertation investigated the conditions for a justification of human rights that is not 
vulnerable to frequently raised charges against the idea of human rights such as individualism, 
ethnocentrism and the ideology objections and that provides an understanding of the 
constitutive role of human rights within democratic politics.  
Obviously, the approach defended in this dissertation has limitations of its own. First, I do 
not claim to offer a full account of human rights with a list of human rights. Rather, here I laid 
down only the underpinnings of a new account of human rights against the background of the 
alternative approaches. Compared to the critical examination of other approaches, I could 
touch on some critical aspects of the approach I am defending only too briefly. I hope that 
these beginnings will be judged worthy of further development. In any case, there are many 
issues for further research. Important questions include the forms the right to resistance can 
legitimately take; and the place of civil disobedience and violence in democratic politics 
against the background democratic account of human rights.  
Second, even granted room for further development, the democratic account I am 
offering, especially its justification, will be vulnerable to objections that condemn any 
justificatory attempt or appeals to reason as the basis of morality. Although I take such 
objections seriously and have examined some of them in this dissertation, I do not claim to 
convince all critics. Neither do I dare to offer solutions to long-lasting problems and 
controversies within political philosophy in general and within the philosophy of human 
rights in particular (controversies about the relation between universals and particulars, 
between morality and politics, about the role of reason, etc.). Starting neither from an abstract 
‘ideal’ notion of human rights nor from a ‘realist’ empirical conception, what I hope to have 
achieved is an engagement in ‘critical philosophy’ by offering an account of human rights that 
has both moral authority and practical relevance and that is open to continuous critical 
reflection. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch Summary) 
De aanspraak op mensenrechten in de politieke sfeer speelt zowel historisch als tegenwoordig 
een belangrijke rol. De taal van mensenrechten is de lingua franca geworden van de 
emancipatiestrijd en het verzet tegen moderne vormen van exploitatie en onderdrukking, met 
name sinds de koude oorlog. Dit alomtegenwoordige beroep op de politieke doeltreffendheid 
van mensenrechten gaat samen met een aanhoudend scepticisme over de emanciperende 
werking van de term ‘rechten’. Dergelijke scepticisme wordt zowel door voor- als 
tegenstanders van het mensenrechtendiscours geuit. Voorstanders zijn beducht op inflatie en 
bijbehorende erosie van de mensenrechtenterminologie. Tegenstanders zijn over de hele lijn 
kritisch over het mensenrechtenkader om verschillende redenen, zoals dat het 
individualistisch of etnocentrisch zou zijn, of dat het bestaande vormen van overheersing 
reflecteert en in stand houdt.  
Het hoofddoel van dit proefschrift is om een bijdrage te leveren aan de filosofische opgave 
een theorie over mensenrechten te ontwikkelen met een robuuste rechtvaardiging zonder de 
relevantie van echte mensenrechtenstrijden uit het oog te verliezen. De vraag hoe een 
dergelijke theorie uitgewerkt kan worden wordt besproken binnen de kaders van het 
filosofische debat over mensenrechten. Het bijkomende doel om het strijdaspect van 
mensenrechten in de theorie te verwerken wordt nagestreefd door te testen hoe de theorieën 
om kunnen gaan met twee hedendaagse casussen: het recht op arbeid en het recht op adequate 
huisvesting.  
Dit proefschrift is opgedeeld in zes hoofdstukken. In hoofdstuk 1 leg ik de basis voor een 
filosofische analyse van moderne mensenrechtenpraktijken. Het hoofdstuk concentreert zich 
op twee rechten: het recht op arbeid en het recht op adequate huisvesting. Ik schets twee 
recente gevallen van strijd voor deze rechten in Turkije (van Tabaksarbeiders en 
sloppenwijkenbewoners in de Dikman vallei, Ankara). Mijn hoofddoel in dit hoofdstuk is niet 
om een gedetailleerde beschrijving en analyse te geven van dergelijke gevallen, maar om 
praktijkgevallen van mensenrechtenstrijd te illustreren (politieke conflicten en twisten waarbij 
claims tegen de politieke en sociale orde worden gemaakt op basis van mensenrechten). Op 
basis van deze gevallen, schets ik een aantal preliminaire theoretische overwegingen, waarbij 
ik inzoom op de volgende drie punten: het formuleren van mensenrechteneisen door de 
partijen in het conflict, het rechtvaardigen van een recht in de politieke praktijk, en het aspect 
van collectieve strijd in het aanspraak maken op sociaaleconomische rechten. 
In hoofdstukken 2 en 3 bespreek ik benaderingen die in de Anglo-Amerikaanse traditie als 
dominant worden beschouwd: respectievelijk de naturalistische en de politieke concepties van 
mensenrechten. Ik beschouw de algemene eigenschappen en bepaalde prominente versies van 
de naturalistische en politieke theorieën, zoals die van James Griffin, John Tasioulas, Joseph 
Raz, Charles Beitz en Thomas Pogge. Tevens kijk ik naar de implicaties van het algemene 
perspectief op mensenrechten dat de verschillende concepties nemen voor de claim dat er een 
recht op arbeid en een recht op adequate huisvesting is. Binnen de naturalistische benadering 
is de vraag “Is er een recht op X?” een theoretische kwestie van het vinden van de juiste 
principes die deel uitmaken van de beste beschikbare morele theorie waarmee een 
theoretische rechtvaardiging van een mensenrechtennorm gegeven wordt. Aanhangers van de 
politieke benadering claimen dat deze dominante interpretatie van het filosofische project een 
rechtvaardiging te formuleren voor mensenrechtennormen irrelevant is voor de 
mensenrechtenpraktijk, of zelfs verstorend werkt. Echter, met ‘mensenrechtenpraktijk’ 
bedoelen deze schrijvers vooral de plek die mensenrechten hebben binnen het internationaal 
recht en rechtsleer, en niet de praktijk van mensen die strijden voor mensenrechten. 
Dit proefschrift is gemotiveerd met het doel om een nieuw filosofisch perspectief te 
ontwikkelen dat een morele rechtvaardiging aan mensenrechten geeft en dat tegelijkertijd 
rekening houdt met het sociale-strijd-aspect van mensenrechten.  Om dit doel te bereiken stel 
ik een modificatie voor van het discourstheoretische begrip van mensenrechten. 
Discourstheoretische concepties stellen mensenrechten en democratie voor als intern 
verbonden concepten, waarbij mensenrechten de uitkomst zijn van politieke strijd. Mensen 
zijn hierbij zowel de auteur als het subject van mensenrechten. Als motivatie voor mijn 
voorstel, beschrijf ik in hoofdstuk 4 de basisinvloeden van Jürgen Habermas’ werk over 
mensenrechten. In het bijzonder 1) zijn rationele reconstructie van het rechtensysteem binnen 
constitutionele democratieën, en 2) zijn analyse van de tweezijdige natuur van mensenrechten 
in relatie tot de wet en moraliteit. De discussie wordt gevolgd door een studie van twee 
recente discourstheoretische posities over mensenrechten van Seyla Benhabib en Rainer Forst. 
Hoofdstuk 5 verplaatst de discussie van specifieke mensenrechtentheorieën naar het 
scepticisme over het idee van mensenrechten in het algemeen en sociaaleconomische rechten 
in het bijzonder. Deze bezwaren zijn gericht op de kernaannames van 
mensenrechtentheorieën, zoals het idee dat rechtenprincipes abstract, individualistisch, 
etnocentrisch of bourgeois zijn. Hoewel er een kern van waarheid zit in deze bezwaren, 
betoog ik dat het een vergissing is om een algehele kritische positie aan te nemen jegens 
mensenrechten. Bovendien betoog ik dat een discourstheoretische conceptie ten minste 
sommige bezwaren kan vermijden die naturalistische en politieke concepties aangaan. 
 
Hoewel het de discourstheoretische conceptie van mensenrechten beter vergaat dan de 
naturalistische en politieke concepties als het om het beschrijven van de inter-afhankelijkheid 
van mensenrechten en democratie gaat, wordt het nog steeds met een aantal problemen 
geconfronteerd. Eén probleem in het bijzonder in Habermas’ positie met betrekking tot 
mensenrechten is de afwezigheid van een morele rechtvaardiging van mensenrechten. In 
hoofdstuk 6 verdedig ik een gewijzigde versie van een discourstheoretische conceptie  - die ik 
een democratische theorie noem – die a) de interne connectie tussen democratie en 
mensenrechten kan beschrijven, en b) mensenrechten fundeert in een specifieke interpretatie 
van Rainer Forst’s basisrecht tot rechtvaardiging, namelijk, geïnterpreteerd als een recht op 
weerstand. Habermas’ discoursprincipe is voornamelijk een toestemmingsprincipe; het 
benadrukt het belang van toestemming van degenen op wie de norm en actie toepassing heeft. 
Forst’s rechtvaardigingsprincipe omvat ook dispuut, doordat het recht op rechtvaardiging elk 
moreel persoon een veto recht geeft tegen basisnormen, regelingen of structuren die niet 
gerechtvaardigd kunnen worden voor hem of haar, wederkerig of in het algemeen. Ik betoog 
dat het recht op rechtvaardiging, in non-ideale omstandigheden, een recht tot weerstand 
omvat: een recht om onrechtvaardige sociale structuren waar men deel van uitmaakt af te 
wijzen. Een mensenrechtenconceptie gebaseerd op het recht om te rechtvaardigen, waarbij dit 
recht het recht tot weerstand omvat, geeft niet alleen consensus en overeenkomst maar ook 
weerstand en conflict een centrale plaats in het denken over zowel mensenrechten als 
democratie. 
 
In hoofdstuk 7 concludeer ik dat door het theoretische kader dat in de voorgaande 
hoofdstukken is ontwikkeld toe te passen op de vraag hoe een claim op een mensenrecht 
wordt aangekaart en gerechtvaardigd in de politieke praktijk, op die manier de democratische 
theorie het doel van filosofie in het denken over mensenrechten verschuift. De democratische 
theorie laat zien dat het mogelijk is om te mensenrechten te rechtvaardigen en overdenken 
zonder eerst de menselijke eigenschappen en noden te identificeren die mensenrechten 
onderbouwen – als een theoretisch kader dat losstaat van praktische overwegingen. Het laat 
tevens zien dat het mogelijk is om voorbij te gaan aan het interpretatie van de praktijk in de 
politieke conceptie van mensenrechten, namlijk dat de praktijk een zaak zijn van 
internationale relaties en wetgeving. In plaats daarvan wijst het op de rol van mensenrechten 
in interne politieke legitimiteit. Het theoretische kader dat ontwikkeld is in dit proefschrift laat 
daarmee zien dat het mogelijk is om een filosofisch perspectief in te nemen dat niet in 
tegenstelling staat tot de ervaringen van mensenrechtenstrijders, zonder de morele autoriteit 
van mensenrechten te verliezen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Curriculum Vitae 
Sine Bağatur 
EIPE, Faculty of Philosophy  ⎸Erasmus University Rotterdam  ⎸E-mail: bagatur@fwb.eur.nl. 
 
 
I am a doctoral researcher with an interdisciplinary training in Philosophy and Economics. My 
research interests are in Normative Political Theory (especially theories of justice and human rights), 
Institutional Economics and Political Economy. 
 
Education: 
 
2010- 2015         PhD in Political Philosophy, Defense: 19 June 2015. 
                              Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 
                              Thesis:  In Defense of a Democratic Account of Human Rights.    
                              Supervisors: Prof.Dr. Ingrid Robeyns and Dr. Constanze Binder. 
 
2008-2010             Research Master in Philosophy and Economics.  
                              Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands. 
                              Thesis: Are Markets Morally Free Zones? (Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ingrid 
Robeyns). 
 
2004-2007             Master of Science in Economics. 
                               Middle East Technical University, Ankara (Turkey). 
                               Thesis: Engendering Consumption (Supervisor: Prof.Dr. Onur Yıldırım). 
 
2000-2004             Bachelor of Science in Economics, Middle East Technical University, 
Ankara. 
 
2001-2004             Minor in History of Philosophy, Middle East Technical University, Ankara.  
 
Previous appointment: 
 
January 2006 – September 2006          Research Assistant – Department of Economics.  
                                                                 Pamukkale University, Denizli (Turkey).  
 
 September 2006-December 2007       Research Assistant – Department of Economics. 
                                                                 Middle East Technical University, Ankara (Turkey). 
Publications: 
 
 “Toward a Democratic Conception of Human Rights,” Theoria and Praxis: International 
Journal of Interdisciplinary Thought 2, no. 1 (2014). 
 Review of , Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice,” Feminist Economics 19, no. 2 (April 
2013): 144–148. 
  Review of Allen Buchanan’s The Heart of Human Rights, Ethical Perspectives, 
forthcoming. 
 
 
 
 
Scholarships: 
 
 The HSP Huygens Grant (≈€73k) for PhD in Philosophy at Erasmus Rotterdam University 
for the period September 2010-August 2014. 
 The HSP Huygens Grant (≈€28k) for Research Master in Philosophy and Economics at 
Erasmus Rotterdam University for the period January 2008-December 2009. 
 
Some International talks, courses, workshops and seminars attended: 
 
Presentations: 
 
  The right to resistance as the fundamental human right, Workshop on ‘Resistance , 
Disobedience and Coercion’, Bilkent University, Ankara (Turkey), May 21-22 2015.  
  Toward a constructivist conception of human rights: Beyond the naturalistic versus political 
dichotomy?, OZSW Conference, Rotterdam (the Netherlands), November 16-17 2013. 
 Toward a constructivist conception of human rights, Cosmopolitanism and Conflict 
Conference, Rome (Italy), October 11-13 2013. 
 Toward a constructive conception of human rights: beyond the naturalistic versus political 
dichotomy?, The Faculty of Philosophy Lunchtime Seminars, Rotterdam (the Netherlands), 
June 6, 2013. 
 Human Rights Politics: Insights from the Right to Housing Movement in Dikmen Valley 
District in Ankara-Turkey, The Many: History, Theory, Politics Conference, Lisbon 
(Portugal), 18-20 April 2012. 
 The Political Conception of Human Rights, PhD Students Workshop Presentation at 
EIUC Venice Academy on Human Rights, Venice (Italy), July 11-16 2011. 
 In Defense of a Historical and Institutional Approach to Markets and Their Moral 
Boundaries, EIPE PhD/Research Master Seminar, November 23, 2009. 
 
Schools and courses attended (with credits & certificates): 
 
 Summer School - Feminist Critical Analysis: Re/Producing, Consuming, Engendering - 
Inter University Centre , Dubrovnik, Croatia, 19-23 May 2008. 
 Winter School- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Onderzoekschool Ethiek (OZSE), 
Barchem, the Netherlands, 14-18 March 2011. 
 Venice Academy of Human Rights- Human Rights and the Cosmopolitan Idea(l), EIUC 
(Europen Inter-University Centre) for Human Rights and Democratisation, Lido Venice, 
Italy, 11-16 July 2011. 
 Course- Political Philosophy of Human Rights, Onderzoekschool Ethiek (OZSE), 
Utrecht, the Netherlands, 10 May-7 June 2012. 
 Course/Masterclass with Samuel Moyn-Human Rights in History, Huizinga Instituut 
(Research Institute and Graduate School of Cultural History), Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands, October 9 2013. 
 Lucerne Masterclass with Prof. Nancy Fraser- Crisis, Critique, Capitalism, Graduate 
School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of  Luzern, the Switzerland, 14-18 
October, 2013.  
 Symposium with Jürgen Habermas- The Future of Democracy-Huizinga Instituut 
(Research Institute and Graduate School of Cultural History), Amsterdam, the 
Netherlands, November 20 2013. 
 
 
 
Teaching experience: 
 
 Erasmus School of Economics (ESE), Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2015. 
Tutorials Philosophy of Economics (Dr. Attilia Ruzzene, Dr. Constanze Binder, Dr. 
Conrad Heilmann). 
 OZSW Research Master Winter School, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2014. 
  A Basic Income for All: A Policy Proposal for Distributive Justice (jointly with Willem van 
der Deijl). 
 Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics (EIPE), 2010. 
Introductory Seminar for the Research Master Students What’s Philosophy of Economics 
at EIPE? (jointly with François Claveau, Luis Mireles Flores and Attilia Ruzzene). 
 Department of Economics, Middle East Technical University, 2007. 
Tutorials Economy, Society and Civilization (Prof. Dr. Onur Yıldırım). 
 Department of Economics, Middle East Technical University, 2006. 
Tutorials Introduction to Economics (Assoc.Prof.Dr. Gül İpek Tunç). 
 
Service to the profession: 
 
 Referee for Erasmus Journal of Philosophy and Economics (EJPE). 
 Referee for Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy (ESJP). 
 Co-organizer of the Graduate Conference in Philosophy of Science (jointly with 
Attilia Ruzzene and François Claveau), Rotterdam 8-9 March 2012. 
 Co-organizer of the Public Lecture and Book Symposium with Rainer Forst (jointly 
with Sem de Maagt), Erasmus University Rotterdam 7-8 March 2013.  
 
Languages: 
 
Turkish (native), English (fluent), German and Dutch (beginner). 
 
 
